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ABSTRACT 
 
 Focusing on national politics and America’s long road to 
civil war, this dissertation presents a history of the “free 
land” idea that culminated with the passage of the Homestead Act 
of 1862.  Using primary sources such as the published papers of 
notable political figures and records of congressional debates, 
this work presents the full political history of homesteading 
from before the Revolutionary War to its ultimate approval 
during the Civil War.  
 Politicians debated how best to use and distribute public 
lands for decades before the Civil War.  While many took 
inspiration from Thomas Jefferson and called for the government 
to provide small tracts of land to settlers for free, others 
remained convinced that sales of public lands should be used to 
grow the national treasury.  Beginning with the Missouri 
Compromise in 1820, debates about land distribution reflected 
the nation’s growing sectional tensions.  Southerners came to 
gradually oppose any form of free land distribution as 
threatening to the expansion and survival of slavery. 
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 After the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, advocates of free 
land distribution were among the earliest adherents to the new 
Republican Party.  The homesteading idea was critical to 
providing cohesion within the new party at a time when many 
Republicans held differing opinions on how best to confront the 
South on slavery expansion. 
 This dissertation argues that the homesteading idea was a 
much more important national political issue than historians 
have heretofore expressed.  It was a critical element to debates 
about the expansion of slavery into the West decades before the 
Civil War and, therefore, stands as an important issue that 
contributed more to the coming of that conflict than most 
historians have recognized. 
By tracing the idea’s earliest expressions by Jefferson to 
its ultimate approval by a Republican-dominated Congress and 
president during the Civil War, this work provides a 
comprehensive history of the Homestead Act’s genesis, 
development, and impact on a century of American politics and 
life.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 In 1997, the now-defunct political magazine George 
published an article listing what it viewed as the ten most 
important legislative acts in American history.  Landmark 
laws such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the G.I. Bill 
claimed spots on the list, as did the enactment of Social 
Security and the creation of the interstate highway system. 
 The Homestead Act of 1862 landed at number three on 
this list, beaten out only by the Louisiana Purchase and 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.1  This seems an appropriate place 
for the Homestead Act to fall on such a ranking.  The 
United States first acquired much of the land eventually 
opened to settlement via the Homestead Act in the 1803 
Louisiana Purchase, which more than doubled the size of the 
nation and claimed most of the today’s Midwest as American 
territory.  
Like the Homestead Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act was 
not intended to be controversial.  Rather, it merely sought 
to establish and administratively organize the two 
territories of Nebraska and Kansas.  Only when Senator 
Stephen Douglas of Illinois inserted a measure calling for 
                                                 
1 Steven M. Gillon, “Top Ten Legislative Landmarks in U.S. History.”  George, December 1997, pp. 48-
50. 
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popular sovereignty on the slavery issue into the Kansas-
Nebraska Act—thereby negating the 1820 Missouri Compromise— 
did it become a major event on the road to the Civil War.   
Kansas and Nebraska both later saw huge numbers of 
homesteading settlers emigrate and settle within their 
borders.  More importantly, however, the Homestead Act, 
like the Kansas-Nebraska bill before it, became politicized 
as North and South marched toward war.  Southerners who 
might otherwise care little about western settlement under 
the Homestead Act instead came to vehemently oppose it, 
seeing it as nothing more than a Northern plot to populate 
the western territories with free soil settlers and prevent 
the expansion and survival of slavery.  Concurrently, 
Northerners far removed from the West who might otherwise 
care little for that region’s settlement and concerns came 
to view homesteading as a critical measure that would 
provide genuine opportunity to the homesteader while 
limiting the South’s chances to expand slavery. 
The provisions of the Homestead Act were relatively 
simple.  The law offered a qualified settler the 
opportunity to select a piece of public land up to 160 
acres in size, though claims in some prime areas were 
limited to 80 acres.  Once selected, the prospective 
homesteader paid minimal administrative costs to the 
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government, which usually totaled about eighteen dollars, 
and had to take up residence on the land within six months.  
At least ten acres of the land had to be placed into 
cultivation, and the homesteader had to stay on the 
property for five consecutive years.  Once that time had 
elapsed and all legal requirements of the Homestead Act 
were met to the government’s satisfaction, title to the 
property was permanently transferred to the homesteader. 
How and why did a relatively straightforward bill 
aimed at settling the nation’s vast interior become 
political fodder for both pro- and anti-slavery forces in 
the years preceding the Civil War?  What role did the 
homesteading idea play in the creation of the Republican 
Party and, eventually, the coming of the Civil War?  These 
are the questions this work seeks to answer.  There is no 
question that issues surrounding the Homestead Act played a 
major role in the political debates leading up to the Civil 
War.  Most historians, however, have treated the Homestead 
Act as a minor sideshow to the main act of arguments about 
slavery.  While I do not go so far as to ridiculously argue 
that the Civil War was actually fought over homesteading, I 
do propose to demonstrate that issues of land settlement, 
expansion, and homesteading played much larger roles in the 
conversations leading up to the conflict than has 
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previously been considered.  Hence, the George ranking of 
legislative acts may very well have gotten it right.  The 
Louisiana Purchase acquired the vast middle of the 
continent for the United States; the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
brought to the forefront the debate over whether that vast 
middle would be settled as free or slave territory; and the 
Homestead Act provided the means by which much of it was 
eventually settled.  This work, while focused on 
homesteading, necessarily deals with all three acts (and 
many others) and demonstrates just how closely related they 
are. Earlier ideas and debates about various land 
distribution ideas are examined as well, including: cash 
sales; credit sales; graduation (reducing prices of public 
lands available to settlers based on quality); preemption 
(allowing so-called “squatter’s rights” for those living on 
lands with no legal title to purchase the land outright in 
order to prevent anyone else from making a claim on it); 
and others. 
 
The Homestead Act was also a critically important 
issue to the fledgling Republican Party in the 1850s and 
early 1860s, and I examine this aspect of the Act’s history 
as well.  Of course, this is directly related to the coming 
of the Civil War.  As more abolitionists joined the 
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Republicans’ ranks, more Southerners came to oppose 
homesteading on principle alone—guilt by association with 
Republicans, if you will.  Early Republicans consisted of 
abolitionists, disaffected Whigs and Democrats, former 
Know-Nothings, and the castoffs of other regional parties.  
Homesteading, even more so than outright abolition of 
slavery, was one issue on which most of them agreed from 
the beginning.  Therefore, the homesteading idea was an 
important one for cementing cohesion among the first 
Republicans.   
Later, the Homestead Act became a central piece in a 
series of western bills Republicans rammed through Congress 
during the war while no Southerners were present to object.  
This represented Republicans taking full advantage of a 
prime opportunity to pass what the party viewed as 
important legislation, and the homestead bill was a 
critical law that Republicans used to determine the future 
of the West and the nation as a whole.  Republicans used 
homesteading, a transcontinental railroad, new taxes, 
national banking, and other radical ideas to completely 
change the nation’s financial system, settlement patterns, 
commerce, economy, and social structure.  In fact, the 
Homestead Act represented a foundational piece of a 
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legislative agenda that had as much impact as the New Deal 
nearly seventy years later. 
 
Modern politicians of both major parties are quick to 
claim themselves as the rightful heirs to the political 
traditions of such luminaries as Thomas Jefferson and 
Abraham Lincoln.  In fact, many credit Jefferson with 
developing the idea that eventually morphed into the 
Homestead Act.  The so-called “Jeffersonian ideal” hoped 
for America to forever remain a nation of small, 
independent farmers, tied to the land and personally 
invested in democracy’s success.  Later, Lincoln and his 
Republican colleagues saw the Homestead Act as a means by 
which to provide genuine opportunity to the masses while 
accomplishing the political goals of keeping slavery out of 
the West and determining the future settlement and economic 
success of that region.   
The Homestead Act not only affected national politics, 
but also initiated great changes to American society.  
Homesteading was used to provide new levels of opportunity 
to many not accustomed to it.  Women, still unable to own 
land in their own names in many parts of the country, were 
free to claim and own homesteads.  After the Civil War and 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment making African 
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Americans citizens, thousands of former slaves and free 
blacks went west to seek homesteads.  Immigrants from most 
areas of the world were welcomed and free to make claims.   
One aspect of homesteading history that I do not 
examine but that is of great importance is the effect this 
law had on American Indian populations and cultures.  I 
have deliberately chosen not to look at this only because 
my study ends with the passage of the Homestead Act.  The 
impacts of the law on natives were, of course, not known 
until many years after my study ends.  However, it is 
critical to understand that while homesteading offered 
great opportunity to many, it represented more land and 
cultural loss for American Indians.  Indian displacement 
and removal had, of course, been occurring for decades 
before the homestead bill was passed, but there is no 
question that the Homestead Act represented yet another in 
a long line of acts that served to further remove natives 
from their ancestral homes and, eventually, force them onto 
reservations.  Anyone wanting more information on this 
aspect of homesteading history can choose from a number of 
excellent studies, including David J. Wishart’s An 
Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska 
Indians (University of Nebraska Press, 1995) and Richard 
White’s “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New 
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History of the American West (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991).  David A. Nichols’s Lincoln and the Indians: Civil 
War Policy and Politics (University of Illinois Press, 
1978) provides a critical assessment of Abraham Lincoln’s 
and the Republican Party’s attitudes toward natives and the 
federal government’s actions toward them during Lincoln’s 
presidency.   
 
What follows is a history of the so-called “free land” 
idea, from its earliest beginnings in the mind of Thomas 
Jefferson to its ultimate success a century later through 
the pen of Abraham Lincoln.  The homesteading idea changed 
and evolved over time, just as the nation and its politics 
changed.  This work seeks to explain how the homesteading 
idea first developed and why it remained in the forefront 
of so many peoples’ thoughts and hopes for so long.  It 
also hopes to demonstrate that debate over the Homestead 
Act was a much more important political issue in the years 
leading up to the Civil War than historians have previously 
understood or explained. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
JEFFERSONIAN BEGINNINGS: ACQUIRING AND ORGANIZING THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
 
In July 1774, thirty-one-year-old Thomas Jefferson, a 
member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, published a 
pamphlet outlining American colonists’ grievances against 
the British crown.  He titled it A Summary View of the 
Rights of British America, Set Forth in Some Resolutions 
Intended for the Inspection of the Present Delegates of 
the People of Virginia, Now in Convention.  It came to be 
known simply as A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America, and it was the young Jefferson’s first real 
encounter with the political fame he would maintain for 
the rest of his life and beyond.  The Declaration of 
Independence would come two years later, but many of the 
ideas articulated in that more famous document first 
flowed from Jefferson’s pen—and subsequently took hold in 
the minds of many of his countrymen—in the Summary View.  
Amidst the complaints of various British monarchs 
having interfered with the Americans’ seaborne trade, 
suspended colonial legislatures, and levied unreasonable 
duties on paper and tea, Jefferson included this 
statement:  
 The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object 
 of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily in- 
 troduced in their infant state.  But previous to the  
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 infranchisement of the slaves we have, it is necessary 
 to exclude all further importations from Africa.  Yet 
 our repeated attempts to affect this by prohibitions, 
 and by imposing duties which might amount to a prohi- 
 bition, have been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s 
 negative: thus preferring the immediate advantages  
 of a few British corsairs to the lasting interests of 
 the American states, and to the rights of human nature 
 deeply wounded by this infamous practice.2 
 
Here Jefferson first articulated an argument not only 
against American slavery but also the African slave 
trade.  Jefferson was, of course, a slaveowner, but it 
seems clear that even at this early stage of his public 
career he worried about the long-term political effect 
the institution would have upon his country. 
Jefferson also expressed a worry that the crown was 
making it nearly impossible for American colonists to 
acquire new lands.  He offered a brief history of the 
feudal system in Britain, then commented that the king’s 
policies made acquiring lands “difficult.” Jefferson 
wrote that, “It is time…for us to lay this matter before 
his majesty, and to declare that he has no right to grant 
lands of himself….Each individual of the society may 
appropriate to himself such lands he finds vacant, and 
occupancy will give him title” if that society’s elected 
                                                 
2 Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America”, in Julian P. Boyd, editor, The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume I: 1760-1776.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 130. 
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representatives had not allotted the land in any other 
manner.3 
 Within the relatively brief Summary View, Thomas 
Jefferson outlined two major controversies that came to 
dominate the United States for nearly the next century: 
what to do about slavery, and how and to whom to distribute 
the lands of what became the public domain.  These issues 
were somewhat intertwined from the nation’s earliest days, 
and they grew more so as the years progressed.  Jefferson 
and the next few generations of American political leaders 
alternatively argued about, ignored, and compromised over 
these issues until the Civil War of 1861-65.  When the dust 
settled at the conclusion of that traumatic event, 
legislation was in place that theoretically solved both 
issues.   
 
 As evidenced in Jefferson’s Summary View, American 
colonists considered land issues at least somewhat 
important in their dispute with King George III.  The first 
shots of the American Revolution occurred nine months after 
the publication of the pamphlet and continued for the next 
eight years.  In addition to the many writings Jefferson 
produced during the war articulating the colonists’ 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 133. 
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argument for independence, Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) also 
influenced colonial thought on the need to break from 
England.  Smith addressed several land issues in his work, 
writing that, “In a fertile soil and happy climate, the 
great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance 
common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an 
advantage, as to compensate many defects in civil 
government.”4  Many colonists looked at the seemingly 
unlimited vastness of North America and felt sure that a 
new nation could survive on the basis of “the great 
abundance and cheapness of land” alone.  Others, including 
Jefferson, were confident that they could also establish a 
functional civil government that would guarantee individual 
rights, including ownership of land.  In Jefferson’s mind, 
such ownership was essential in order to create a nation of 
small, independent agrarians. 
 Like many of his cotemporaries, Jefferson was born 
into farming, and it was the pursuit he claimed to love 
above all others.  “No occupation is so delightful to me as 
the culture of the earth,” he wrote in 1811.5  Though he 
lived most of his life on plantations where slaves 
                                                 
4 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III, edited by Andrew S. Skinner.  New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1986, p. 308. 
5 Thomas Jefferson to Charles Willson Peale, August 20, 1811,  quoted in A. Whitney Griswold, Farming 
and Democracy.  New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948, p. 24. 
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performed the actual farming labor, Jefferson took a keen 
interest in such subjects as adapting foreign crops, 
livestock breeding, and agricultural technology.  Later in 
life, he insisted on the inclusion of scientific 
agriculture in the curriculum at the University of 
Virginia, a school he founded and designed.6 
 Jefferson’s interest in agriculture was not merely 
reflective of his personal enjoyment of it.  He also 
strongly believed that the United States must remain an 
agriculturally-based society and economy.  During most of 
Jefferson’s life, approximately ninety percent of Americans 
farmed for a living; “To champion the people, therefore, 
was to champion agriculture, a political theorem no 
politician could deny.”7 The common man in America during 
the colonial and early national periods worked the soil.  
Though he fancied himself a farmer, Jefferson was no common 
man: he was born into the Virginia aristocracy, had a 
college education and legal training, and owned slaves.  
But he saw the political and economic potential for a 
nation with a seemingly unlimited supply of tillable land, 
                                                 
6 Griswold, Farming and Democracy, pp. 24-25. 
7 Ibid., p. 25. 
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“…room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and 
thousandth generation.”8 
 Many early political figures, including several of 
Jefferson’s fellow Virginians, sought to sell unsettled 
land in order to raise revenue for the national government.  
This was especially true during the Revolution and 
immediately after it, when leaders recognized the crushing 
debt the nation incurred to shake off British rule.  Even 
in this early period, however, Jefferson expressed his 
opposition to selling land to settlers.  On August 13, 
1776, he wrote from Philadelphia to Edmund Pendleton: 
 I am against selling the lands at all.  The people who 
 will migrate to the Westward whether they form part of 
 the old, or of a new colony will be subject to their pro- 
 portion of the Continental debt then unpaid.  They ought 
 not be subject to more.  They will be a people little  
 able to pay taxes.  There is no equity in fixing upon 
 them the whole burthen of this war, or any other propor- 
 tion than we bear ourselves.  By selling the lands to 
 them, you will disgust them, and cause an avulsion of 
 them from the common union.  They will settle the lands 
 in spite of everybody.9 
 
 Economic issues must certainly be recognized when 
considering Jefferson’s idolization of the small farmer.  
As the American Revolution approached, Jefferson and the 
entire colony of Virginia suffered serious economic 
difficulties. The widespread debt of the planter class, 
declining land values and tobacco prices, and the lack of 
                                                 
8 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801,” from The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. 
Princeton: Princeton University, accessible at http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/inaugural/infinal.html. 
9 Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776, in Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
Volume I: 1760-1776, p. 492. 
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an adequate specie supply combined to create a crisis 
mentality among the colony’s landed aristocracy.  Like 
many, Jefferson blamed the British colonial system for 
these difficulties.  The English had closed off fertile 
western lands to American settlement, prevented Virginia 
from issuing paper money, and passed the Navigation Acts.  
These Acts gave British merchants a monopoly on the 
lucrative tobacco trade, which they used to force colonists 
to sell their crops cheaply.  Combined with high prices for 
manufactured goods, these conditions left Virginians in 
perpetual debt.10   
Jefferson’s own lifelong struggle with debt has been 
well documented by historians.  His own dire financial 
straits and those of Virginia certainly made Jefferson more 
open to the idea of revolting against the British.  They 
also further convinced him of the nobility of the small 
farmer who owned, lived on, and tilled his own piece of 
ground, indebted to no one.  His negative interactions with 
commercial agriculture made him something of an 
agricultural innovator, always looking for new crops, 
fertilizers, and equipment to make Virginian farming more 
                                                 
10 Richard E. Ellis, “The Political Economy of Thomas Jefferson,” in Lally Weymouth, ed., Thomas 
Jefferson: The Man, His World, His Influence.  New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973, p. 82. 
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stable and self-sufficient and less beholden to the ebbs 
and flows of market economics.11    
 Jefferson served a tumultuous two years as governor of 
Virginia from 1779 to 1781.  His election to that position 
was partially facilitated by his skillful leadership and 
eloquence in speaking about the use and future of the West 
during an October 1776 dispute over bills intended to 
divide Fincastle County, Virginia into two separate (and 
later three separate) counties.  During this debate, 
according to historian Julian P. Boyd, he spoke for 
“…justice, for liberal land tenure, and for the use of the 
West for settlers and not for exploiters.”12  Boyd argued 
that Jefferson established a following during this debate 
that responded to his articulate speeches and legislative 
leadership, and this following helped him win the 
governorship three years later.    
During his gubernatorial tenure, British troops 
invaded the state and forced Jefferson and the state 
government to flee the capital of Richmond.  Jefferson took 
refuge at Monticello; redcoats eventually chased him from 
there as well.  When his term expired, Jefferson, exhausted 
and stung by criticism of his actions while in office, 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume I, p. 569. 
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vowed to leave public life forever.  In September 1782, his 
wife died following childbirth, and Jefferson descended 
into a deep depression.  The public life he claimed to 
despise actually came to his rescue, and he ended up in 
Congress.  It was also during this period that he wrote his 
only published book, Notes on the State of Virginia.  
Historian Merrill D. Peterson described the book as “a 
guide to Jefferson’s mind,” revealing him as a “man of 
science eager to possess nature for the mind, but also the 
man of almost romantic sensibilities enraptured by the 
grandeur of the American environment in his quest for 
useful knowledge.”13  
 Notes on the State of Virginia offers a revealing 
glimpse into Jefferson’s mind, and his thoughts on 
agriculture, land ownership, slavery, and political economy 
are on full display within its pages.  The book, written in 
response to several inquiries from the secretary of the 
French legation in the then-national capital of 
Philadelphia, “gave voice to an incipient American 
nationalism” and “ensured Jefferson a scientific and 
literary reputation on both sides of the Atlantic.”14  It 
also proved to be another forum for him to extol the 
                                                 
13 Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. xxiii. 
14 Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv. 
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virtues of agriculture and education and express suspicion 
of industry and manufacturing.   
Jefferson made clear his affinity for agriculture and 
distaste for industry and manufacturing.  Of course, the 
nation followed a different path over the next two or three 
decades, and Jefferson eventually qualified these 
statements and slightly softened his stance on 
international commerce.  However, he clearly had grand, if 
unrealistic, expectations for the agricultural potential of 
his fledgling nation and its citizens.  He maintained this 
vision into his presidency, when he made the Louisiana 
Purchase and fully expected no one but small farmers to 
inhabit the more than 800,000 square miles bought from 
Napoleon. 
 In response to Query XIV, “The administration of 
justice and description of the laws,?” Jefferson sounded 
off on slavery, stating that “The improvement of the blacks 
in body and mind…has been observed by every one, and proves 
that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their 
condition of life….The opinion, that they are inferior in 
the faculties of reason and imagination must be hazarded 
with great diffidence.”15 
                                                 
15 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 269.  Charlottesville: University of Virginia Library 
Electronic Text Center, accessible at http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefVirg.html. 
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Jefferson’s comments must be taken with the proverbial 
grain of salt since he was, after all, a slaveowner his 
entire life and, as modern evidence suggests, may have 
engaged in sexual relations with at least one of his female 
slaves.  However, his comments here, relatively early in 
his career, demonstrate again that he did not wholly 
subscribe to the theory of blacks’ absolute inferiority 
despite their “condition of life” (slavery)—though he does 
offer “mixture with the whites” as the reason for blacks’ 
“improvement.”   Jefferson here also seems to have 
presciently described the slavery issue’s major role in the 
onset of party politics in his statement that “…many other 
circumstances will divide us into parties.”  No one 
suffered more at the hands of party-affiliated politicians—
or played their game better—than Thomas Jefferson.  Lastly, 
in his opinion that freed blacks cannot be “retained and 
incorporated into the state,” Jefferson appears to endorse 
the idea of colonizing blacks outside the United States.16  
This controversial plan for simultaneously ending slavery 
and removing blacks from American soil claimed a number of 
influential advocates from Jefferson’s age to the Civil 
War.  Abraham Lincoln once endorsed the idea on the basis 
that free blacks had no real future in the racially-charged 
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atmosphere into which they would be thrown if slavery 
ended. 
Notes on the State of Virginia allowed Thomas 
Jefferson to write about a number of issues important not 
just to his own state but to the others as well.  In it, he 
explained his preference for agriculture over industry and 
rural communities over urban ones.  He clearly demonstrated 
his famously conflicted mind on the issue of slavery—the 
slaveowner who claimed to despise slavery.  Questions about 
land distribution, agriculture, and slavery persisted for 
nearly the next hundred years, and Jefferson’s words were 
never far from the minds of many political figures who 
attempted to answer them.  Though the nation eventually 
urbanized and industrialized rapidly and enthusiastically, 
the Jeffersonian vision was a powerful and important one 
for decades to come.  As one historian noted, “The 
Jeffersonian type of agricultural fundamentalism has 
persisted…and is still frequently pressed with great vigor, 
particularly by writers whose idealism outweighs their 
knowledge of economics.”17 
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At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the new 
United States of America possessed massive western land 
tracts outside the boundaries of the thirteen states.  This 
included the territory east of the Mississippi River, south 
of the Great Lakes, and north of the modern northern 
boundary of Florida.  These territories eventually became 
the modern states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and parts of Minnesota, Alabama, and 
Mississippi.  These areas became what one historian called 
“…the nucleus of the public domain.”18  A Congressional 
resolution passed October 10, 1780, stated that any 
unappropriated lands ceded by the states would be formed 
into news states eventually intended to join the Union.  
The same resolution stated that Congress would regulate 
granting and settling of these lands.19  This was, according 
to historian William Goetzmann, “…the new government’s most 
significant power.”20 
The existing states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia 
claimed large chunks of these western lands based on 
language in their original colonial charters.  This meant 
that the remaining six original states—New Hampshire, Rhode 
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Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland—
had no western land claims.  Led by Maryland, these six 
states pressed that the western lands “…wrested from the 
common enemy by blood and treasure of the Thirteen States, 
should be considered as common property, subject to be 
parceled out by Congress into free, convenient and 
independent governments in such manner and at such times as 
the wisdom of that Assembly shall direct.”21  Of these six, 
only Pennsylvania was considered a large state, and the 
smaller states must surely have feared the increased power 
of larger states like Virginia and New York should they be 
permitted to retain their western claims.  Maryland even 
refused to ratify the Articles of Confederation until the 
seven states with western land claims agreed to cede them 
to the national government.  Governor Thomas Jefferson of 
Virginia lobbied his state’s leaders to agree to the 
cession so that the Articles of Confederation could pass.  
In a September 26, 1780 letter to George Washington, he 
wrote, “I am informed the ratification of the Confederation 
has been rested on our Cession of a part of our western 
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Claims, a cession which…I verily believe will be agreed to 
if the Quantity demanded be not unreasonably great.”22 
On March 1, 1781, New York became the first state to 
cede its western claims; Maryland signed the Articles the 
same day after receiving assurances that the other six 
states would soon follow suit.  They did so at various 
times from 1781 to 1802.23 
New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina made 
unconditional cessions of their western lands.  The 
cessions of Virginia, Connecticut, North Carolina, and 
Georgia had conditions placed upon them, often intended to 
reserve certain western areas for possible future use by 
the respective states or, in the case of Georgia, an 
attempt to have the national government pay the state for 
land sales in its cession.  Virginia’s western land were 
the largest and included modern Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and part of Minnesota.  
Virginia’s initial and largest cession occurred March 1, 
1784; later cessions took place as well.  Connecticut ceded 
its western claims on September 13, 1786 with a few 
reservations, including an attempt to hold a piece of land 
located in modern Pennsylvania.  On February 25, 1790, 
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North Carolina made its cession with reservations “…more 
detailed and far reaching than those made by any other 
state.”24 Modern Tennessee was eventually created from North 
Carolina’s cession.  Georgia’s aforementioned cession 
occurred April 24, 1802.25 
Historian William Goetzmann gave Jefferson a great 
deal of credit for convincing his Virginia colleagues to 
agree to the western cession, arguing that Jefferson 
“prevented…the Balkanization of America” and guaranteeing 
that “the United States would be a large, potentially 
powerful continental nation that could not easily be 
divided and conquered….The undeveloped West had made this 
possible….The West served as the cement of Union at a 
critical time.”26   
With the western cessions held as “common property,” 
as originally demanded by Maryland, a bond developed among 
all the states that played a part in holding them together 
since the Articles of Confederation gave little real 
federal power to the national government.  In this manner, 
Goetzmann’s statement that the West was the “cement of 
Union,” while perhaps somewhat overstated, does have 
credence.  Jefferson certainly deserves some credit for 
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this, as do the Marylanders who demanded fair treatment in 
the matter of western lands in the first place. 
 
In 1784, Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson to two 
separate committees dealing with western lands.  
“Jefferson’s thoughts were never far from the West, and 
now, in 1784, he sought to fix its future.”27  The first 
committee was to determine the proper governmental 
organization of new western territories, the second to 
devise a method for disposal of public domain lands.  
Several pressing issues made the work of these committees 
extremely important.  Revolutionary War veterans clamored 
for their promised land bounties; under the Articles of 
Confederation, Congress had no means by which to raise 
revenue, and selling public land was seen as a possible way 
to raise money; no one was sure how best to defend the 
Northwest from American Indians; fear existed that Kentucky 
and Tennessee might fall under British or Spanish 
commercial control; those who wished to emigrate to the 
West pressured the government to hurriedly organize the 
various territories; and more.  Congress needed to act 
quickly but carefully. 
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Report of a Plan of Government for the Western 
Territory was written in Jefferson’s hand and submitted to 
Congress on March 1, 1784.  Following the lead of the 
Congressional act of October 10, 1780, Jefferson’s report 
recommended that “…the territory ceded or to be ceded by 
Individual states to the United states [sic] shall be 
formed into distinct states.”28  The report recommended the 
creation of ten new states and suggested boundaries and 
even Latin-style names for them, including Michigania, 
Cherronesus, Illinoia, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia.   
Next, the report stated that “free males of full age” 
in the new states should meet to establish a temporary 
government, adopt a temporary constitution and laws, and 
establish counties or townships “for the election of 
members for their legislature.”29  Such temporary 
governments were to continue only until 20,000 free 
inhabitants lived in the state, when, subject to 
Congressional approval, the states could call conventions 
to establish permanent constitutions and governments.  When 
a new state had obtained enough free inhabitants as the 
least populous state of the original thirteen, the new 
state would have delegates admitted to Congress. 
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The legality of both the temporary and permanent 
governments was subject to five conditions:  that the 
states “shall for ever remain a part of the United States 
of America;” the new states would always be subject “to the 
government of the United states [sic] in Congress 
assembled;” like the original thirteen states, the new ones 
would be responsible for their fair share of the federal 
debt; all new state governments “shall be in republican 
forms, and shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds 
any hereditary title;” and, lastly and most 
controversially, “that after the year 1800 of the Christian 
era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude in any of the said states.”30  This last measure 
proved to be a sticking point, and Congress ultimately 
rejected the committee’s report.  Jefferson amended it, 
dropping the slavery clause and the Latinized names for the 
new states, and Congress adopted it on April 23, 1784.31  
His attempt to keep slavery out of the Northwest was a 
precursor to the 1787 Northwest Ordinance and an early 
manifestation of the “empire of liberty” to which he had 
first referred in the Declaration of Independence.   
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Jefferson presented his second committee report, 
focusing on proper disposal of western public lands, on May 
7, 1784.  It recommended that lands be surveyed before 
settlement, and that surveyors be appointed by Congress.  
The report also stated that lands should be purchased, not 
seized, from American Indians.  The clauses in this report 
seemed particularly important as the Continental Army 
demobilized and thousands of former soldiers demanded the 
land bounties promised them as rewards for service.  
Various factors delayed the government’s ability to grant 
these lands, including the slowness in getting them 
surveyed and the continued presence in many areas of 
American Indians hostile to encroachment.  As historian 
Paul Wallace Gates noted, “Many veterans swarmed into the 
West, especially from Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania ….They rushed across the Ohio and into 
Kentucky and Tennessee where Indians still claimed the land 
and threatened to bring on renewed warfare.”32 
The designers of the Articles of Confederation had 
tried to place Indian affairs under the purview of the 
national government, but the overall weakness of the 
document led many states to continue to deal with natives 
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however they chose.  The Confederation government was 
unable to prevent intrusions into Indian lands “…and to 
show at the same time both generosity and military might to 
the natives.”33  Indians in many areas became more and more 
distressed as squatters and speculators streamed into their 
traditional lands.  In the Ohio country, the national 
government had already begun the long and shameful process 
of negotiating and then ignoring treaties with American 
Indians. 
The continued presence of the British at Forts Oswego, 
Niagara, Detroit, and Mackinaw also contributed to American 
difficulties in dealing with natives.  The British still 
sought domination of the fur trade and continued to supply 
Indians with weapons, manufactured goods, and other items 
in return for furs.  The presence of the British and their 
continued alliance with many local tribes angered American 
settlers as well as many in the Confederation government.  
Eventually, the Americans realized that only a resounding 
defeat of the Ohio country Indians would make settlement 
there safe.  This defeat occurred at the battle of Fallen 
Timbers in August 1794.  The British offered the Indian 
forces no assistance, and soon afterward agreed to Jay’s 
Treaty, which called for the surrender of British posts on 
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the American frontier by June 1, 1796.  With the Indians 
defeated and the British gone, American settlement in the 
Ohio country proceeded rapidly.34 
  
 Jefferson’s May 7, 1784 report recommended survey 
before settlement and combined the two major survey systems 
in use in the United States: the New England and Southern 
systems.  In the New England system, used for decades 
before independence, residents lay out and surveyed new 
areas prior to settlement.  They prepared plats and 
recorded them with colonial officials before anyone was 
permitted to settle.  Towns were organized based on 
neighborhood allotments, and no one was able to claim all 
the best lands for himself.  As the town grew, its 
residents shared in divisions of unappropriated land.  This 
system worked well in New England because it promoted 
tight, compact communities, which benefited all by offering 
protection from native attacks and mutual aid during harsh 
winters.  As historian Benjamin H. Hibbard noted, “Little 
republics—townships—of convenient size were organized, 
placing the civil and political power in the hands of those 
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who own the country, at the same time making provision for 
the moral and educational wants.”35 
The second major survey system Jefferson incorporated 
into his report, and the one with which he was certainly 
more familiar, was the Southern system.  A warmer climate, 
fewer native attacks, and plantation agriculture resulted 
in much more scattered settlements in this region than in 
New England.  Formal surveys rarely preceded settlement; 
land was distributed according to the location of warrants, 
which granted the holder the right to select his land in 
any unappropriated area.  As a result, many settlers simply 
walked into the wilderness and staked their claims, often 
giving themselves a monopoly on a given area’s best land.  
Of course, without surveys, claims often overlapped and 
many errors occurred.  However, Hibbard observed, “with all 
its disadvantages this practice expressed the spirit of the 
frontiersman and, in spite of logic, persisted as an 
important incident, even assuming the dignity of a 
policy.”36   
Jefferson’s report led to the Ordinance of 1784, which 
was then carried over into 1785 and sent to committee.  The 
members reported a new and updated ordinance in April 1785; 
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Congress adopted it on May 20.  This was the blueprint for 
the rectangular survey system still in use, with the 640-
acre section and the township as the basic units of 
measurement.  Jefferson recommended ten-by-ten section 
townships, though this was later reduced to six-by-six 
sections.  The 1785 ordinance also reserved section 16 of 
each township for public schools, one section for religious 
purposes, and sections 8, 11, 26, and 29 “for the future 
disposition of Congress.”37  Lands for settlement under this 
ordinance would be sold for one dollar per acre to raise 
money for the general treasury.  Public auctions would be 
held to make land available before it could be sold to 
individuals. 
In March 1785, Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson 
U.S. Minister to France, a position he held until 1789.  
Jefferson therefore missed several important debates about 
land policy (as well as the Constitutional Convention).  
However, his friends and colleagues kept him informed of 
important events, and Jefferson continued in his beliefs of 
the moral and economic virtues of agriculture.  On August 
23, 1785, he wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John 
Jay, responding to a question from Jay regarding “whether 
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it would be useful to us to carry all our own productions 
[meaning manufactures], or none?” Jefferson answered:  
We have now lands enough to employ an infinite number of people 
in their cultivation.  Cultivators of the earth are the most 
valuable citizens.  They are the most vigorous, the most 
independant [sic], the most virtuous, and they are tied to their 
country and wedded to it’s [sic] liberty and interests by the 
most lasting bands.  As long therefore as they can find 
emploiment [sic] in this line, I would not convert them into 
mariners, artisans, or any thing else.38 
 
A few months later, in October 1785, he lamented the 
inequality of European property distribution in a letter to 
James Madison.  He noted that the vast majority of wealth 
in France was concentrated in the hands of a very few and 
that the poor masses owned no property.  His experiences in 
France seemed only to strengthen his conviction that 
America should remain a primarily agricultural economy.   
“The earth is given as a common stock for man to 
labour [sic] and live on,” he wrote Madison.  “The small 
landholders are the most precious part of a state.”39  He 
wrote to the Frenchman Brissot de Warville on August 16, 
1786 after reading an excerpt of a book Warville was 
writing about commerce between the United States and 
France.  Jefferson informed de Warville that his favorite 
passages in the book were those in which the author proved 
to Americans “that they will be more virtuous, more free, 
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and more happy, emploied [sic] in agriculture, than as 
carriers or manufacturers.”40  
 Jefferson watched from Paris in 1787 as the 
Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia and the 
Continental Congress revisited one of his old projects: 
developing a plan for governmental organization in the 
West.  Unlike in 1784, however, when he made 
recommendations for the United States’ entire western 
territory, Congress took up only the issue as it related to 
the Northwest.  An organized government there was critical 
to the successful initiation of land surveys as well as to 
fighting American Indians angered by unfair, dishonestly 
negotiated treaties.    
 The simultaneous meetings of the Congress debating a 
government for the Northwest and the Constitutional 
Convention is interesting.  Those meeting in Philadelphia 
originally intended only to amend the Articles of 
Confederation to make the central government stronger.  
This was particularly important for the future of the West 
since the weak Confederation government could do little in 
reality to defend and govern the Northwest Territory.  
However, they soon scrapped the Articles of Confederation 
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completely and turned instead to drafting a new, stronger 
document.  As historian Jack N. Rakove noted, “Only by 
endowing the national government with the means to act on 
its intention could the Federal Convention redeem the 
promise that the Northwest Ordinance held out.”41    
 Jefferson’s 1784 report served as a starting point for 
the depleted Congress, many of whose members were at the 
Constitutional Convention.  As Rakove observed, the primary 
questions that needed to be answered had to do with how the 
Northwest territories could be fairly integrated into the 
United States.  “Would their residents enjoy the same 
political rights as their countrymen closer to the 
Atlantic?”42  Yes, according to Jefferson in 1784: “…Such 
state shall be admitted by it’s [sic] delegates into the 
Congress of the United states [sic], on an equal footing 
with the said original states.”43   
 The role of the West came up time and again during the 
Constitutional Convention.  Many delegates argued that new 
western states should not be permitted to enter the Union 
on equal terms with the original thirteen.  Gouverneur 
Morris of New York worried that Congressional 
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representatives from the West would not be “equally 
enlightened” as those from the original eastern states and 
proposed a number of plans to guarantee the old states’ 
superiority.  These plans drew sharp responses from the 
likes of James Madison, George Mason, and others.  Madison 
demanded to know if Morris “determined the human character 
by the points of the compass.”44   
Madison clearly believed that the western states’ 
allegiance to the Union could be secured by granting them 
equal political rights under the new Constitution.  To do 
otherwise—to bring new states in as inferiors—risked 
angering and alienating them, which was unwise at a time 
when the British and French still had designs on the 
Northwest.  The Philadelphia delegates could not allow the 
new Constitution to drive Americans into the arms of the 
European fur traders, merchants, and soldiers who longed 
for opportunities to undermine and perhaps destroy the 
young American nation.  Equality of the new western states 
was a main idea of the Northwest Ordinance, but that 
document would have been worthless without the political 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Fair treatment of Native Americans was another issue 
for the framers of the Northwest Ordinance.  In his May 
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1784 report on proper disposal of western lands, Jefferson 
called for the purchase of lands from natives.  The framers 
of the Northwest Ordinance agreed, and stated in the 
document’s third article that Indians’ “lands and property 
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and 
in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be 
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars 
authorized by Congress.”45 
 By the time of the Ordinance, many tribes in the 
Northwest had already grown weary of Euroamerican promises 
and treaties and had become determined to give up no more 
land to the Americans.  In fact, despite Jefferson’s 
ordinances of 1784 and 1785, many of the lands affected by 
those laws remained in native hands in 1787.  If Congress 
truly intended to treat natives with “the utmost good 
faith” and not forcibly take native lands, then the 1784 
and 1785 laws could be argued to have been ineffectual at 
best and wishful thinking at worst.  However, while the 
modern observer may view these laws and the Northwest 
Ordinance’s statement on the treatment of natives as 
hypocrisy (or at least greatly ironic), they were quite 
realistic to the majority of early white Americans.  As 
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historian Bernard W. Sheehan observed, “From the very 
beginning colonial authorities had assumed that European 
society would displace the Indians in America.”46  Many 
whites hoped to assimilate natives into American society; 
others cared little where Indians went as long as they 
vacated lands to make room for white settlement.  Either 
way, “…in no case was it assumed that Indian society would 
remain intact and in possession of any substantial segment 
of the continent.”47  There was not, therefore, at least in 
the minds of most white Americans, any incompatibility 
between displacing American Indians from their lands and 
still treating them with “the utmost good faith” as 
promised in the Northwest Ordinance.   
While the Northwest Ordinance was the beginning of a 
more philanthropic attitude toward natives, it has already 
been observed just how long that philanthropy lasted: until 
about 1794, when the Americans defeated natives at the 
battle of Fallen Timbers.  This battle came about largely 
due to a shift in the attitude of the Americans, who had 
come to realize that most natives had no interest in being 
assimilated or giving up more of their traditional lands.  
Only military defeat and treatment of the Indians as a 
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conquered people would allow for the seizing of native 
lands and mass settlement of them by Americans.  While the 
Northwest Ordinance may have had good intentions in how it 
proposed to deal with Indians, those intentions were not 
realistic or in line with the general American attitude 
about the continent’s racial hierarchy. 
The Ordinance’s third article did not just offer lofty 
language about treatment of Native Americans.  It also 
raised the issue of education in the Northwest: “Schools 
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”48  
This was another area in which Jefferson’s influence on the 
future of the West was clear.  Long before he founded the 
University of Virginia, Jefferson articulated the need for 
some organized American system of higher education and 
governmental support of that system.  In an August 13, 1786 
letter to George Wythe, he wrote: “Preach, my dear Sir, a 
crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law 
for educating the common people….The tax that will be paid 
for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part of 
what be paid to kings, priests and nobles who will rise up 
among us if we leave the people in ignorance.”49  Jefferson 
viewed education as he did land distribution and 
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agricultural innovation: they were means to strengthen and 
improve American democracy by giving his so-called “common 
people” genuine opportunities to improve their social and 
economic standing. 
Jefferson, who opposed the spread of sectarianism and 
religious bigotry in education, regarded federal support 
for schools as something to encourage, as did others who 
felt similarly.  The education clause in the Northwest 
Ordinance “…reminded Americans that they could ill afford 
to let their common commitment to republican principles and 
democratic procedures be undermined by sectarian rivalry 
and intolerance.”50  The federal commitment to education 
first proposed in the Northwest Ordinance eventually led to 
the creation of the land grant college system under the 
Morrill Act of 1862. 
The Ordinance’s sixth article is surely its most well-
known and oft-debated.  Again looking to Jefferson’s 1784 
report as a guide, the Continental Congress wrote that 
“There shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude 
in the said territory otherwise than in the punishment of 
crimes.”  The article also included a statement that 
fugitive slaves could be returned to their owners. 
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An interesting and frequently ignored fact about the 
Northwest Ordinance is that half of the states present when 
it came to a vote were southern: Virginia, North and South 
Carolina, and Georgia.  Delaware, another slave state, was 
present as well.  Three New England states and Pennsylvania 
were absent.  At first glance, it seems curious that 
Article Six made it into the final version of the Ordinance 
considering the supposed threat it posed to the expansion 
of slavery.  However, the Ordinance passed with the assent 
of all eight states.  How did a prohibition on slavery 
survive a 1787 vote dominated by southerners who had 
rejected Jefferson’s 1784 suggestion to end slavery in the 
West by 1800?    
A closer look reveals the South’s possible 
motivations.  First, Jefferson’s 1784 report proposed a ban 
on slavery in the entire West.  Article Six of the 
Northwest Ordinance affected only lands located north of 
the Ohio River, so perhaps many Southerners took comfort in 
knowing that slavery was still permissible south of it.  
Some historians have speculated that Article Six was 
accepted because prohibiting slavery north of the Ohio 
would deter the planting of crops there that would compete 
with important southern cash crops such as tobacco. (The 
climate there would have surely prohibited this regardless 
42 
 
of the presence or exclusion of slavery.)  Others have 
theorized that southerners were sure that most migrants to 
the Northwest would come from the South, leading to a 
political alliance between the Northwest and the southern 
states that would weaken the strong states of New England, 
New York, and Pennsylvania.  Still others have proposed the 
possibility that Congress and the representatives at the 
Constitutional Convention had a secret arrangement to 
protect slavery in the existing states and exclude it from 
the Northwest.51 
Historian Paul Finkelman suggested that the South 
likely viewed Article Six as strengthening the institution 
of slavery, not weakening it.  He agreed that the South 
must have been happy that the article only affected the 
lands north of the Ohio River but also asserted that it was 
actually a gain for southerners because it contained a 
fugitive slave cause.  The Articles of Confederation 
contained no such clause, and one had not yet been added to 
the proposed Constitution being debated in Philadelphia.52   
Article Six also did not decree that all slaves 
already in the Northwest be immediately freed.  It was not, 
in Finkelman’s phrase, “…an emancipation proclamation for 
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the Northwest.”53  In fact, slavery continued to exist in 
parts of the Northwest for decades.  Blacks were held in 
slavery in Indiana through the 1830s; slavery was on the 
books in Illinois until 1848.  Though Article Six did lay 
the groundwork for the eventual creation of five free 
states (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin), 
slavery did not simply disappear from the Northwest when 
the Ordinance was approved on July 13, 1787.  Such 
paradoxes and complexities justify Finkelman’s use of the 
term “an ambiguous article” to describe Article Six.54  The 
adoption of the sixth article “…illustrates the difficulty 
of ending a powerful institution merely by constitutional 
dictates and without the support of legislative enactments 
and executive enforcement.”55   
As sectional tensions rose over the decades and the 
nation marched toward civil war over the slavery issue, 
many antislavery politicians, including Salmon P. Chase and 
Abraham Lincoln, began to refer to Article Six of the 
Northwest Ordinance as some sort of sacred text.  However, 
their perception of the article simply did not correspond 
to the reality of it, which was much more complex.  Many of 
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the issues the Northwest Ordinance raised would continue to 
be argued for nearly another century. 
 
Thomas Jefferson was not part of the debates over the 
Northwest Ordinance or the Constitution.  However, his 
presence and influence were felt as both important 
documents were conceived, written, debated, edited, and put 
to votes.  His work, beginning with the Summary View and 
continuing forward to the 1784 and 1785 land ordinances, 
influenced not only legislation but also the ways in which 
Americans viewed land use and ownership.  His views on 
agriculture, expansion, education, and slavery were cited 
as near-gospel for the next hundred years and beyond.  
Moreover, in 1787, the year that both the Northwest 
Ordinance and the Constitution were written, many of his 
greatest contributions were yet to come. 
On December 20, 1787, Jefferson wrote to James Madison 
from Paris.  This letter encapsulated many of Jefferson’s 
ideas that so influenced the development and future of not 
only the West, but also American government, history, 
institutions, and character: 
After all, it is my principle that the will of the Majority 
will always prevail.  If they approve the proposed Conven- 
tion in all it’s [sic] parts, I shall concur in it cheer- 
fully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall 
find it wrong.  I think our governments will remain virtu- 
ous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agri- 
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cultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant 
lands in America.  When they get piled upon one another in 
large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in 
Europe.  Above all things I hope the education of the com- 
mon people will be attended to; convinced that on their  
good sense we may rely with the most security for the pres- 
ervation of a due degree of liberty.56 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LAND ISSUES FROM THE CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE 
MISSOURI COMPROMISE 
 
 
 The first Federal Congress under the new Constitution 
met in New York beginning March 4, 1789.  Almost 
immediately, issues involving the public domain in the West 
came to the forefront.  On May 28, Representative Thomas 
Scott of Pennsylvania rose and presented a speech 
explaining the situation to his colleagues and demanding 
that action be taken on behalf of those seeking western 
lands.   
 Scott lamented that land surveys, mandated by Thomas 
Jefferson’s 1785 ordinance, had not yet been completed and 
estimated that 7,000 Americans currently lived on lands 
that had not yet been surveyed and for which they had 
therefore not yet paid the government.  “There are,” Scott 
stated, “a great number of people on the ground, who are 
willing to acquire by purchase a right to the soil they are 
seated upon.”  He then struck a Jeffersonian tone: “Allured 
by its fertility, the agreeableness of the climate, and the 
prospect of future ease to themselves and their families, 
they would not seek a change.”  This was the first real 
articulation by a Congressional figure of what came to be 
known as “squatter’s rights:” that those occupying land, 
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even without legal right or title, should have the 
opportunity to buy that land from the government rather 
than be automatically evicted from it.  The argument Scott 
began with this idea was destined to last another fifty 
years. 
 Scott also warned that if the United States government 
did not soon act, it was possible that other governments 
would.  If settlers could not be accommodated within U.S. 
boundaries, they could move into Spanish territory, “where 
they are not altogether uninvited, and become an accession 
of power to a foreign nation forming to us a dangerous 
frontier.”  They might also simply remain on lands to which 
they had no title and never pay for it. 
 Scott argued that the current proposals for disposing 
of the public domain called for the lands to be sold in 
quantities much too large, telling the House, “It is very 
difficult to form a company for the purchase of a million 
acres.”  He proposed selling land in much smaller 
quantities and opening a federal land office to “grant the 
soil in such quantities as may suit the applications.”57 
 On July 13—the second anniversary of the passage of 
the Northwest Ordinance—Scott again took the floor of the 
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House of Representatives to speak about western lands and 
argue for the creation of a land office.  He estimated the 
western territory he spoke of to be a thousand miles long 
and five hundred miles wide and capable of holding two 
million farms, but “…for greater caution, say it will 
contain one million.”  If each farm had an average of six 
people living on it, then the western territory could 
potentially have six million inhabitants in the future, 
double the number living in America in 1789.   
 Scott spoke of the great fertility of western soil, 
the excellent waterways, and a climate with “…a salubrity 
that accommodates it to the emigrant from both Northern and 
Southern States.”  He insisted that the nation observe and 
honor the treaties made with American Indian tribes, for 
“…if the country is settled by a lawless banditti, they 
will keep the nation in a perpetual broil with the 
savages.”  Scott also rather dramatically read a 
translation of a proclamation issued by the Governor of the 
Spanish posts at the Illinois, which offered free land, 
exemptions from taxes, civil and religious freedom, and 
farm implements to Americans who settled in Spanish 
territory: 
 It may be said, that Americans will not venture to live 
 under the Spanish Government, or settle a Spanish colo- 
 ny.  To this it may be replied, that when people, from 
 their necessities or inclinations, are determined to em- 
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 igrate, in order to mitigate their distresses, they  
 think little of the form of Government; all they care for 
 is relief from their present or approaching wants or  
 troubles.58 
 
 Why, Scott asked, send our countrymen into the arms of 
a foreign government when the United States could easily 
provide to them everything the Spanish could if it would 
simply create a land office and make western lands 
available for purchase?  To emphasize the point, Scott 
explained that the government was owed nearly five million 
dollars for completed surveys and land purchases; $771,310 
of the sum had been paid into the treasury and $4,165,553 
was still outstanding, paying a daily interest of $684.25.  
“This, gentleman, is what we actually lose every day, for 
want of establishing some regulations on the subject.”59  
Despite that seemingly persuasive financial argument, the 
Committee of the Whole came to no resolution that day.  
However, Scott’s speeches and arguments well encapsulate 
many of the important western land issues that faced the 
early Congresses and that would continue for many years to 
come, including Indian relations, squatter’s rights, and 
methods of distribution. 
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 The First Congress debated a number of land issues, 
including whether prices should be fixed or graduated; 
whether to accept only cash or also credit; the number and 
locations of land offices; and more.  However, few 
decisions appear to have been reached.   
When a foreign national, Hannibal W. Dobbyn, applied 
for a contract to purchase more than 50,000 acres of 
western land in January 1790, Congress was unable to come 
to a decision on several questions.  These included whether 
or not to sell American lands to foreigners, even though 
Dobbyn stated his interest in becoming an American citizen.  
There was also discussion of extending him credit: he 
planned to put one-third down immediately, another one-
third down in seven years, and pay the balance within 
twelve years.  Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, the Chairman 
of the House of Representatives Committee on the Whole, 
“…presumed that the House could not proceed understandingly 
in the business upon the information now in their 
possession.”60  Boudinot stated that someone in the 
Executive branch should prepare a report explaining what 
had already been done in the area of land sales and 
recommending how Congress should proceed in the future.  On 
January 20, 1790, Congress requested that Secretary of the 
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Treasury Alexander Hamilton submit a plan for the 
disposition of the public domain.61 
 Hamilton submitted his report six months later, on 
July 22, 1790.  His “Report of a Uniform System for the 
Disposition of the Lands, the Property of the United 
States” stated that two main objectives existed: to 
facilitate “advantageous sales according to the probable 
course of purchases” and “the accommodation of individuals 
now inhabiting the Western Country, or who may hereafter 
emigrate thither.”62  Hamilton was a financier and the 
Secretary of the Treasury, so raising revenue for national 
use was his primary concern.  However, he made clear that 
he was not ignorant of the need to ensure “the satisfaction 
of the inhabitants of the Western Country.”63  According to 
his report, it was possible to do both. 
 Hamilton wrote that purchasers of western lands fell 
into three categories: individuals and companies with money 
that would buy land in order to re-sell it to others; 
associations of people who would buy land with the 
intention of settling it themselves; and individuals and 
families either already on western lands or intending to 
“emigrate thither.”  The first two groups would always want 
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large tracts of land, while the third would generally buy 
smaller quantities.  Priority must be given, he wrote, “to 
obtain all the advantages which may be derived from the two 
first classes.”64  Hamilton recommended that the main land 
office be located at the main seat of the national 
government, where those wishing to make large purchases 
could most easily find agents.  To accommodate those making 
smaller purchases, he recommended two satellite offices, 
one in the northwest and another in the southwest.  No land 
was to be sold “…except such, in respect to which the 
titles of the Indian tribes shall have been previously 
extinguished.”65  The entire land sale program would be 
administered and overseen by a board of three 
commissioners.   
 In order to attempt to satisfy the three classes of 
purchasers he imagined, Hamilton also called for the 
establishment of three different types of land tracts.  The 
first was to be available in increments of 500 acres or 
more and would be available to subscribers to the federal 
loan then being considered by Congress.  The second type 
was to appeal to those seeking small family farms; these 
tracts would be limited to no more than 100 acres.  
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Finally, the third designation was for very large purchases 
of entire townships, which under this plan would be ten 
miles square.  It was assumed that those making such 
sizeable purchases would subdivide them.  Hamilton 
recommended that the lands be sold for thirty cents per 
acre and that no credit be extended to anyone except those 
falling into the third category.  The law required those 
receiving credit to put down one-quarter of the price 
immediately as well as provide some other security for the 
balance, which was due in no more than two years.  
Purchasers would be responsible for the expenses of 
conducting government surveys, though survey before 
settlement was not required.66   
Hamilton’s July 1790 report basically ignored the 
Ordinance of 1785 in a number of ways.  Jefferson called 
for survey before settlement; Hamilton did not.  The 
Secretary of the Treasury recommended townships of ten 
sections by ten sections (interestingly, the original 
recommendation of Jefferson) rather than the six-by-six of 
the Ordinance of 1785. Hamilton also made no mention of 
setting aside land for schools, a main tenant of the 1785 
law.  He inserted no public auction clause in his report.  
Hamilton clearly gave preference to those wishing to 
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purchase massive land tracts, while Jefferson hoped to 
populate the west with small family farms.  Ironically, 
Hamilton’s system, though it clearly favored speculators 
awash with cash, was actually more favorable to small 
settlers than Jefferson’s.  Under the 1785 Land Ordinance, 
land was more expensive—one dollar per acre—and the 
smallest parcel one could purchase was a 640-acre section.  
Few had $640 to spare, and the government raised little 
revenue from this land system.  The lack of success of the 
1785 law was a prime motivation for Congress to request 
Hamilton’s 1790 report in the first place.   
It must be noted that when Congress received 
Hamilton’s report in July 1790, it was simultaneously 
debating Hamilton’s “Report on the Public Credit,” which he 
had submitted in January 1790.  This report was Hamilton’s 
plan to liquidate the approximately $50 million national 
debt.  In it, Hamilton made clear his financial and 
political philosophy: that the government must take an 
active role in creating wealth and making sure that it was 
placed into the hands of those who could best take 
advantage of it.  As historian John C. Miller observed, 
“Hamilton was primarily concerned with those individuals 
who possessed a disposable surplus of capital which could 
be devoted to the support of the government and to the 
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furthering of economic enterprise.”67 These speculators were 
the people Hamilton was sure would buy massive chunks of 
western land, especially considering the cheaper price of 
thirty cents per acre over the one dollar per acre charged 
under the 1785 law.  His philosophy dictated that they be 
given preference just as Jefferson’s agrarian-centered 
philosophy caused him to prefer small farms.  Though at 
this time the two men were not yet political enemies, 
Hamilton’s two 1790 reports certainly pointed them in that 
direction. 
To complicate matters further, Congress in January 
1791 requested that Hamilton submit another report, this 
one on the state of American manufacturing.  His report, 
submitted to Congress on December 5, 1791, put him further 
at odds with Jefferson on the issues of agriculture and the 
promotion of a farming economy in the United States.  
Hamilton’s report was, in the words of one of his modern 
biographers, “…the first government-sponsored plan for 
selective industrial planning in America.”68  Few things 
could have placed Hamilton more at odds with Thomas 
Jefferson. 
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The origins of this report were actually military and 
strategic in nature.  In his first annual address to 
Congress, on January 8, 1790, President George Washington 
told those gathered in the Senate chamber: 
A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined; 
to which end a uniform and well digested plan is requi- 
site: And their safety and interest require, that they 
should promote such manufactories, as tend to render  
them independent on others for essential, particularly 
for military supplies…The advancement of Agriculture, 
Commerce and Manufactures by all proper means, will not 
I trust need recommendation.69 
 
Hamilton had served in the Revolutionary War and well 
remembered the Americans’ scarcity of nearly everything: 
food, clothing, ammunition, gunpowder, and more.  He noted 
in his report, “The extreme embarrassments of the United 
States during the late War, from an incapacity of supplying 
themselves, are still matter of keen recollection.”70  Now, 
as Secretary of the Treasury, he knew that reliance on 
foreign manufacturing would likely prove disastrous for the 
nation at some point in the future.  In order to better 
prepare himself for drafting this important paper, he had 
U.S. marshals and customs collectors gather information and 
statistics on U.S. manufacturing as well as send him 
samples of manufactured goods to see and touch.  With a 
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showman’s flair, he laid many of these samples out in the 
House of Representatives’ committee room for elected 
officials to see.  As Ron Chernow noted, Hamilton proceeded 
“…as if operating a small trade fair, an altogether new 
form of lobbying.”71 
As he researched and prepared the report, Hamilton 
must have surely known that he would face great resistance 
from Jefferson and other agriculturally-minded politicians.  
Hamilton stated from the outset that he did not seek to 
replace agriculture but merely to add manufacturing.  “In 
every country,” he wrote, “Agriculture is the most 
beneficial and productive object in human industry.  This 
position…applies with peculiar emphasis to the United 
States, on account of their immense tracts of fertile 
territory.”72  However, Hamilton realized that if everyone 
produced farm crops, supply would soon outpace demand, and 
massive stocks of surpluses would create unemployment and 
dismal economic conditions.  He also worried that the 
United States would face difficulties in selling its farm 
products abroad since most of the great European nations 
with which America hoped to trade had economies tightly 
controlled against foreign products so as to build up 
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domestic markets.  To Hamilton, all of these considerations 
made having the majority of the nation’s populace working 
in agriculture a weakness, not a strength as envisioned by 
Jefferson.  As one historian noted, “If, as Thomas 
Jefferson supposed, a nation of farmers was the closest 
approximation upon earth to paradise, Hamilton was of the 
opinion that the time of exodus was at hand.”73   
Throughout his report, Hamilton took issue with the 
opinions of the Physiocrats, French economists who, like 
Jefferson (who had become acquainted with several of them 
during his five years in Paris), revered agriculture and 
resisted any governmental attempts to steer a national 
economy.  Hamilton argued that mechanization would make 
manufacturing more productive and less expensive.  He also 
proposed government support for internal improvements such 
as roads and canals, which would serve to unify several 
regional markets into a single American economy.  He called 
for moderate tariffs, bounties on some products, patent 
protection for inventors, government inspection of 
manufactured goods, and many more regulations and 
incentives to make manufacturing an important aspect of the 
American economy.  In short, the report was a call for 
governmental activism to stimulate and grow the nation’s 
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economic diversity and power.  It was a report that foresaw 
America’s future, though it was a future that would not 
completely take hold until decades after Hamilton’s—and 
Jefferson’s—death. 
Again sensing that Jefferson and others would oppose 
him, Hamilton invoked authority for his manufacturing plan 
in the Constitution:  “The National Legislature has express 
authority ‘To lay and Collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the Common 
defense and general welfare’….”74  
Hamilton was right: Jefferson and others of like mind 
were aghast at his report.   James Madison lamented that 
Hamilton had overstepped the bounds intended by the 
Constitution’s “welfare clause” and that if Hamilton’s 
advice were followed, Congress would amass far too much 
power in deeming what was or was not appropriate for the 
nation’s welfare.  “If not only the means, but the objects, 
are unlimited,” Madison wrote to Henry Lee, “the parchment 
had better be thrown into the fire at once.”75  Jefferson 
agreed, telling President Washington that Hamilton read the 
welfare clause much too broadly, which permitted “…Congress 
to take everything under their management which they should 
                                                 
74 Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures,” p. 302. 
75 James Madison to Henry Lee, January 1, 1792, in Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Volume Two: 
Jefferson and the Rights of Man.  Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1951, p. 430. 
60 
 
deem for the public welfare.”76  Fundamental and decisive 
differences were beginning to appear among some of the 
nation’s most influential and powerful political figures, 
and the first party system was close at hand.  The 
differences between followers of Jefferson and Hamilton 
over issues such as manufacturing, agriculture, the 
national debt, and land distribution played key roles in 
the birth of American political parties.  Though Hamilton’s 
report on manufactures was shelved and subsequently ignored 
by Congress, its contents and recommendations reverberated 
in American society and politics for years to come. 
 
Despite Hamilton’s 1790 report on public lands made at 
the request of Congress, not until 1796 did that body again 
seriously examine the nation’s system of distributing and 
selling public lands.  The issue remained basically the 
same: how could western lands best be sold to provide funds 
to retire at least some of the national debt but also 
provide for inexpensive settlement by farmers? 
With a bill before Congress proposing a land office 
for selling lands northwest of the Ohio River, Democratic-
Republican Robert Rutherford of Virginia spoke before the 
House of Representatives on February 15, 1796, striking a 
                                                 
76 Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, p. 379. 
61 
 
Jeffersonian (and anti-Hamiltonian) tone in calling land 
speculation a “hydra” that had “done the country great 
harm.”  He called speculators “monsters” and feared that 
those in Europe were ready to join those in the United 
States to establish a land monopoly.  He continued, “This 
tract of country should be disposed of to real settlers, 
industrious, respectable persons, who are ready to pay a 
reasonable price for it, and not sold to persons who have 
no other view than engrossing riches.”77  Rutherford was 
vehemently opposed to the proposed bill, which he felt 
would line the pockets of the hated speculators and do 
little for those who wished to settle western lands.  He 
concluded by stating that he loved his country and all 
honest men and hoped the proposed bill would fail to pass.78 
On February 17, Democratic-Republican Albert Gallatin 
of Pennsylvania spoke at length on the proposed bill.  He 
made clear that in his mind, no issue was of greater 
importance to the nation than the eradication of the public 
debt, and no group would gain more from retiring the debt 
than the country’s poor.  It was possible, he stated, to 
pay off the entire debt within ten years, but in order to 
do so the country must raise revenue from land sales.  To 
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Gallatin, then, speculators, distasteful as they might be, 
had a role to play, and some large land tracts must be sold 
to them.  “If the whole were to be divided into small 
tracts,” he stated, “persons would choose here and there, 
and prevent men of property from purchasing large tracts 
lying together.”79  To counter domination by speculators and 
opposition from some of his Congressional colleagues, 
Gallatin also proposed that smaller tracts be available for 
those with little or no money to spend on land.  The 
majority with no capital could buy on credit from those 
that had it.  He recommended that half of the land affected 
by the proposed bill be sold by townships; the other half 
was to be sold in 640-acre sections.  Though Gallatin 
considered himself a friend of small settlers, he advocated 
a land price of $2.00 per acre, in contrast to the 30 cents 
per acre recommended in Hamilton’s 1790 report.  Gallatin 
appears to have worried incessantly about paying off the 
federal debt. 
Debate on the bill continued, and on March 3, 
Federalist John Williams of New York suggested a settlement 
clause be placed into land sale contracts requiring that at 
least one settler be located on every quarter-section 
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purchased within two years of the sale.  (This amendment 
eventually failed.)  Gallatin advocated this clause, though 
he conceded that it would likely reduce the number of sales 
made to speculators.  Gallatin now seemed to favor the 
government absorbing speculative profits on its own rather 
than having them go to the speculators themselves, and the 
easiest way to accomplish this was for the government to 
sell more land directly to settlers.  Gallatin’s earlier 
support for a minimum price of $2.00 per acre was sure to 
make this difficult, and Gallatin’s reversal is difficult 
to fully understand.  As Paul Wallace Gates noted, 
“Gallatin seemed to be on all sides of the issues revolving 
around speculators and settlers.”80  Perhaps Gallatin’s 
change of heart in favor of reducing speculation may have 
reflected pure political pragmatism since James Madison, 
then a Virginia representative and an acolyte of Thomas 
Jefferson, was one of those in Congress who agreed with 
Gallatin’s revised stance.  Gallatin and Madison began to 
work closely together on a number of issues, and when 
Jefferson became president in 1801, he brought both into 
his cabinet.  
During the 1796 debate, House members favoring making 
land available in smaller tracts tended to be those from 
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states and specific districts closest to the actual 
frontier, including such districts in Kentucky, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and New York.81 One powerful 
opponent, however, was Federalist William Cooper of New 
York, who owned vast tracts of land in his state and had 
spent years in the land business.  Cooper argued against 
distributing land in small tracts, since “…in the States of 
Pennsylvania and New York, where, though land was sold in 
small plots, there were not twenty instances of farmers 
buying it.”82 The “moneyed men,” as Cooper called them—
speculators—always bought the land and then sold it to the 
small farmers.  Cooper insisted that poor men never 
attended land sales at which he had been present, so he 
found the idea of Congress debating over dividing land and 
selling it to small farmers to be a waste of time. 
Senate records record little debate about this 
proposed land bill, which passed on May 18, 1796.  The 
final version created the position of Surveyor General and 
a surveying corps.  The rectangular survey system was 
retained; half of the available townships were to be 
divided into sections of 640 acres and sold in tracts of 
that size, while the other half of townships were left 
                                                 
81 Hibbard, History of the Public Land Policies, p. 62. 
82 Speech of William Cooper, April 5, 1796.  Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 
1st Session, p. 859. 
65 
 
undivided to be sold in quarters.  The bill established the 
two-dollars-per-acre price, of which one-twentieth was to 
be paid in cash at the time of sale.  Thirty days of credit 
was extended for the balance of the first half; the 
purchaser was permitted one year of credit on the second 
half.83 
By 1800, it was clear this bill was a failure.  Few 
sales had been made by settlers or speculators.  Less than 
50,000 acres had been sold over the course of four years, 
and in 1800 Congress realized that it had to again reassess 
the nation’s system of distributing public lands.  Another 
bill, commonly called “Harrison’s frontier bill” after Ohio 
Congressional delegate William Henry Harrison, its main 
sponsor, passed in 1800 but also did little to increase 
sales.  It also lacked a preemption measure, which was of 
great importance to many in the West.  The law retained the 
price of two dollars per acre.84   
Those hoping for cheap western lands for farming must 
surely have rejoiced when Thomas Jefferson won the 
presidency in 1800.  In his first inaugural address, 
Jefferson promised a “wise and frugal government” that 
would not “take from the mouth of labor the bread it has 
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earned” and would undertake the “encouragement of 
agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid.”85 
Jefferson’s presidency would prove to be an important 
one for the history and expansion of the West for one major 
reason: the Louisiana Purchase.  Jefferson knew that in 
order to ensure free American navigation of the Mississippi 
River the United States must acquire the city of New 
Orleans.  At the same time, he worried over reports that 
Spain was considering retrocession of the Louisiana 
Territory back to Napoleon Bonaparte’s France, a 
possibility Jefferson called “…an inauspicious circumstance 
to us.”86  The Spanish empire had long been in decline and 
viewed Louisiana as an expensive liability.  Napoleon 
coveted the massive territory as a place to reassert a 
major French presence in North America.  “There is on the 
globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our 
natural and habitual enemy,” Jefferson wrote to Robert 
Livingston, his emissary in France.  “It is New Orleans.”87   
Though himself a strong Francophile, Jefferson feared 
a French presence on the North American continent and knew 
that such a presence would force him to ally the United 
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States with England.  “The day that France takes possession 
of N. Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her 
forever within her low water mark,” he continued to 
Livingston.  “From that moment we must marry ourselves to 
the British fleet and nation.”  Acquiring New Orleans, 
“through which three eighths of our territory must pass to 
market” became imperative.88  If he could do that, as well 
as acquire the Floridas, which he mistakenly believed the 
French controlled, he could at least temporarily avoid the 
need for the alliance with Britain.89   
Something had to be done.  Westerners, whom Jefferson 
admired and who returned that admiration with political 
support, worried about their lands and the commerce down 
the Mississippi.  Jefferson also worried that Federalists 
in Congress would soon clamor for an ill-advised war with 
France.  War with Spain seemed a possibility as well, 
especially after the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans 
closed the right of deposit there in October 1802 in what 
was likely an attempt to halt American smuggling.90 
In January 1803, Jefferson sent James Monroe to France 
to work with Livingston and convince Bonaparte to sell New 
Orleans.  Monroe had just completed his third term as 
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governor of Virginia and was immensely popular with 
westerners, whose rights, including the free navigation of 
the Mississippi and inexpensive access to farmland, he had 
long championed.  Westerners were by and large not fond of 
Robert Livingston, a New York native, so Jefferson likely 
sought to reassure those in the West that he had their 
interests in mind by appointing Monroe.  The appointment of 
Monroe was approved by Congress on January 13, 1803, though 
it would be three months until he set foot in Paris.91  For 
his part, Livingston resented Monroe’s appointment and 
presence. 
Unknown to the American negotiators, Napoleon had 
already given up on his dream of reestablishing France in 
North America.  His expedition in St. Domingue (now Haiti) 
was a disaster due to the generalship of the rebel leader 
Toussaint L’Ouverture and the tropical diseases that 
ravaged his army’s ranks.  His own brother-in-law had died 
there of yellow fever.  These setbacks led Bonaparte to 
believe that he should abandon Louisiana, which he now 
expected eventually to lose to the British, whose navy had 
twenty ships in the Gulf of Mexico.  Better to sell it to 
the United States than allow the English to have it.  “They 
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only ask of me one town in Louisiana,” he told several of 
his advisors, “but I already consider the colony as 
entirely lost.”92  The next morning, he summoned his 
minister of finance, Francois Barbe-Marbois, and told him, 
“I renounce Louisiana….I renounce it with the greatest 
regret.  To attempt obstinately to retain it would be 
folly.”93  Bonaparte directed Barbe-Marbois to immediately 
begin negotiations with Livingston for the purchase of all 
Louisiana.  He wanted fifty million francs for it. 
That same morning, April 11, Livingston was called to 
the home of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the French 
minister of foreign relations with whom he had discussed 
the New Orleans situation for months.  Livingston wrote to 
James Madison later that day, “M. Talleyrand asked me this 
day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have 
the whole of Louisiana.”  Livingston was shocked, of 
course, but also aware that he had no authority from 
Jefferson or Congress to negotiate for the entire Louisiana 
Territory.  Livingston reported, “I told him no; that our 
wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas….He 
said that if they gave New Orleans the rest would be of 
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little value.”94  Over the next few days, Livingston began 
to realize the value of the offer.  Soon he, Monroe, 
Talleyrand, and Barbe-Marbois defined the general outline 
of the purchase.  The final price was 80 million francs, 
which included money to settle certain French debts.   
The purchase treaty’s third article stated that the 
inhabitants of Louisiana would be incorporated into the 
American Union as citizens as quickly as allowed by the 
Constitution, “and in the mean time they shall be 
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their 
liberty, property, and the Religion which they profess.”  
This article could have been written by Thomas Jefferson 
himself, since it included elements of both his 1785 plan 
for western government (that all states enter the Union as 
equals) and the Declaration of Independence.  The treaty 
was dated April 30, 1803; two months passed before anyone 
in the United States, including Jefferson, knew of it.  In 
a July 5 letter to his son-in-law, Jefferson lauded the 
treaty:  “This removes from us the greatest source of 
danger to our peace.”  Of the size of the purchase, he 
wrote, “It is something larger than the whole U.S., 
probably containing 500 millions of acres, the U.S. 
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containing 434 millions.”95  The purchase actually contained 
529 million acres.  The price was $15 million, though by 
the time all interest was paid that figure increased to 
$23.5 million, or about four cents per acre.96 
Even Jefferson’s old adversary, Alexander Hamilton, 
thought the Louisiana Purchase a mostly positive 
occurrence.  However, he was loath to give Jefferson any 
credit for it.  In a July 5, 1803 editorial in the New-York 
Evening Post, he credited the climate of St. Domingue for 
defeating Bonaparte’s army there and forcing him to rid 
himself of Louisiana.  “The real truth is,” wrote Hamilton, 
“Bonaparte found himself absolutely compelled by situation, 
to relinquish his darling plan of colonizing the banks of 
the Mississippi.”  Just to reinforce his point that 
Jefferson had little to do with the successful purchase, he 
added, “…the Government of the United States, by the 
unforeseen operation of events, gained what the feebleness 
and pusillanimity of its miserable system of measures could 
never have acquired.”  Hamilton also argued that New 
Orleans alone would have been plenty, since Louisiana was 
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“…not valuable to the United States for settlement.”97  How 
wrong he was about that. The Louisiana Territory contained 
the lands that eventually made up all or part of fifteen 
American states containing millions of acres of land for 
settlement and, perhaps most important to Jefferson and his 
followers, cultivation.  Jefferson now had territory across 
which he could spread his so-called empire of liberty. 
 
On November 25, 1803, the legislators of Mississippi 
Territory submitted a memorial to Congress on the subject 
of land settlement in their territory.  They argued that 
many who might come to Mississippi could not afford to pay 
the two dollars per acre the government currently charged 
for land there and that settlement was therefore greatly 
retarded.  To rectify the situation, they suggested that 
Congress should, instead of selling the lands, “…grant them 
in small tracts to actual settlers, who should continue to 
live on, and cultivate the same for five successive years.”  
The Mississippians asked for this provision only for three 
years in order to “accelerate the settlement and ensure the 
prosperity of the territory.”98  This was one of the 
earliest proposals for the free distribution of land by the 
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U.S. government.  Though it would take another six decades 
to germinate, the seeds of the Homestead Act had been 
planted. 
Over the next 15-20 years, the federal government 
experimented with various systems of land distribution, 
including credit and cash sales.  During much of this 
period, sectional differences toward the administration of 
the public domain were quite pronounced.  Northerners 
generally favored higher prices for western lands and 
slower settlement of them.  Those favoring this system 
sought to raise revenue for the national government but 
also prevent too many workers—mainly young people and 
recent immigrants—from abandoning the North all at once.   
Many Southerners, however, wanted to limit the 
government’s power and maintain a political balance with 
the North.  Cheap western land prices that siphoned off 
northerners to the West helped them accomplish these goals, 
so the South was happy to support low land prices that 
encouraged western migration.  This all changed, however, 
with the 1819-1821 Missouri controversy.  From that point 
forward, western land distribution became forever entwined 
with the political debate over the western expansion of 
slavery. 
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The United States acquired what became the territory 
and eventually the state of Missouri via the 1803 Louisiana 
Purchase.  Slavery existed in the Louisiana Territory 
during its ownership by both the Spanish and French, and 
the United States government agreed in the purchase treaty 
to protect Louisianans’ free enjoyment of liberty, 
property, and religion.  Most assumed that “property” 
included slaves.  When Missourians initially requested 
permission to begin the process of joining the Union, in 
April 1818, their petition to Congress said nothing of 
slavery.  Most likely, they saw no need to mention it: 
slaves made up one sixth of the territory’s population of 
66,000.99  Most assumed that slavery would continue to exist 
and prosper in Missouri, and there was little reason to 
believe that it would not. 
Representative Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire, 
however, threw up an unexpected roadblock.  On the very day 
the Missouri petition was reported, he proposed in the 
House a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery in any 
future states admitted to the Union.  This would include 
Missouri.  “The resolution was read,” according to the 
Annals of Congress, “and, on the question of proceeding to 
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its consideration, it was decided in the negative.”100  The 
issue lay dormant for the next seven months. 
In November 1818, a resolution for the admission of 
Illinois as a state was presented to Congress.  
Representative James Tallmadge, Jr., of New York spoke 
against it on the grounds that the Illinois constitution 
was not sufficiently anti-slavery: “The principle of 
slavery, if not adopted in the constitution, was at least 
not sufficiently prohibited.”  Tallmadge argued that the 
1787 Northwest Ordinance forbade slavery from the area now 
known as Illinois and referred to the Indiana constitution 
“to show how carefully and scrupulously it had guarded 
against slavery in any shape, and in the strongest terms 
reprobated it.”101  With their insistence on legislating 
anti-slavery, Livermore and Tallmadge laid the groundwork 
for the controversy over Missouri’s admission.   
Speaker of the House Henry Clay presented to the House 
a resolution from the Legislative Council and House of 
Representatives of Missouri on December 18, 1818.  The 
Missourians sought permission to adopt a constitution and 
form a state government.  In February 1819, when the House 
began debate on bills to enable Missouri and Alabama to 
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form state governments, Tallmadge struck again.  He moved 
that the bill to admit Missouri include a provision 
stipulating that “the further introduction of slavery or 
involuntary servitude be prohibited…and that all children 
of slaves, born within the said state, shall be free” upon 
reaching twenty-five years of age.102  Enraged at efforts to 
legislate emancipation, Georgia Representative Thomas W. 
Cobb thundered at Tallmadge, “If you persist, the Union 
will be dissolved.  You have kindled a fire which all the 
waters of the ocean cannot put out, which seas of blood can 
only extinguish.”  Tallmadge replied, “Sir, if a 
dissolution of the Union must take place, let it be so!  If 
civil war, which gentlemen so much threaten, must come, I 
can only say, let it come!”103  Tallmadge’s proposed 
amendment ignited the Missouri controversy that consumed 
Congress for the next two years.   
The real issue over Missouri was not slavery in that 
state or any other, but rather whether or not Congress 
could prohibit slavery in certain territories.  After more 
than a year of debate and suggestions of compromise, 
members of Congress agreed that it could.  By restricting 
slavery to areas below the 36 degrees, 30 minutes line 
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(excluding Missouri itself) Congress took an unprecedented 
step and allowed itself to determine where slavery could 
and could not exist.  Though the Compromise held for over 
three decades, it also completely changed the North-South 
dynamic in Congress. 
Prior to the Missouri controversy, American politics 
were dominated by the party system of Federalists and 
Republicans.  However, Federalists all but collapsed after 
the War of 1812 and were basically extinct by the time 
Missouri attempted to enter the Union with slavery.  As 
historian Robert Pierce Forbes noted, “The Missouri 
controversy marked the end of the old Jeffersonian 
alliances created to fight the centralizing and repressive 
tendencies of the Federalists.”104  The desire to combat 
Federalism had produced strange and often uneasy Republican 
alliances between southern agriculturalists and northern 
industrialists, artisans, and small farmers.  The Missouri 
controversy ended these alliances, and the South knew it.   
Southern Republicans complained that without the 
Federalist threat to unite them, their northern colleagues 
were more than happy to abandon them over the slavery 
issue.  Many southern political leaders concluded that 
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slavery, so vital to their economic and social structures, 
was now under attack.  Shrinking and limiting the power of 
the government was the only way to make it less threatening 
to the slave system.  If that meant opposing measures like 
roads and canals that would benefit the people and commerce 
of the nation, so be it.  “If Congress can make canals,” 
said North Carolina’s Nathaniel Macon, “they can with more 
propriety emancipate.”105  Historian Don Fehrenbacher noted 
that after 1820, “It became increasingly difficult for a 
defender of slavery to support the expansion of federal 
power.  John C. Calhoun managed to do so for just a few 
more years.”106  Another historian, George Dangerfield, put 
it even more simply: “In a sense, the Tallmadge Amendment, 
with its train of town-meetings, pamphlets, editorials, and 
debates, summoned the South into being.”107  Sectional 
differences, both between ordinary citizens and members of 
Congress, increased in frequency and ferocity after the 
Missouri controversy.   
Thomas Jefferson, nearly eighty and long retired at 
Monticello, weighed in on the unpleasantness over Missouri. 
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He wrote to Maine Representative John Holmes on April 22, 
1820:  
But this momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, 
awakened and filled me with terror.  I considered it at  
once as the knell of the Union….But this is a reprieve only, 
not a final sentence.  A geographical line, coinciding with 
a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and 
held up to the angry passions of men, will never be oblit- 
erated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and  
deeper…. I regret to say that I am now to die in the belief, 
that the useless sacrifice of themselves by the generation 
of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness to their 
country, is to be thrown away by the unwise and unworthy  
passions of their sons, and that my only consolation is to 
be, that I live not to weep over it.108 
  
 
The expansion and limitation of slavery were destined 
to be the preeminent, but not the only, political issue of 
the next forty years.  Politicians, speculators, poor 
farmers, immigrants, and others continued to argue and 
debate the best ways for the government to distribute 
public lands (if at all).  The geographic line between 
slave and free territories established by the Missouri 
Compromise was critical to these debates, as was the new 
post-Missouri political reality.  From this point on, few 
southerners supported the government distributing public 
lands in small tracts cheaply or freely because they knew 
that many who claimed it would take lands north of the 
Missouri Compromise line, build up populations, and 
eventually attain statehood.  Before long, the South 
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feared, it would be far outnumbered in Congress, and surely 
the North would then set it sights on emancipation.  No 
free homestead bill could be allowed to pass.  Better to 
leave the West unpopulated and barren than permit free soil 
settlers into it.  This remained the policy of many 
southern politicians for the next forty years, and for that 
entire period they succeeded in blocking passage of several 
free land bills that came before them.  In the meantime, 
the Second Party System arose, and issues of land and 
improvements continued to be of great importance. 
 
The period between the Constitutional Convention and 
the Missouri Compromise was an important one in the history 
of American land policy and the march toward the Homestead 
Act.  It was during this period that the nation more than 
doubled in size via the Louisiana Purchase; millions of 
homesteads would eventually be claimed throughout the more 
than 800,000 square miles of the Purchase.  Hamilton and 
Jefferson became arch enemies during this period as well, 
and at least part of their animosity toward one another 
came from their differing philosophies on how best to 
manage and distribute the public domain.  With the Missouri 
Compromise, land distribution became forever linked with 
the expansion of slavery.  If the Missouri controversy did, 
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as Dangerfield claimed, “summon the South into being,” then 
land distribution and, eventually, the push for a homestead 
bill can be definitively identified as an important source 
of sectional tension for the next forty years and a major 
cause of the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE NATIONAL HOMESTEADING DEBATE EMERGES 
 
   
 As the 1820s began, Jefferson’s old Republican Party 
had succeeded in ousting the Federalists from power and 
becoming the nation’s only truly national party.  However, 
despite this period being labeled “the Era of Good 
Feelings,” factionalism and sectionalism in Congress had 
never been more pronounced. Disagreements over land 
policies and distribution played major roles in producing 
and prolonging these conflicts.  Though the recently 
reelected President James Monroe extolled “the prosperous 
and happy condition of our country,”109 in 1820 definite 
battle lines were being drawn over a number of issues 
important to the future of federal land policies. 
 Hamiltonian attitudes regarding several land-related 
issues made a brief comeback in the 1820s, mainly in the 
form of Henry Clay’s so-called American System of internal 
improvements.  Clay and his Whig allies sought to build up 
manufacturing interests and create a home market for the 
agricultural products of the South and the burgeoning West.  
One important aspect of this system was a protective tariff 
to shield manufacturers from foreign competition, and one 
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passed Congress in 1824.  The passage of this tariff and 
the beliefs and influence of notable political figures like 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams gave credence to the 
rising strength of Hamiltonian forces.  Adams viewed the 
public domain as a great national resource from which 
profits should flow for the benefit and education of 
Americans.  Elected as president, he noted in his First 
Annual Message to Congress in 1825 that “The purchasers of 
public lands are among the most useful of our fellow 
citizens….The tide of wealth with which they replenish the 
common Treasury may be made to reflow in unfailing streams 
of improvement from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.”110  
Adams’s belief that proceeds from the sale of public lands 
should be distributed among the states for educational 
purposes found support in state legislatures, especially in 
the eastern states that expected to receive the largest 
shares. 
 Adams also believed, however, that lands in the West 
should be distributed without causing any economic injury 
to the real estate and manufacturing interests of the East.  
“The bee that robs the hive of his neighbor,” he stated, 
“becomes idle and improvident—and is never known to profit 
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even by the flowers in his own garden, and the outrage 
usually results in the death of the robber and the 
robbed.”111  Here Adams demonstrated that he and his allies 
wished to make maximum profits from western land sales but 
use those profits to benefit the manufacturing interests of 
the East.  This angered those in the West who believed that 
any profits from selling land in their region should be 
used to benefit their own agricultural interests, not 
eastern capitalists.  Adams’s stance also angered the 
South, which received no real benefit from the high 
protective tariff Adams and his allies supported.  With no 
major manufacturing interests to speak of, the South bore 
the burden of the protective tariff without receiving any 
advantages from it.  During the argument over the tariff 
that eventually passed in 1824, Virginia Representative 
John Randolph angrily exclaimed, “If…you draw the last 
shilling from our pockets, what are the checks of the 
Constitution to us?  When the scorpion’s sting is probing 
us to the quick, shall we stop to chop logic?”112 
 Many from the South and West agreed with Randolph, and 
a powerful alliance of those two regions arose to oppose 
Adams, Henry Clay, and the political faction of Republicans 
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that eventually became known as Whigs.  This alliance 
organized itself during Adams’s presidency and eventually 
became the new Democratic Party.  Andrew Jackson became the 
Democrats’ first national hero, based largely on his 
standing as a popular military commander and his 1824 
electoral defeat at the hands of John Quincy Adams despite 
Jackson’s victory in the popular vote.  Agricultural 
interests and disagreements over federal land policies 
played a major role in the rise of Jacksonian democracy and 
the short-lived return of Hamiltonian policies championed 
by Adams and Clay. 
  
 In the long and constant struggle over the direction 
of federal land policies, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of 
Missouri became one of Congress’s foremost authorities on 
and advocates for liberal land distribution.  He was highly 
regarded by his colleagues and his constituents, and he 
spoke on western issues as a westerner who understood and 
represented his region’s economic and social interests.   
 While the controversial tariff was debated in Congress 
in 1824, Benton proposed a bill calling for graduation in 
the price of land.  He thought it unfair that $1.25 per 
acre was the set price for the purchase of any acre of the 
public domain, regardless of the land’s quality.  “It is 
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unjust to the people,” he said, “because it prevents them 
from getting the inferior land at a fair price; unjust to 
the states, because it checks their population and deprives 
them of their right of taxation; unjust to the nation, 
because it prevents the public treasury from receiving the 
money which such land is worth and for which it would 
sell.”113  Benton’s bill established 50 cents per acre as a 
minimum price for poorer lands and gave away the worst 
lands to people willing to live on and cultivate them.  
Though the bill received little attention amidst the 
furious tariff debate, it was notable for establishing in 
Congress the possibility of distributing public land for 
free. 
 In the four years between 1824 and 1828, the South and 
West brought forward several measures to counter President 
Adams’s proposal to distribute profits from land sales 
among states for education and internal improvements.  
These proposed measures included graduation, donation, and 
preemption (giving “squatter’s rights” to those living on 
land they did not own).  All of these ideas greatly 
concerned the conservatives of the North and East.  Adams 
recorded in his diary on December 31, 1828 that he had 
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spoken with Henry Clay, who expressed “great concern…[over] 
the prospects of the country—the threats of disunion from 
the South, and the graspings after all public lands, which 
are disclosing themselves in the Western States.”114  
Eastern newspapers published editorials lamenting 
Congress’s agrarian tendencies and the perceived rush to 
distribute public lands.  The Canal of Intelligence of 
Norwich, Connecticut, called for “a little Yankee 
management” of the situation, adding that the government 
should “make fair bargains, give credit only where payment 
can be reasonably expected, and then hold the parties to 
strict accountability.”115 
 Some in the East agreed with agrarian sentiments, 
however.  A major labor newspaper, The Mechanics’ Free 
Press, implored Congress to make all public lands 
immediately available to the people by right of a title of 
occupancy only.  “The present state of affairs must lead to 
the wealth of the few,” an editorial read.  “All men have a 
natural right to the soil, else they will be deprived of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”116 
 Despite the East’s misgivings about agrarianism and 
the West’s growing political influence, the alliance 
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between the South and West made possible the rise of the 
new Democratic Party.  This party elected Andrew Jackson 
president in 1828, and the East had no choice but to 
recognize the importance of the West.  By 1830, when 
approximately one-third of Americans were westerners, their 
priorities increasingly shaped the nation’s agenda.  The 
region’s population and influence were growing, and its 
residents’ opinions about land distribution and agrarianism 
could no longer be ignored or denigrated by the politicians 
of the East.  In the words of historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner, Jackson’s 1828 electoral victory and the rise of 
the new Democrats “meant that an agricultural society, 
strongest in the regions of rural isolation…, had triumphed 
for the moment over the conservative, industrial, 
commercial, and manufacturing society of the New England 
type….  A new, aggressive, expansive democracy…had come 
into control.”117 
 Issues of land availability and distribution were 
necessarily important to the West, which had no major 
manufacturing interests but possessed great agricultural 
potential and the ability to accommodate countless new 
settlers.  Westerners and those interested in seeing the 
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public domain made available for settlement and cultivation 
had reason to expect that the newly-elected Jackson would 
look favorably upon them.  As Thomas Hart Benton stated, 
“The manufacturers want poor people to do the work for 
small wages; these poor people wish to go to the West and 
get land; to have flocks and herds—to have their own 
fields, orchards, gardens, and meadows—their own cribs, 
barns, and dairies, and to start their children on a 
theater where they can contend with equal chances for the 
honors and dignities of the country.”118 
 Many Southerners recognized that both the South and 
West opposed the economic policies of the East, albeit for 
different reasons.  Westerners desired low prices and 
liberal access to public lands for the purposes of 
settlement and cultivation.  Southerners wanted a low 
tariff, opposed by many easterners because it meant 
increased foreign competition and a likely reduction in 
profits.  Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina 
recognized these differing motivations and suggested that 
the South and West work together based on their common 
enmity toward the East.  Though such a partnership would 
become inconceivable later as the spread of slavery into 
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the West became the South’s main concern regarding public 
lands, that aspect of sectionalism was not yet fully 
ingrained into the minds of most in the South or the West. 
 Ultimately, Hayne’s proposed partnership between 
southerners and westerners accomplished little besides 
infuriating politicians of the North and East, including 
Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts.  In an attempt to 
defend New England’s position, Webster answered many of 
Hayne’s statements in a long Senate debate that captivated 
many but produced no real solution.  Benton’s graduation 
bill passed the Senate in May 1830 but was allowed to die 
in the House of Representatives.  Every senator from the 
East voted against it.  Though the West-South partnership 
succeeded in pushing it through the Senate, it was not 
strong enough to ensure the bill’s passage.  
  
 Removal of American Indians from western lands was 
another critical land issue on which those living in the 
West demanded action.  This was also an issue in some 
southern states and therefore represented another 
opportunity for partnership between those two sections.  
Being of both the West and the South and a former Indian 
fighter to boot, Andrew Jackson sought to quickly and 
decisively remove Indians from lands on which they had 
91 
 
lived for generations but, in his mind, would better serve 
white American farmers.  Many in Georgia, the Carolinas, 
Florida, Alabama, and even Illinois implored Jackson to 
act.  They had waited for years for federal lawmakers to 
deal with their perceived “Indian problems,” and they 
sensed an opportunity with Jackson in the White House.   
With many states, especially Illinois, threatening to 
deal directly with removal of natives, Jackson became 
convinced that something must be done immediately.  He 
noted in his Annual Message to Congress in December 1829 
that federal policies toward natives had largely failed.  
Indians making way for whites by heading to new lands 
“should be voluntary,” he stated, “for it would be as cruel 
as unjust to compel the aborigines to abandon the graves of 
their fathers and seek a home in a distant land.  But they 
should be distinctly informed that if they remain within 
the limits of the states they must be subject to their 
laws.”119 
Jackson’s administration offered Indians no real 
opportunity to remain “within the limits of the states.”  
Forcible removal became the federal government’s policy, 
and it was largely accomplished by the mid-1830s.  The 
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areas between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River and 
eastern Iowa were cleared of Indian title, resulting in 
millions of acres of land suddenly opened to settlers and 
the creation of Iowa and Wisconsin Territories.  Countless 
acres in several southern states were cleared of natives 
and opened to white farmers as well.  The West and South 
considered Indian removal a major victory and the 
accomplishment of a goal both had long sought.  For the 
Indians, of course, it was another in a long line of 
travesties at the hands of the U.S. government.  The new 
“Indian frontier” in the far west (much but not all of it 
in what is now Oklahoma) was supposed to be permanent, but 
one wonders how many of those removed truly believed that 
the United States would honor its promise to leave them 
alone “as long as the grass shall grow and rivers flow.”  
Once the removal of Indians was considered complete, strong 
demand arose for rapid surveys of the newly acquired lands 
so that they might be opened for immediate settlement. 
 
In March 1832, while Indian removal was still ongoing, 
public land policy came to a head in Congress.  Western and 
southern allies in the Senate referred measures on tariffs 
and public lands to the Committee on Manufactures, chaired 
by Henry Clay.  Their goal was to secure a reduction in the 
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price of public lands.  Clay was immediately suspicious:  
“A majority of the Senate referred a resolution concerning 
public lands to the Committee of Manufactures!  Can you 
conceive a more incongruous association of subjects?”  Clay 
suspected that he was being set up and that this move by 
his opponents “was to affect me personally by placing me in 
a situation in which I must report unfavorably to the 
western and southwestern states which are desirous of 
possessing themselves of the public lands.”120  If his 
enemies could not accomplish their goals through 
legislation, they would try to shame Clay into giving them 
what they wanted. 
Clay did not take the bait.  His committee reported 
that a price reduction was not advisable and that the 
current pace of land sales proved that the price of public 
land was not prohibitively high.  To reduce prices would 
only result in acquisition of more land by speculators, 
which would be no help to those hoping to settle in the 
West. He called for a system of distribution of land 
revenues among the states according to their number of 
representatives in Congress.  The states would be free to 
apply this money to education, internal improvements, debt 
reduction, or other purposes.  
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Thomas Hart Benton was outraged and became convinced 
that Clay and his allies cared only for increasing the 
federal government’s power over the individual states.  
Benton and his Committee on Public Lands immediately 
challenged Clay’s findings and objected to the Committee on 
Manufactures’ right even to examine questions dealing with 
the public domain.  (On this point, Benton might have 
actually agreed with Clay, who wondered the same thing.)  
Benton argued for a reduction in public land prices in 
order to make more land accessible to more settlers.  The 
public domain, he argued, should be used as a means of 
building up individuals and communities, not a source of 
revenue to the federal government or the individual states. 
Andrew Jackson finally weighed in on this controversy 
in his December 1832 Annual Message to Congress.  “The 
wealth and strength of a country,” he wrote, “are its 
population, and the best part of that population are the 
cultivators of the soil.  Independent farmers are 
everywhere the basis of society and the true friends of 
liberty.”  Jackson went on to state that he believed that 
the public domain should cease to be a revenue source for 
the government and that residents of the West had paid more 
than their fair share of taxes and land fees for which they 
had thus far received little in return.  Jackson also 
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reiterated his opposition to any federal funding for 
internal improvements.121 
 Despite Jackson’s message, Clay’s distribution bill 
passed the Senate in December and eventually passed the 
House of Representatives as well.  Jackson pocket vetoed it 
on the grounds that distribution in reality equaled federal 
funding for internal improvements, no matter how indirectly 
it proponents wished to characterize it.122  Clay called 
Jackson’s veto unconstitutional and offered his opinion 
that the president had “despotically” pocket vetoed the 
measure.123 
 
About five weeks after Martin Van Buren became the 
eighth president, every bank in New York City stopped 
specie payments, and the Panic of 1837 ensued.  Whigs were 
quick to blame Jacksonian policies such as the denial of 
re-chartering the Bank of the United States.  “The Hero of 
the Hermitage,” wrote Clay, “has lived to hear himself 
cursed as bitterly and as lowdly [sic] as any of his Class 
of whom History treats.”124  Van Buren called Congress back 
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to Washington for a special session to deal with the 
nation’s financial difficulties. 
 The panic was particularly felt in the West, where 
banks crashed and the few ongoing internal improvement 
projects ceased.  Several state legislatures passed laws 
increasing taxes on lands, which caused many speculators to 
sell quickly and cheaply.  In this way, settlers may have 
actually benefitted from the nation’s financial chaos by 
having an abundance of cheap lands made suddenly available.  
Most of the settlers who acquired land at this time were 
already in the West.  Despite the opinions of Horace 
Greeley and others that the panic would actually spur 
migration to the West, very few easterners could afford to 
buy transportation there or, once arrived, the necessary 
equipment and implements to establish a farm. 
 In Congress, the panic led to more sectional battles 
about land distribution.  Thomas Hart Benton reintroduced 
his graduation bill to reduce the price of public lands 
proportional to how long they had been on the market.  Clay 
opposed this, fearing it would drive land values down even 
further.  Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina 
presented a plan under which all federal land laws would 
remain unchanged, the federal government would receive 12.5 
percent of the proceeds of all state land sales, and all 
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states would be required to receive congressional approval 
before lowering the prices of their lands.  None of these 
plans went anywhere in Congress. 
 Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi introduced a 
preemption bill before the Senate on January 25, 1838.   He 
argued that allowing preemption for actual settlers on 
public lands would serve to increase the value of other 
unsold property.  The bill was designed to “confine the 
settler to the space he occupies, giving him preference in 
the purchase, at the Government price, over the 
speculator.”125 Providing this right to those living on 
lands to which they had no legal title would add value to 
nearby lands because, Walker said, “It is population in the 
immediate neighborhood that gives value to the public 
lands, which would otherwise bring little or nothing.”126  
He decried the dishonest practices of speculators and 
linked preemption with western expansion, stating, “God 
grant they (settlers) may go on adding to this glorious 
Republic State after State, until we have one long line of 
States to the Pacific.”127 
 Walker’s bill disgusted Clay, who viewed preemption as 
a reward for breaking the law.  “The whole preemption 
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system is a violation of all law,” he told the Senate the 
day after Walker introduced his bill, adding that the bill 
was “an encouragement to persons to go on the public lands 
and take the choicest portion of them.”128  Van Buren’s and 
Benton’s support for the bill only made Clay’s opposition 
more rigid and his belief that they were merely seeking 
political popularity in the West more entrenched in his 
mind.  Horace Greeley wrote in the June 23, 1838 issue of 
The Jeffersonian that the preemption bill appeared to him 
to be “calculated to set our western people hunting after 
sudden fortunes in making a claim upon some choice tract of 
land…instead of striving to improve their circumstances by 
regular and patient industry.  It looks like a premium on 
thriftlessness and gambling adventure.”129 
 The debate over preemption grew so contentious that 
the Senate eventually dropped the Walker bill and elected 
instead to concur in the passage of a watered-down version 
that came out of the House of Representatives.  The passage 
of this bill was an overwhelming victory for the Democrats; 
even some western Whigs broke ranks and supported it.  
Preemption continued to be debated for the next few years 
in Congress, and everyone could see that western land 
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issues would be of great importance in the upcoming 1840 
presidential campaign.  In 1838, John C. Calhoun predicted 
that the 1840 census would show the West had sufficient 
population to control approximately five-twelfths of the 
Electoral College.  If that were to be the case, according 
to Calhoun, the candidate who best catered to the West 
during the campaign would surely win the presidency.130 
William Henry Harrison was that candidate.  The hero 
of Tippecanoe was a former Democrat who had authored the 
Land Bill of 1800, which had reduced the minimum amount of 
land that could be purchased in the old Northwest, thereby 
making more land available to more settlers.  Harrison 
played to his western audience during the campaign by 
reminding them of his role in devising the bill “which had 
for its object to snatch from the grasp of speculation all 
this glorious country which now teems with harvests under 
the hands of honest, industrious, and virtuous 
husbandmen.”131 
   Harrison portrayed himself as a hearty frontiersman 
and his Democratic opponent, President Martin Van Buren, as 
a wealthy eastern snob living richly at public expense.  
Few were aware of Harrison’s own personal wealth; his “log 
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cabin” image fascinated the public and helped him connect 
with those suffering in the nation’s poor economy, which 
the Whigs predictably and effectively blamed on Van Buren.  
Harrison cruised to an electoral victory, proving the 
validity of Calhoun’s earlier prediction about the growing 
importance of the West. 
  In 1846, Representative Jacob Thompson of 
Mississippi, during a speech on public lands issues, 
explained Harrison’s appeal and the real reason for his 
victory in 1840: 
 No one fact of circumstance had so powerful a control over 
 the minds of the great masses in the Mississippi Valley in 
 winning their affections to General Harrison as that he had 
 been a pioneer himself, a settler, in the western sense of 
 that term, had lived in a log cabin, and had favored all of 
 the laws which had tended to the protection and security of  
 the squatter.  Here was the consideration which threw confu- 
 sion into the ranks of the Democratic party.  This was the 
 lever by which the Whig party raised themselves from a hope- 
 less minority into an unexpected and triumphant majority.   
 The supposed sympathy of General Harrison, and the reputed 
 aversion of Van Buren for the poor man, for the humble citi- 
 zen, is the true secret of the great and tremendous political 
 revolution of 1840.132  
 
 Thompson considered the 1840 election a “revolution” 
because it represented what many believed would be the 
culmination of two decades of sectional struggle over 
public lands issues.  Conservative easterners tended to 
look at the western states and territories as something 
akin to colonies and treat them with paternalistic 
                                                 
132 Speech of Jacob Thompson, July 9, 1846, in Congressional Globe: House of Representatives, 29th 
Congress, 1st Session, p. 777. 
101 
 
condescension.  They also preferred to view western lands 
as sources of revenue for the national government.  Those 
living in the West, however, wanted no part of a system 
that viewed their region as good for little more than 
raising money for the U.S. Treasury.  Land was the one 
thing the West had in abundance, and westerners sought 
legislation from Congress that would put that land into the 
hands of settlers, not speculators.  Therefore, westerners 
tended to favor enactment of a preemption system. Their 
most vocal champion during the 1830s and 1840s was Thomas 
Hart Benton. 
Easterners, however, feared that preemption would 
result in massive population losses for the old states if 
young men and their families bolted for cheap western 
lands.  These same easterners also feared the potential 
agricultural power of the West, which could threaten the 
farms and farm products of the Atlantic states.  They 
tended to favor the distribution system, which disavowed 
preemption, continued the sales of public land, and then 
distributed the proceeds among all states according to the 
numbers of their congressional representatives.  This was 
Clay’s preferred system, and his support of it brought him 
no small measure of grief from westerners. 
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Many inhabitants of the West believed their moment had 
arrived with the election of Harrison.  Land debates, 
however, would only increase in frequency and intensity 
during the decade.  Calhoun opposed Clay’s distribution 
system because he feared it would mean the return of a high 
tariff, always political anathema to the South and other 
proponents of states’ rights.  Calhoun presciently foresaw 
that the election of 1840 was not even close to the end of 
the rancorous debates over distribution of public land.  “I 
regard the question of public lands, next to that of the 
currency, the most dangerous and difficult of all which 
demand the attention of the country and government at this 
important junction of our affairs,” he told the Senate on 
January 12, 1841.133 
President Harrison’s death after just one month in 
office complicated land matters further.  Vice President 
John Tyler of Virginia assumed office upon Harrison’s 
death.  Like so many vice presidential candidates, Tyler 
had been selected to provide geographic balance on the 
ticket in 1840.  Neither Harrison nor anyone else expected 
the former Democrat Tyler ever to occupy the White House.  
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In fact, according to historian George M. Stephenson, “The 
victory of the Whigs proved to be their undoing.”134 
Tyler was an extreme proponent of states’ rights who 
had little in common with Harrison and other northern Whigs 
except opposition to Martin Van Buren.  He had been placed 
on the ticket merely to appeal to those Whigs who had been 
so horrified and frustrated by what they viewed as the 
monarchical attitude of Andrew Jackson and his successor, 
Van Buren.  Like Harrison, Tyler had said little about 
public land issues during the campaign.  In fact, the Whig 
party seemed to have no real plan for public lands. What 
Harrison had said about them during his presidential run 
had been geared specifically toward the audience he 
addressed.  No one really knew what course Harrison would 
pursue toward the public lands as president.  When he died 
and Tyler assumed office, most said the same of Tyler.  
Fellow Whig John Quincy Adams thus assessed Tyler’s fitness 
for office and likely course of action: “Tyler is a 
political sectarian, of the slave-driving, Virginian, 
Jeffersonian school, principled against all improvement, 
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with all the interests and passions and vices of slavery 
rooted in his moral and political constitution.”135 
When Tyler sent his first message to Congress and came 
out in favor of distribution, most Democrats assumed that 
Henry Clay—whom many referred to as the “Acting President”—
was calling the shots for Tyler.  Tyler, however, was not 
so easily influenced by Clay, with whom he sometimes agreed 
but just as often disagreed.  Several times Tyler vetoed 
bills Clay supported.  When westerners again began to force 
the issue of a stronger preemption bill, Clay naturally 
assumed that the Congress’s Whig majority would follow his 
lead and oppose it.   
However, proponents wisely and shrewdly combined the 
preemption bill with a distribution amendment, which 
included a proviso that the distribution law would be 
suspended when the rate of tariff duties was above twenty 
percent.  Though westerners were the only group universally 
pleased, Tyler signed the bill into law.  It provided 
settlers the opportunity to purchase land on which they 
lived without legal title before it was offered for public 
sale.  The distribution provision stated that after 
December 31, 1841, ten percent of the proceeds of public 
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land sales in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Michigan would be 
returned to those states.  The remainder of public land 
proceeds (less the expenses of surveys and administration)  
would be divided among the other states and territories 
according to representation in Congress.136  
In August 1842, both houses of Congress passed a 
tariff measure raising the duties to about the twenty 
percent level, effectively killing the distribution side of 
the combined preemption-distribution bill.  Hence, only the 
preemption law remained active.  This was a major and 
somewhat unexpected victory for the West.  Under the 1841 
preemption bill, an individual was free to move onto a 
tract of surveyed public land up to 160 acres in size and 
stake a claim that, so long as he paid the government 
minimum price of $1.25 per acre, no one else could take or 
purchase out from under him.  The preemptive settler had to 
be at least twenty-one years old or, if younger, the head 
of a family, and had to be either a U.S. citizen or have 
filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen.  The 
settler was not permitted to own more than 320 acres of 
land in any state or territory. 
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The Preemption Act of 1842 recognized four general 
principles that later came to be associated with the 
Homestead Act: settlement of the public domain was more 
preferable than public lands generating revenue; Congress 
intended that the benefits of the law apply to those who 
had little or no land already; small farms were preferable 
so that as many as possible could benefit from the law; and 
settlers should be free from intrusion and have sufficient 
time to gather the required sum to purchase the land (or, 
later, make improvements to it).137 
The Preemption Act did not, of course, end the debate 
over land distribution.  If anything, it hardened the 
resolve of politicians from various sections of the country 
to either expand or destroy it.  The law was, however, 
something of a victory for the West over the traditionally 
conservative interests and political figures of the East.  
It was, at the time, the most important, far-reaching land 
law Congress had passed in the history of the country.  
Almost immediately, though, westerners began to sense their 
own power and began clamoring for more: specifically, a law 
that would grant public land for free. 
Shortly after the passage of the Preemption Act, many 
easterners sensed and feared the West’s growing power and 
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influence.  In an effort to check this development, some 
Whigs attempted to bring back their distribution plan, 
which had been automatically repealed in 1842 when the 
tariff was raised above twenty percent.  New York Tribune 
editor Horace Greeley, a loyal Whig, attempted to ensure 
that the land issue would be at the forefront of the 
upcoming 1844 presidential election.  In his words, 
distribution was “a measure of strict justice to the 
states, of relief to the impoverished and bankrupt, and of 
encouragement to education and internal improvement.”  He 
feared that the next Congress would “feel the influx of an 
enormously increased proportion of Representatives of the 
squatter interest, clamorous for spoliation of the Old 
States altogether, by measures of graduation, loose 
preemption, or direct cession of these lands.”138 
Greeley also worried that “one year of prosperous 
industry will lead to heavy purchases of public lands; then 
comes an excessive revenue, next a reduction of the tariff 
in the midst of good prices, next excessive importations 
followed by derangement, bankruptcy and distress.  Friends 
of American industry!  Stand by the land distribution!  It 
is the sheer anchor of our safety!”139  To Greeley and many 
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other Whigs, going against distribution would clearly lead 
to a slippery slope of moves that would eventually result 
in the destruction of the American economy.  Democrats, 
including Van Buren, believed that income from the public 
domain would be better used for the benefit of the entire 
nation if placed into the general treasury.  Southerners 
naturally agreed with Van Buren since this would ensure a 
lower tariff. 
Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi introduced 
another graduation bill in the Senate on December 11, 1843.  
Walker had, in 1838, also proposed a preemption bill.  In 
his 1843 measure, he sought to graduate the price of public 
lands in order to aid settlers and cultivators, making 
public land prices dependent upon the land’s quality rather 
than making all land available at the same price per acre 
regardless of its suitability for cultivation.  Still 
hoping to make land policy a large issue for the 1844 
campaign, Horace Greeley responded: “We must watch and foil 
the demagogues who are incessantly trying to squander the 
public lands by reducing their price….  The public lands 
are the great regulator of the relations of Labor and 
Capital, the safety valve of our industrial and social 
engine; and woe to this people should they by any cheating 
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pretense of favoring ‘poor settlers’ be alienated, or 
suffered to be absorbed by the few.”140 
Public land policy did not ultimately become a major 
issue in the 1844 campaign, though western expansion did.  
Perhaps most notably, Walker of Mississippi, nearly as 
vocal an advocate for graduation as Thomas Hart Benton, was 
named Secretary of the Treasury in the new James K. Polk 
administration.  President Polk, a southern Democrat, was 
also an outspoken supporter of reducing land prices.  In 
his December 1845 message to Congress, he stated that, “By 
adopting the policy of graduation and reduction of prices 
these inferior lands will be sold for their real value, 
while the States in which they lie will be freed from the 
inconvenience, if not injustice, to which they are 
subjected in consequence of the United States continuing to 
own large quantities of the public lands within their 
borders not liable to taxation for the support of their 
local governments.”141 
Horace Greeley responded in his newspaper’s pages.  
“If ever there was a scheme,” he wrote of Polk’s stance on 
graduation, “full of mischief and injustice, this is one.  
It ought to be entitled ‘A bill to discourage and prevent 
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all payment for the public lands, and enable speculators to 
get them ultimately for a song.’”142  Greeley’s strong 
stance against graduation or any price reduction on public 
lands makes his eventual support for homesteading—giving 
those lands away for no monetary cost—curious and subject 
to charges of being either politically expedient or 
politically brilliant. 
As the population and political influence of the West 
began to grow, the Whig view of the proper use of public 
lands looked more and more unrealistic.  Jacob Thompson of 
Mississippi pointed this out in a speech in the House of 
Representatives on July 9, 1846.  He blasted the Whigs in 
general and Henry Clay in particular.  Clay’s stance 
“always lost him the vote of the new states, and it must 
and will be the fate of all those who follow in his 
footsteps.”  Easterners would “never learn that 
distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public 
lands among the States is an exploded, an ‘obsolete idea,’ 
condemned by the people, unauthorized by the Constitution, 
and founded in injustice and a false economy.”  According 
to Thompson, Clay’s boldness and eloquence should have won 
him the loyalty of westerners, but his stands against 
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preemption and for distribution made them “turn away with 
odium and disgust.”143 
Another graduation bill came before Congress in the 
summer of 1846, passing the Senate by a party-line vote but 
being tabled in the House of Representatives.  Greeley, for 
one, saw the writing on the wall and finally seemed to 
admit that the Whig view of the public lands would never 
pass and had to change.  There was, he stated, “but one 
hope left.  That rests on the principle of freedom of the 
lands in small tracts (not over 160 acres) to actual 
settlers only, each paying the sum adequate to the cost of 
survey, etc. for the right of occupancy only… [and] 
inalienable except by the free consent of the holder, and 
not alienable then except to one who possesses no other 
land.”144  In this passage, Greeley had not only outlined 
the skeleton of the eventual Homestead Act but had 
essentially challenged the Whigs to consider and adopt a 
completely new way of thinking about the public lands.  The 
real question was whether or not they would accept that 
challenge. 
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The mid-1840s through the end of that decade witnessed 
a flurry of congressional activity on a number of homestead 
measures.  Representative Felix McConnell of Alabama 
presented a bill in March 1846, and Andrew Johnson of 
Tennessee attempted to introduce another just three days 
later.  Illinois Representative Orlando Ficklin presented a 
bill that provided for homesteads of eighty acres and made 
the land inalienable for debt for ten years.  To Greeley, 
this was a positive step forward but one that did not go 
far enough.  None of these bills went very far, and the 
matter was temporarily shelved during the 1846-48 Mexican-
American War. 
During and especially after the war, those seeking 
land reform turned their attention to the upcoming 1848 
presidential campaign.  Many, including Greeley, were 
disappointed in the candidates of both major parties.  The 
Whig, General Zachary Taylor, was an avowed expansionist 
who had played a major military role in acquiring vast new 
territories during the recent war. Many feared the South 
intended to attempt to populate those new territories with 
pro-slavery settlers.  Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, the 
Democratic nominee, had in the past speculated extensively 
on land in the West. 
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The Free Soil Party nominated former president Martin 
Van Buren.  This pleased Greeley, despite that party’s 
platform not containing a plank supporting homesteads.  “If 
I could make Van Buren president tomorrow, I would,” wrote 
Greeley.  “I do like the principles he now embodies—Free 
Soil and Land Reform….  The Free Soil party is the only 
live party around us.”  Greeley also pointed out, however, 
that the Free Soilers, in their lack of stated support for 
homesteading, “missed a great opportunity of drawing in a 
large western vote.”145  Eventually, however, Greeley 
returned to the Whigs, who needed his public and vocal 
support in the pages of The New York Weekly Tribune.  He 
likely realized privately that no third party had a real 
chance of winning, and the Whigs made it hard for him not 
to return to the fold when they nominated him to fill an 
unexpired congressional term. 
 
As the 1840s came to an end, vast economic and 
industrial changes were taking place in America that would 
eventually increase public support for the “free land” 
idea.  Immigration, especially from Ireland and Germany, 
provided a labor supply for eastern manufacturers.  The 
growing factory system allowed for increased production and 
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wider, more diverse markets.  Canals and railroads linked 
together the East and West like never before.  All that 
remained was to increase the number of farms and farmers in 
order to maximize agricultural production, and the huge 
expanses of the West presented the opportunity to do just 
that.  “Every smoke that rises in the Great West marks a 
new customer to the counting rooms and warehouses of New 
York,” Greeley wrote in an effort to link western 
agriculture to the economic success of the East.146  “Even 
to those workers who will never migrate, free land at the 
West would be a great and lasting benefit.”147  Finally, 
Greeley appealed to his readers’ religious sensibilities, 
quoting the book of Leviticus: “The land shall not be sold 
forever; for the land is mine; for ye are strangers and 
sojourners with me.”148  In other words, selling the land as 
a mere commodity was not only bad policy, but also a sin. 
Thanks to the Whigs who wanted The New York Weekly 
Tribune on their side during the 1848 campaign, Greeley 
became a member of Congress during the short session that 
convened in December 1849.  He immediately announced his 
intent to introduce a homestead bill, which he did, but the 
bill went nowhere and died in February.  Because of his 
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brief tenure in office, this was the extent of Greeley’s 
efforts to make homesteading a legislative priority for 
Congress. 
In the Senate, luminaries such as Stephen A. Douglas, 
Sam Houston, and William Seward introduced their own bills 
designed to distribute free land to citizens.  Even Daniel 
Webster put forward a measure that pleased many, including 
Greeley.  However, none of these came close to having the 
support needed to pass.   
In the House, Andrew Johnson, never able to get the 
Committee on Public Lands to endorse his homesteading 
vision, issued a report from his Committee on Public 
Expenditures that seemed to do just that.  The House 
refused to take up the measure, however, noting that it had 
nothing to do with public expenditures.  He tried again on 
February 25, 1850, reintroducing a homestead bill and again 
seeing it referred to the Committee on Public Lands, which 
meant the bill’s certain death.  He introduced it yet again 
on June 4, and maneuvered it to the Committee on 
Agriculture, which reported it favorably and thus allowed 
it to be debated.  Still it went nowhere, facing opposition 
from such old states as Virginia and Pennsylvania, whose 
representatives argued that they had equal rights in the 
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public domain that the bill all but forfeited to the newer 
western states.149 
Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin introduced a version 
of the homestead bill in January 1852.  It was voted down, 
which brought a strong rebuke from Greeley and The New York 
Weekly Tribune: “Land Reform was slapped in the face…by 
that illustrious body, the United States Senate, among whom 
only seven members could be found to sustain Mr. Walker’s 
proposition to give a quarter section to each landless 
improver and occupier….Of course, after voting that the 
settlers shouldn’t have land free, the Senate proceeded to 
vote that the speculators in Bounty Warrants should go at 
it with a perfect looseness henceforward.”150 
Johnson was still undaunted, and in March 1852 his 
homestead bill again passed through the Committee on 
Agriculture and came up for debate on the House floor.  
Among those speaking in support of his measure was Galusha 
Grow of Pennsylvania, who stated that, “The two fundamental 
rights of man are Life and Happiness….  For the only true 
foundation of any right to property is man’s labor.  That 
is property, and that alone which the labor of man has made 
such.  What rights, then, can the Government have in the 
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soil of a wild and uncultivated wilderness?”151  Grow was 
emerging as an articulate and consistent pro-homesteading 
voice. 
Still, many old-state representatives continued to 
oppose the homestead measure.  New York Democrat Josiah 
Sutherland feared that the bill would “take labor from the 
manufacturing states to the land states—from the 
manufactories of the East to the farms of the West—and 
thereby increase the cost of labor and the cost of 
manufacturing.”152  Again Johnson answered, telling his 
colleagues that opposing the bill based on Sutherland’s 
arguments was essentially telling people, “Do not go away; 
stay here in your poverty; do not go and settle upon the 
new, rich, fertile lands of the West, but stay here, 
linger, wither, and die in your poverty…where the only 
inheritance you can leave to your children is your 
poverty.”153 
Fayette McMullen of Virginia summed up the concerns of 
many from the North and East: “They fear that the laborers—
the manufacturing hands—will leave the manufacturing 
districts and go to the West, and that, in consequence of 
the diminution of laborers, the wages of labor will advance 
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among them….  Sir, I say let these men go to the West, and 
emigration invited from abroad to fill their places—the 
foreigners will take their positions in the manufacturing 
districts of the North.”154  Many of McMullen’s fellow 
southerners still had reservations about the homesteading 
idea, however, due to concerns that free land meant less 
money for the treasury and a correspondingly higher tariff.  
Richard Bowie of Maryland, a Whig, estimated that at least 
one twenty-fifth of government revenue would disappear if 
the homestead measure became law.155 
The homestead measure passed the House in May 1952.  
Historian Roy M. Robbins observed that, “The cleavage 
between the old and new states was clearly portrayed, but 
it is impossible to estimate the effect of the slavery 
issue…since the South Atlantic States would be opposed to 
free land on either basis.”156  For his part, Greeley noted 
that more southerners voted for the bill than against it, 
but Robbins raises an interesting question: “Should 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi be 
classified at this time as ‘Southern’ or were they still 
‘Western?’…  The South Atlantic States could hardly have 
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failed to sense the rising alliance between the Upper 
Mississippi Valley and the North Atlantic States.”157 
This version of the bill, which came before the Senate 
in August, was negatively reported by the Committee on 
Public Lands.  Nothing was done.  In the next Congress, 
debates over free land regularly drifted into arguments 
over the questions related to Kansas and Nebraska.   
 
As the 1850s progressed and sectional arguments over 
slavery became more pronounced, there could be no doubt 
that states like Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi 
considered themselves “Southern.”  Sectionalism—old states 
versus new, North against South—held sway over the 
political debate on homesteading for decades.  As the years 
advanced and the slavery issue became the nation’s primary 
concern, the sections hardened their stances on the 
distribution of free land. 
The national debate on land distribution emerged in 
the 1820s and was a major issue in Congress for the next 
three decades.  The arguments shifted and matured over the 
years, and as the nation’s politics moved toward civil war, 
a new party, emerging from the ashes of the old Whigs, 
embraced both the restriction of slavery and the 
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implementation of homesteading.  The decades-long fight 
over land distribution, then, can be said to be a prime 
reason behind the creation of the Republican Party and, 
eventually, the onset of the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: 
RISE OF THE REPUBLICANS 
 
 
“The Republicans,” stated Carl Schurz in May 1860, 
“stand before the country, not only as the anti-slavery 
party, but emphatically as the party of free labor.”  A few 
weeks later, Illinois Republican gubernatorial candidate 
Richard Yates declared that, “The great idea and basis of 
the Republican party…is free labor.…To make labor honorable 
is the object and aim of the Republican party.”158   
Republicans often made such lofty statements during 
the party’s early days, regularly extolling the virtues of 
free labor and free soil.  To Republicans, the best labor 
was so-called “free labor,” which equated to an independent 
worker reaping the benefits of his own toil, be it at an 
industrial vocation or a farm.  Support for free labor 
naturally coincided with support for free soil, which 
called for the establishment of farms to be worked by 
landowners, not slaves.  It was only natural, then, that 
those favoring free labor and free soil would eventually 
ally themselves with the Republican party.   
But how and why did the Republicans form in the 1850s, 
and what role did their support of a homestead measure play 
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in their rapid rise to national promise?  To understand 
this, it is important to look back to the land reform 
movement and Free Soil party of the 1840s and early 1850s, 
the collapse of the Whigs, and the national debate over 
slavery expansion. 
 
The year 1854 opened with Senator Stephen Douglas of 
Illinois introducing a bill to organize the Nebraska 
Territory, which later was divided into the two territories 
of Kansas and Nebraska.  Many southern Democrats were 
already angry with the Franklin Pierce administration’s 
friendly overtures toward northern free soil Democrats, and 
they told Douglas that they would not support a Nebraska 
bill that barred slavery from that territory.  Douglas 
acquiesced and used his influence with Pierce to ensure the 
administration’s support for a bill that amounted to a 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.  Northern Democrats and 
free soilers were understandably upset, seeing this as 
their own party establishing a litmus test on slavery.  
Gideon Welles, a Connecticut Democrat, complained that, 
“The administration has identified itself with this new 
test and, wielding the power and patronage of the 
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government, it assumes an attitude of open hostility to any 
democrat who does not conform to its views.”159 
Another Democrat, Montgomery Blair, saw the repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise as just another example of the 
South dominating both the Democratic party and national 
politics.  If the Democrats could not obtain votes based on 
their ideas, they would acquire them by forcing northerners 
who sought higher office to cater to southern demands.  
Blair also foresaw the political storm the repeal would 
cause: “We are to have a renewed contest for the ascendancy 
of slavery over freedom.”160 
While most Whigs were naturally disaffected with the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill, the issue also drove many northern 
Democrats from their own party.  “We have submitted to 
slavery long enough,” wrote an Ohio Democrat.  “I am done 
catching negroes for the South.”  A Republican later 
asserted that, “Radical and Jackson Democrats…were the 
first to aid in organizing the Republican party, especially 
in the West.”161 
On January 19, 1854, several abolition-minded members 
of Congress printed a manifesto containing the seeds that 
soon sprouted into the Republican Party.  The Appeal of the 
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Independent Democrats, as it became commonly known, 
implored readers to take heed of dangerous developments in 
Congress pertaining to the West.  The specific bill in 
question focused on the proposed Kansas and Nebraska 
Territories: “…a new Nebraska bill has been reported by the 
Senate Committee on Territories, which, should it unhappily 
receive the sanction of Congress, will open all the 
unorganized Territories of the Union to the ingress of 
slavery.”162  Published under the heading, Shall Slavery be 
Permitted in Nebraska?, the Appeal listed a number of 
arguments against the extension of slavery to the western 
territories. By permitting popular sovereignty on the 
slavery question in the new territories, many northerners 
feared the bill would repeal the Missouri Compromise and 
potentially open the West to the possibility of slavery.  
In addition to a condensed history of American 
westward expansion, the document also touched on a number 
of western issues that proved important to Republicans over 
the next decade and beyond.  The Appeal dealt with the 
population and agricultural potential of the West, proposed 
mainly by a homestead bill: “If slavery be allowed there, 
the settlement and cultivation of the country must be 
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greatly retarded.…The homestead law, should Congress enact 
it, will be worthless there.”163   The document also 
mentioned the negative impacts of territorial slavery on 
the proposed transcontinental railroad: “What will be the 
effect of this measure…upon the proposed Pacific 
Railroad?...The enhanced cost of construction, and the 
diminished expectation of profitable returns, will present 
almost insuperable obstacles to building the road at 
all.”164 
The Appeal concluded by asking readers to consider the 
geographical consequences of allowing slavery in Nebraska: 
“We beg you…to observe that it will sever the East from the 
West of the United States by a wide slaveholding belt of 
the country, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to British 
North America.  It is a bold scheme against American 
liberty, worthy of an accomplished architect of ruin.…The 
first operation of the proposed permission of slavery in 
Nebraska will be to stay the progress of the free States 
westward, and to cut off the free States of the Pacific 
from the free States of the Atlantic.”165  Thus was 
encapsulated an argument against the expansion of slavery 
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and for the improvement of the West that would soon lead to 
the creation of the Republican Party.  
Of course, many who would become Republicans did not 
claim to be abolitionists; rather, they hoped to see 
slavery contained in the South instead of eliminated 
altogether.  The January 20 edition of the New York Daily 
Times called the Nebraska bill “so clearly regardless of 
Northern sentiment, and so bare-faced a bill for Southern 
votes that it must disgust a large portion even of those 
who are supposed to be especially benefited by it.”166 
Fearing that approval of the bill would drive northern 
moderates to become abolitionists, however, the same 
article speculated on “a storm of indignation in the North” 
that would “give that section completely into the hands of 
GIDDINGS, GERRITT SMITH, CHASE, SUMNER, and their political 
friends.”167  Claiming that “the cause of human freedom is 
the cause of God,” Giddings, Smith, Chase, and Sumner all 
signed the Appeal of the Independent Democrats, along with 
Representatives Edward Wade of Ohio and Alexander DeWitt of 
Massachusetts.168  All, including the westerners Chase, 
Giddings, and Wade, eventually became Republicans. 
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 By mid-1854, the need for a new political organization 
to combat the extension of slavery was obvious. Southerners 
dominated the Democratic Party, and the Whigs hovered 
perilously close to dissolution and were unable to mount 
any meaningful response to the proposed Kansas-Nebraska 
bill.169  The passage of the bill and subsequent approval of 
it by President Franklin Pierce in May 1854 “obliterated 
old party lines in the North completely, and left 
disorganized groups of anti-Nebraska Whigs, anti-Nebraska 
Democrats, Free-soilers, Abolitionists, and Know-Nothings, 
all of whom represented every extreme of the Northern view 
of slavery.”170  As one Free Soiler-turned-Republican put 
it, “The dispersion of the old parties was one thing, but 
the organization of their fragments into a new one on a 
just basis was quite a different thing.”171   
John D. Long, an early historian of the Republicans, 
called the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the upheaval it 
unleashed “a new phase of an old subject.”172  There is 
little dispute among historians that the idea of slavery’s 
extension into unsettled American territories necessitated 
the creation of the Republican party.  However, the 
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evidence also shows that as early Republicans fought to 
exclude slavery from the West, they simultaneously pursued 
an aggressive agenda designed to rapidly settle, improve, 
populate, and manage the western states and territories.  
In short, the Republican party was, from its earliest days, 
a party of the West and westward expansion. 
The selection of the name “Republican” was no 
accident.  Organizers purposely chose the moniker to 
connect themselves to the political tradition of Thomas 
Jefferson:  “Tying the new party to the framer of the 
Declaration of Independence underlined the commitment of 
northerners to doctrines of political equality and 
expanding economic opportunity.”173  (These early 
Republicans must have chosen to overlook Jefferson’s status 
as a slave owner.)  Even in 1854, Americans revered 
Jefferson, so Republicans must have recognized that 
claiming to be his political descendants would lend weight 
to their cause and organization as well as help 
recruitment.   
Though he never traveled beyond the Alleghenies, the 
West had fascinated Jefferson.  The third president was 
long dead before states like Wisconsin and Michigan 
existed, but the first Republicans were aware of his 
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interest in their part of the country.  This may have given 
them additional motivation to connect their new movement to 
him.   
 Jefferson’s influence on the West was undeniable.  In 
1785, he co-authored the bill creating the rectangular 
survey system.174  Many also considered him the intellectual 
originator of the free land idea that eventually culminated 
in the Homestead Act of 1862 (driven through Congress by 
the Republican Party).  “Whenever there is in any country 
uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that 
the laws of property have been so far extended as to 
violate natural right,” Jefferson wrote on August 13, 1776.  
“The small land holders are the most precious part of a 
state.”175  Finally, Jefferson was also an early proponent 
of peaceful displacement of American Indians in order to 
make room for American settlers and farmers.  Historian 
Stephen E. Ambrose wrote: “In Jefferson’s view, the trans-
Mississippi western empire could serve as a vast 
reservation for Indians displaced from east of the river.  
There they could learn to farm and become civilized, so 
that they could be incorporated into the body politic.”176  
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Later, both during and particularly after the Civil War, 
politicians and soldiers, many of them Republicans, became 
advocates of forcibly removing or exterminating Indians to 
make room for homesteaders and other settlers.  They would 
have done well to remember Jefferson’s 1785 statement, “I 
believe the Indian then to be in body and mind equal to the 
white man.”177 
After the party’s somewhat humble beginnings in 
Michigan and Wisconsin, Republicanism began to spread.  
While some national political figures of several different 
parties—many of them abolitionists—immediately converted, 
others held back their support until they could gauge the 
party’s chances of success.  Experienced politicians had 
seen a number of regional antislavery parties rise quickly 
and disintegrate quicker.  No one with any serious 
political ambitions wanted to have a record of jumping from 
party to party for their opponents to exploit.  Abraham 
Lincoln was among those that resisted immediately jumping 
to the Republicans.  As historian Lewis L. Gould noted, 
“Until Lincoln and men like him were sure that the Whigs 
were indeed doomed, they kept their political options 
open.”178 
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Salmon P. Chase of Ohio was one who almost immediately 
cast his lot with the Republicans.  He was also one who had 
belonged to seemingly every antislavery party that had 
risen and fallen over the years.  He had been an 
abolitionist since at least the mid-1830s and had over the 
years been a Whig, a member of the Liberty Party, and a 
Free-Soiler.179  Later in life, he was a Democrat as well.  
(Chase yearned to be president of the United States and was 
willing to ally himself with nearly any party whose 
presidential nomination he thought he could capture.)  A 
Free Soil party U.S. Senator in 1854, he fiercely opposed 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act and became an organizer of Ohio’s 
Anti-Nebraska party, which soon morphed into the Republican 
Party.  In July 1855, Chase became the Republicans’ 
candidate for governor of Ohio.  In his acceptance speech 
for that nomination, he stated, “The spread of slavery, 
under all circumstances and at all times, must be 
inflexibly resisted.  Slavery in the Territories must be 
prohibited by law.…Side by side with all men who are 
willing to unite with me for the defense of freedom, I am 
ready to contend to the last for the rescue of the 
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Territories from slavery.  I would do no injustice to the 
slave states.”180  
 Like many early Republicans, Chase was a native 
easterner who early in life migrated west and came to 
identify with western issues and concerns.  As a Whig 
during his early political career, he championed a national 
bank and internal improvements.  During his 1849-1855 
Senate term, he even introduced a bill to construct a 
transcontinental railroad.  In commemoration of the 
groundbreaking on the Union Pacific line in Nebraska 
Territory in late 1862, he wrote, “It is among my most 
pleasing recollections of service as a Senator from Ohio, 
that the first practical measure looking to the 
construction of a Pacific Railroad, which received the 
sanction of Congress, was moved by me.”181   
 George Washington Julian of Indiana was another early 
western convert to the Republicans.  Julian had been an 
anti-slavery Whig until 1848, when his party’s presidential 
nomination of slaveholder Zachary Taylor led him to abandon 
the party.  He then joined the Free Soilers and was their 
vice presidential nominee in 1852.  He wrote of “the 
sacredness of the bargain of 1820” and described efforts to 
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repeal it as “the cold-blooded conspiracy to spread it 
(slavery) over an empire of free soil.”182  Julian also 
favored passage of a homestead law and wrote of “the need 
of great highways to the Pacific.”183 
 Like his fellow Ohioan Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin 
Franklin Wade was born in the northeast but moved west as a 
young man, leaving Massachusetts for Ohio in the early 
1820s.  By the upheavals of the mid-1850s, he was a Whig 
member of the U.S. Senate and was recognized as the leader 
of a small but very vocal anti-slavery group.  He lobbied 
against the Kansas-Nebraska Act and in favor of both a 
homestead bill and a land grant college policy.  Opposing 
slavery and slaveholders, however, became his life’s work 
in the Senate.  During the slavery debates of the 1850s, 
members of Congress from North and South denounced one 
another’s views and engaged in particularly vicious 
personal attacks.  At one point, Wade and two other like-
minded northerners created, “A league by which we bound 
ourselves to resent any repetition of this conduct by 
challenge to fight, and then, in the precise words, the 
compact to ‘to carry the quarrel into a coffin.’”184   
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 Born and raised in Indiana, James Henry Lane served as 
a colonel in the Mexican-American War.  He was then a 
Democratic lieutenant governor of Indiana and a member of 
the House of Representatives during the Thirty-third 
Congress (1853-55).  While in the House, he voted for the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, a vote that was to haunt him the rest 
of his political life.  An early biographer wrote, “Was he 
a pro-slavery man?  The ultra-abolition type of agitators 
regarded him in that light.…He was, however, no more pro-
slavery than Pierce, Buchanan, Douglas, Logan, and Grant.  
He believed in what they called the ‘compromises of the 
Constitution.’  He was no more a pro-slavery man than Henry 
Clay, who said he would rather be instrumental in relieving 
his country of the great stain of slavery than to be a 
conquering hero.”185 
 After finishing his congressional term in 1855, Lane 
migrated west to Kansas Territory.  He arrived in the midst 
of the struggle between pro- and anti-slavery forces to 
dominate the territorial government and determine if the 
Kansas constitution would allow or prohibit slavery.  
Though never an overt abolitionist, Lane allied with the 
free state forces and was eventually recognized as an 
                                                 
185 John Speer, Life of General James H. Lane, “the Liberator of Kansas,” with Corroborative Incidents of 
Pioneer History (Second Edition).  Garden City, Kansas: John Speer, Printer, 1897, p. 13. 
135 
 
impassioned, radical leader.  When Kansas finally obtained 
statehood without slavery in 1861, the legislature rewarded 
his leadership by electing him one of the new state’s first 
U.S. senators.   
 In contrast to Lane, Kansas’s other initial senator 
lived and worked most of his life in the east and returned 
there later in life.  Samuel Clarke Pomeroy was born in 
Southampton, Massachusetts, attended Amherst College, and 
later moved to New York to teach school.  He returned to 
Massachusetts and served in the state’s legislature in 
1852-53.  He was also active in the New England Emigrant 
Aid Company, an organization formed to transport emigrants 
to Kansas to ensure the territory’s new government would be 
of an anti-slavery persuasion.  Of his desire to go to 
Kansas, he wrote, “I am anxious to have the right impetus 
given to its early settlement.  That the best principles of 
our resting fathers, may be transplanted there!  And that 
thus our untold domain may be saved from the blighting—
withering—deadening—damning—influence of American 
slavery!”186  Pomeroy traveled to Kansas in 1854, settling 
in Lawrence and eventually moving to Atchison.  After 
serving as mayor of Atchison in 1859 and as a Republican 
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convention delegate in both 1856 and 1860, the free soil 
legislature he had helped organize selected him to serve in 
the U.S. Senate in 1861. 
 James W. Grimes was born in New Hampshire but later 
moved west to Iowa.  He twice served in the territorial 
legislature (1838-39 and 1843-44) and was the state’s Whig 
governor from 1854 to 1858. In 1859, he was selected to 
serve as one of Iowa’s U.S. Senators.  He was by then a 
Republican.  His Iowa Senate colleague, James Harlan, was a 
native of Illinois and a former member of the Free Soil 
party.  Harlan served in the Senate as a Free Soiler from 
1855 to 1857 before being ejected for “irregularities” in 
the process that elected him.  He ran as a Republican in 
1859 and was re-elected to the Senate.   
 Abraham Lincoln of Illinois was a lifelong Whig and 
had served in the Illinois legislature in the 1830s and 
‘40s.  On March 3, 1837, he co-authored a protest of 
slavery to the Illinois House of Representatives in which 
he and his co-signer, Dan Stone, agreed that “the 
institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad 
policy, but that the promulgation of abolition doctrines 
tends rather to increase than to abate its evils.”187   He 
                                                 
187 Roy P. Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume One.  New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953, p. 75.  
137 
 
was a one-term member of the House of Representatives in 
1847-49.  He was little-noticed during that single term 
except for his scathing critique of President James K. 
Polk’s rationale for pursuing war with Mexico from 1846 to 
1848.  “The war with Mexico was unnecessarily and 
unconstitutionally commenced by the President,” Lincoln 
told the House on January 12, 1848.188  He also called Polk, 
“a bewildered, confounded, and miserably perplexed man.”189   
Like many future Republicans, Lincoln was enraged by 
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  “It is argued that 
slavery will not go to Kansas and Nebraska, in any event.  
This is a palliation—a lullaby.  I have some hope that it 
will not; but let us not be too confident.…Equal justice to 
the south, it is said, requires us to consent to the 
extending of slavery to new countries. That is to say, 
inasmuch as you do not object to my taking my hog to 
Nebraska, therefore I must not object to you taking your 
slave. Now, I admit this is perfectly logical, if there is 
no difference between hogs and negroes. But while you thus 
require me to deny the humanity of the negro, I wish to ask 
whether you of the south yourselves, have ever been willing 
to do as much?”190 
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While members of Congress, Whigs, Democrats, Free 
Soilers, and, eventually, Republicans, made arguments both 
for and against homesteading on the House and Senate 
floors, in the press, and in political gatherings, an 
organization called the National Reform Association (NRA) 
sought agrarian reforms, including homesteads, amongst the 
public and in the press.  The NRA had actually existed for 
decades by the time the homesteading argument reached its 
fever pitch in the 1850s.  In fact, the NRA was a critical 
factor in bringing together groups of homestead seekers, 
abolitionists, and laborers and convincing them to work 
together for their common interests.  These interests 
eventually culminated with the creation of the Republican 
Party. 
 The NRA was born of trade unions and related 
workingmen’s associations in eastern cities such as New 
York, Boston, and Philadelphia.  These groups were 
responsible for a great deal of labor organizing among the 
eastern working classes beginning in the 1840s.  They 
appealed to both skilled and unskilled workers, landless 
laborers, and even small-scale farmers.191 
                                                 
191 Mark A. Lause, Young America: Land, Labor, and the Republican Community.  Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2005, p. 2. 
139 
 
 Members of the NRA (and other similar organizations) 
believed that the republic’s health and success depended on 
the broadest possible distribution of land ownership among 
various classes of people.  The NRA had a three-point plan 
for accomplishing this.  First, they urged state 
governments to end the seizures of land for debts in order 
to defend the small family farm and decrease speculation 
and concentrations of land ownership.  Next, the NRA 
advocated a homestead measure to permit the free and wide-
scale settlement of the public domain.  Lastly, NRA members 
sought to limit the amount of land any individual could 
own, arguing that limitless ownership of a finite resource 
actually reduced the number of property owners.192 
 The NRA headquartered itself in New York City, and its 
leaders found a sympathetic and influential friend in 
Horace Greeley of the New York Weekly Tribune.  His 
newspaper columns spoke often of the need for agrarian 
reform and allowed the NRA’s ideas to reach a very large 
audience.  He explained the organization’s principles as 
such in an 1852 edition of the Tribune: 
 Land reformers do not complain of the present minimum price 
 of Public Lands as too high.  On the contrary, if they are 
 to be sold evermore to whoever shall see fit to locate and 
 pay for them we would far sooner see the price enhanced  
 than reduced.…What we do ask…is simply that our Public Land 
 System be so modified that every person needing Land may 
                                                 
192 Ibid., p. 3. 
140 
 
 take possession of any quarter-section not previously 
 located, and that none other than a person needing  
 land shall be allowed to acquire it at all.…No public 
 Lands to be sold to a Speculator.  This is the essential 
 matter—all else is but subsidiary.…We are confident the 
 Government would permanently increase its Revenue by  
 giving a modicum of wild land to everyone who requires 
 it, and looking to Duties on Imports alone for Revenue. 
 Every new clearing in the West, every new wheat- or corn- 
 field cut out of the Prairies, is a new source of Federal 
 income.  Every breaking-up team is a feeder to the Custom- 
 house.…It should be the policy of a wise government to 
 encourage the settlement of new farms by every means in 
 its power.  The fact that a man wishing unappropriated 
 wild land is unable to pay for it affords the very best 
 reason for letting him have it.193 
 
 
 The leaders of the NRA were mostly disgusted with the 
inaction of both major political parties on land 
distribution issues.  Alvan Bovay, the group’s secretary, 
slammed Congress by saying that “both parties are in favor 
of selling the fertile soil to mercenary wretches who might 
as well traffic in the life’s blood of the poor.…The right 
of man to the soil is so obvious and clear a right.… 
Probably the discovery will soon be made that if a man has 
a right to life, he has, by inevitable consequence, the 
right to the elements of life, to the earth, the air, and 
the water.”194 
 Many among the NRA’s membership feared the United 
States had an oversupply of labor in the East and sought to 
encourage emigration to the West in order to reduce the 
strains of overpopulation and unemployment.  This thinking 
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eventually led to the idea of the West being the nation’s 
“safety valve,” an area that could be opened to free 
homesteading for those seeking to leave the East to escape 
overcrowding, poverty, and poor work opportunities.  (It is 
important to note that many historians of the West, 
including Paul Wallace Gates and others, have questioned 
this “safety valve” theory and debated whether or not it 
actually made any significant impact on reducing 
unemployment and labor surpluses in the East.  However, it 
was a popular and predominant theory among the NRA’s 
membership and other land distribution advocates in the 
1840s and 1850s.)  By the end of the 1840s, the NRA had 
grown influential enough to see over two hundred newspapers 
endorse a homestead bill.195   
 During the late 1840s and early 1850s, the NRA also 
found itself drawn into antislavery politics.  In October 
1847, the Massachusetts chapter of the NRA held its state 
convention, during which it approved a platform that 
advocated both land reform and abolition.  The platform 
called slavery “a crime against Humanity…to be abolished 
immediately” and urged all who agreed to “adopt the 
Measures and Political Action that shall secure to every 
disenthralled slave, whatever their complexion…the 
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peaceable and immediate possession of a sufficient quantity 
of Land to enable them to procure the necessary means of 
subsistence whenever their liberation is achieved.”  The 
NRA here took the radical step of endorsing not only 
abolition, but also black land ownership.  “If some solicit 
your aid in the protection of the rights of the white man—
if others ask your assistance in alleviating the 
oppressions of the colored man—we entreat you to cooperate 
with US in the protection and security of all men in the 
full possession and free exercise of every natural 
right.”196 
 In New York in 1847, the NRA made nominations for 
state offices in common with organized abolitionists.  
Statewide, NRA-backed candidates won nearly 2,000 votes and 
outpolled Whigs in a few areas.  The Independent Liberty, 
Antirent, and National Reform tickets statewide polled over 
15,000 votes.197  The confusing jumble of small parties 
served to deny Democrats and Whigs majorities in a number 
of races but, more critically, demonstrated that a fusion 
of agricultural reformers and abolitionists, if properly 
organized, could make a legitimate impact in electoral 
politics.   
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 The 1848 presidential election served as the first 
real test of the NRA’s power in a national contest.  
Strongly allied with the National Industrial Congress 
(NIC), the National Reform Association’s members argued 
among themselves about their candidate of choice.  Some 
favored a practical choice that might actually influence 
the election’s outcome, while others wished for a candidate 
with ideological purity above anything.  The so-called 
“Liberty League” had already nominated Gerritt Smith and 
Elihu Burritt; the NIC eventually agreed with Smith’s 
nomination but substituted William S. Wait for vice 
president.  Eventually, both Burritt and Wait declined 
their respective nominations, and Michigan’s Charles C. 
Foote, a vocal abolitionist, became the vice presidential 
candidate. 
 The wild card, however, was the emergence of the Free 
Soil party and its nomination of former president Martin 
Van Buren.  While some NRA members grudgingly supported the 
Whig candidate Zachary Taylor (and a few the Democrat, 
Lewis Cass), the Free Soilers sought to bring NRA members 
into their fold.  Though many NRA proponents expressed 
dissatisfaction with Van Buren’s candidacy, NRA members 
attended the Free Soil convention in August 1848 as 
delegates from Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, 
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Illinois, Indiana, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.  
Van Buren did not win the presidency, of course, but the 
Free Soil party gained about five times more votes than the 
earlier Liberty Party had ever received by attracting and 
mobilizing those who believed that “free soil” meant both 
land reform and antislavery.198  Many Whigs who were 
inclined to agree with the Free Soilers’ stance on several 
issues remained loyal to their original party, however, and 
backed Taylor.  Included among these were many future 
Republican leaders like William H. Seward and Abraham 
Lincoln.   
 Even among vocal antislavery politicians, party 
loyalties often took priority over their antislavery 
ideals.  When the Free Soil party captured about fourteen 
percent of the popular vote in 1848, many enthusiastic 
antislavery men hoped this new party would become a 
dominant political force in the North, especially 
considering that even the staunchest Whigs by then 
recognized their party was significantly weakened by its 
inability to develop a cohesive national position regarding 
slavery.  
The hoped-for rise of the Free Soilers did not occur.  
Like Seward and Lincoln, too many northern abolitionists 
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still preferred to fight for slavery restriction and land 
reform within the confines of the existing parties.  
Another important reason for the fall of the Free Soil 
party was the fact that most of its power was concentrated 
in New York, and many Democratic “barnburners” there had 
bolted to the Free Soilers more to defeat their political 
rivals than to truly serve the antislavery or homesteading 
causes.  Once the rival faction was defeated, many 
barnburners, led by Martin Van Buren’s son John, simply 
returned to the Democratic fold.199   
Both parties—the Whigs and Democrats—faced a quandary.  
To win nationally, they both needed Free Soil support in 
the North but also proslavery support from the South.  But 
how could they cultivate one without alienating the other?  
Put simply, they could not.  Any hope of avoiding a purely 
regional party alignment all but evaporated by the national 
election of 1852.  Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, 
elected president that year, was the last pre-war 
presidential candidate to win the popular vote in both 
sections.  He was a nationally (albeit slimly) elected 
president, trouncing the Whig Winfield Scott in the 
Electoral College as well. 
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 But if the Democrats were relatively united behind 
Pierce in 1852, the Whigs were just as divided.  They were 
leery of Scott, a southern-born military hero like Zachary 
Taylor in 1850.  Southern Whigs did not fondly remember 
Taylor, a slaveholder who southerners felt sure would 
protect their interests as president.  When Taylor turned 
out to be too independent for their taste and threatened to 
personally lead the army against them to enforce the law, 
southern Whigs became enraged.  They feared that nominating 
Winfield Scott would lead to another politically 
disappointing Whig presidency.   
 It was an unfounded concern.  Scott carried only four 
states in November 1852: Vermont, Massachusetts, Kentucky, 
and (barely) Tennessee.  The Whigs lost twelve 
governorships; they won less than a third of seats in the 
House of Representatives.  Even before the election, 
Charles Francis Adams had lamented, “The moral tone of the 
Free States never was more thoroughly broken.”200  After the 
election, William H. Seward was asked by a prominent New 
York Whig, “Was there every such a deluge since Noah’s 
time?”201 
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 Scott had made a minimally respectable showing in the 
North, but the results from the South troubled the Whigs.  
While Zachary Taylor had garnered about half of the popular 
vote in the Deep South in 1848, Scott only received about 
35 percent and carried just two slaveholding states.  
Southern Whigs were in trouble, and the 1852 election 
resulted in a nearly solid Democratic South.  Even more 
critically, the 1852 results led to increased southern 
dominance of the Democratic party.  These factors, plus the 
June and October deaths of Whig giants Henry Clay and 
Daniel Webster, respectively, did not bode well for the 
Whig party’s survival.  Conversely and just as importantly, 
however, the Democratic party was reduced to a minority in 
the North. 
  
Disaffected Whigs, Free Soilers, Democrats, Know-
Nothings, and independents formed the Republican party in 
1854 as a direct response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  As 
members of the new party began meeting across the country, 
they continued to rail against the expansion of slavery but 
began discussing other issues as well.  Among these were 
free labor and land distribution, two issues near and dear 
to many of them and especially to Horace Greeley. 
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   In Greeley’s mind and his conception of free labor, 
every worker’s goal was to acquire capital and, eventually, 
economic independence.  He vigorously opposed strikes by 
industrial workers on the grounds that they halted 
production and prevented other laborers from working.  If a 
worker viewed his pay as too low, Greeley encouraged him to 
either take another job or move to the West.  (In all 
likelihood, this is the basis for the attribution to 
Greeley of the phrase, “go west, young man.”)  Homestead 
legislation was needed, however, to allow such workers to 
settle in the West, and Greeley’s New York Weekly Tribune 
became a powerful advocate for free land beginning in the 
1840s and continuing into the Civil War.  “Unappropriated, 
unimproved Public Land,” Greeley wrote in 1852, “is by the 
law of Nature and of Social Right the portion of those who, 
claiming no other portion of Man’s heritage, are willing to 
improve and cultivate.”202 
 Favoring homesteading and opposing speculation were in 
line with Greeley’s other ideas of social equality and 
justice, but such positions were also somewhat politically 
mainstream by the 1850s everywhere except the South.  
Providing land to the landless and keeping it out of 
speculators’ hands appealed to many people’s sense of 
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fairness but also harkened to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
nostalgia.  Suspicious of high finance, land monopolies, 
and speculation, those favoring a homestead bill could 
claim complete faith in the yeoman farmer—the backbone of 
the Jeffersonian ideal of small, independent landowners. 
 Like many National Reform Association members before 
them, new Republicans clung to the “safety valve” theory 
that the West could relieve overcrowding in the East if 
only some measure to freely distribute western lands could 
pass Congress.   
The Panic of 1857 only increased Republican support 
for homesteading, allowing Republicans to blame the lack of 
a free land law for massive urban poverty and unemployment.  
There was, according the Cincinnati Gazette, “an abundance 
of land to be possessed” in the West.203  Orville Browning 
of Illinois agreed, telling a gathering of Republicans, “In 
many of the free states, population is already pressing 
hard upon production and subsistence, and new homes must be 
provided, or the evils of an overcrowded country 
encountered.”204 
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The homestead issue became increasingly sectional in 
the 1850s as the country argued more regularly and 
violently over anything that could be even peripherally 
related to the expansion of slavery.  Republicans came to 
see homesteading as not only a necessity for their 
conceptions of free labor, but also as a way to create a 
western bulwark against slavery expansion.  In fact, by 
1860, the Republican Party was so dedicated to the idea of 
homesteading that it inserted a plank into its national 
platform calling for immediate passage of a homestead act.  
Conversely, fearing that a homestead bill would forever end 
the possibility of slavery in the West, southerners became 
increasingly opposed to any form of homesteading.    
The 1850s, rising sectional tensions, and the creation 
of the Republican party were all major milestones on the 
road to the Civil War.  Land distribution in general, and 
homesteading specifically, played large roles in all of 
these events and therefore must be considered when 
assessing the North’s and South’s actions and motivations 
in the decades before the war. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE HOMESTEAD ACT 
 
 
 Land policy was one of the early republic’s most 
persistent arguments.  From the differences between 
Hamilton and Jefferson to the differences of the Jacksonian 
era, debates over how best to distribute the federal 
government’s land were common in the halls of Congress.  
Like other issues of the day, disagreements over land 
policies eventually assumed a sectional dimension.  
Northerners, southerners, and westerners all had different 
ideas about which land policies would best serve the 
nation’s interests—and their own.  This was particularly 
true starting in the 1820s and moving forward. 
 Beginning then, the West sought accelerated 
development and a liberal land policy.  The Northeast hoped 
for expanding markets for its goods, so it maintained an 
interest in a high tariff and cheap labor.  The South, 
meanwhile, wanted a low tariff and therefore maximum 
revenue from sales of the public domain.  The tariff was 
one of the major issues of the day and therefore drove the 
arguments over which land policies the federal government 
should pursue. 
 Beginning in the early 1840s, however, it became clear 
that the government was moving away from trying to raise 
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revenue from western land sales and toward some policy that 
would result in actual western settlement.  Though a few 
major political figures still argued for policies that 
would theoretically create revenue from western land sales, 
most began instead to lean toward policies that would make 
western lands more available to real settlers.  A homestead 
bill was among these policies. 
 The homestead idea came into its own in the mid-1840s.  
The idea was not new or even exclusively American; both the 
French and Spanish had at various times offered free land 
to stimulate settlement.  Many had already sought such a 
measure for years.  The bill introduced on March 9, 1844 by 
Alabama’s Felix G. McConnell was the first American 
legislation to specifically call for land grants to 
settlers who had performed no governmental service.  Its 
leading advocates were westerners, of course, and eastern 
workers, most of whom had accepted the conventional wisdom 
that western lands served as a safety valve to reduce the 
oversupply of eastern workingmen by encouraging emigration 
to the West.  Many also supported it because it required 
actual labor on the land and not merely cash on hand.  It 
would also theoretically limit the amount of land one 
person (or speculator) could acquire.  Despite these 
attributes, however, McConnell’s bill never left committee.  
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In fact, the legislation languished for several more years, 
superseded by other concerns. 
 Representative Andrew Johnson of Tennessee wrote a 
homestead bill in 1852 that managed to pass the House but 
never reached a vote in the Senate.  Johnson tried again in 
1854, and a southern majority in the Senate suppressed the 
bill, which again never received a floor vote.  Galusha 
Grow of Pennsylvania tried again in 1859, and his bill 
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate by the tie-
breaking vote by Vice President John C. Breckenridge of 
Kentucky.  Why did the South so consistently oppose 
homestead legislation? 
 
 Southern members of Congress had many reasons for 
opposing the passage of a homestead bill.  They of course 
considered the effects of such legislation on their 
constituents—many of them (but certainly not all) 
slaveholders.  Later, though, southern opposition to the 
bill seems to have been grounded more on ideological 
grounds than practical ones.  Simply put, homesteading 
became intertwined with sectional disputes over the 
expansion of slavery into the western territories and, 
eventually, the differing northern and southern views of 
the right course for the nation’s future.  Most southern 
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congressmen eventually came to believe that the approval of 
homesteading would be counterproductive to the interests of 
slaveholders—and, therefore, their own interests in 
remaining in office and securing the survival of the 
South’s “peculiar institution.”  This came about largely 
due to the rise of political parties that supported 
homesteading legislation—Free Soilers, Free Soil Democrats, 
and, eventually, Republicans. 
 One major problem slaveholding southerners foresaw was 
just how little land would be available to them to carry 
slavery westward.  Plantation agriculture simply could not 
thrive on the 160-acre farms envisioned by the homestead 
bill.  Senator James Mason of Virginia acknowledged as much 
on April 10, 1860, when he stated that the North’s true aim 
in permitting homesteading in the West was “planting a 
population there from the free States, and excluding the 
slave population.”205   
It is accurate to state that many southern reasons for 
opposing a homestead bill had much to do with the survival 
of slavery.  While a relatively small percentage of whites 
in the South owned slaves, a large percentage of southern 
whites did view as sacred the RIGHT for whites to own 
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slaves.  Historian Roy M. Robbins wrote that eventually, 
“the slavery issue had gained the ascendancy over 
agrarianism and over protection (tariff) and had become the 
most important of the new conditioning arguments against 
homesteading.”206  Historian Benjamin Horace Hibbard went a 
step further than Robbins, pointedly stating that “free 
homesteads became a part of the anti-slavery struggle.…Had 
it not been for this complication, the South would 
evidently have favored it.”207 
 Regardless of whether abolitionists created the 
homesteading idea, the South feared that passing a 
homestead bill would lead to marked increases in free 
western farms.  Simply, slavery would be given little 
opportunity to expand.  Free land meant free soil.  Free 
soil meant southern opposition.  By 1850, the South had 
become openly hostile to the image of the yeoman farmer 
promoted by homestead advocates because that image was 
being used to combat the spread of slavery.208  The brave, 
bold yeoman on a small farm in a western territory like 
Kansas or Nebraska would not be a practitioner of slave-
driven plantation agriculture and was therefore an enemy to 
the politicians of the South. 
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 By 1850, congressmen from both North and South judged 
most legislation on its possible effects on slavery.  Many 
southerners may well have supported a homestead bill had it 
not by then become so strongly intertwined with 
abolitionism.  The idea that homesteading meant more free 
western states and territories and, therefore, eventually a 
minority in Congress, made it completely unpalatable to the 
South.  One Arkansas Senator went so far as to refer to 
homesteading as a bonus designed to induce settlers “to 
emigrate to the Territories on condition that aid societies 
will pay their expenses to get there.”209 
 Much of the South’s opposition came from its distaste 
for the new Republican Party, whose overt support of free 
soil equaled support of the homestead bill.  Before the 
Republicans existed, Free Soil Democrats had included a 
pro-homestead plank in their 1852 platform.  By the mid-
1850s, many former Free Soil Democrats allied themselves 
with the Republicans.  When the Republicans ran their first 
national ticket in 1856, they did not include a pro-
homestead plank in their platform.  However, the party made 
a concentrated effort to expand its agrarian appeal (and 
therefore attract more immigrants, especially Germans), and 
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incorporated a call for a homestead bill in its 1860 
platform.   
In the context of the continuing debate over slavery, 
homesteading became an important campaign issue during the 
1860 election cycle.  The homestead bill became one of many 
so-called “Black Republican” ideas demonized by the South; 
many in the North praised homesteading as a way to build a 
buffer against southern encroachment into the West.  Never 
before had the homestead bill been so openly and frequently 
discussed and debated, both in the halls of Congress and in 
the press.   
The anti-homesteading stance of the southern states, 
however, far pre-dated 1860 and was more than merely guilt 
by association with the Republican Party.  The successful 
passage of a homestead measure would unquestionably lead to 
a major increase in the number of free farms while 
providing little opportunity for slavery to expand.  
“Southern leaders,” noted historian Henry Nash Smith, “were 
eventually forced to recognize that the notions of the 
course of empire and of the coming dominance of the West 
were implicitly free soil.”210   
 To slaveholders, the main problem with homesteading 
was that the bill would open very little land to which they 
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could emigrate with their slaves.  Senator Robert W. 
Johnson of Arkansas openly acknowledged this problem during 
a homestead bill debate in 1854, noting that as long as the 
Missouri Compromise remained effective, southerners could 
carry no slaves into new territories.  Therefore, in 
Johnson’s mind, the homestead bill had to be delayed until 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which would effectively 
repeal the Missouri Compromise and open the door for 
slavery’s expansion westward.211 
 Regardless of the Missouri Compromise, however, the 
South faced a number of limitations on expanding its 
slavery-based agricultural empire.  Foremost among these 
was a lack of good land to which southerners could 
emigrate.  Much of the best land in the Southwest “had been 
taken up by 1837, and it was now a process of consolidating 
the holdings into cotton or sugar plantations.”212  The 
massive state of Texas contained no public domain lands 
because it had not been formed with federal land.  Due to 
climate, land acquired from Mexico was clearly not fit for 
plantation (i.e., slave) agriculture. 
Even had there been abundant arable land in the 
Southwest, the small quarter-section (160 acres) farms 
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envisioned under the Homestead Act were simply not 
sufficient for the plantations that dominated the southern 
agricultural system.  Therefore, in the minds of many 
northerners and southerners alike, the free farms offered 
by the Homestead Act constituted a very real barrier to 
slavery’s expansion.  Republicans recognized this and used 
it as a selling point for their support of the Act.  In 
1859, the party published a circular entitled “Lands for 
the Landless” that bluntly stated that “slavery cannot 
exist at the same time with a system of small freeholds.”213   
Virginia Senator James Mason acknowledged that a 
homestead law would prevent slavery from moving into the 
West, calling it “a scheme…for the purpose of planting a 
population there from the free States, and excluding the 
slave population.”214  By the early 1850s, in fact, the 
South was openly hostile to the Jeffersonian ideal of 
small, independent, yeoman farmers since that very symbol 
was by then being used by antislavery forces to combat 
slavery’s western expansion.  Since homesteaders would not 
engage in slave-driven plantation agriculture in the West, 
a homestead bill had to be opposed by southern congressmen. 
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The South’s greatest (and justified) fear was that an 
influx of homesteading farmers to the West would eventually 
lead to the creation of more free states that would 
obviously send antislavery representatives to Congress.  
Southerners realized they would soon be overwhelmed in 
Congress and feared that a large Northern majority would 
eventually legislate slavery out of existence.  “Do not let 
the Government destroy us of the South,” said Congressman 
James Letcher of Virginia in 1854, “by holding out 
stimulants to the encouragement of northern Territories, 
the propagation of northern sentiment, and the 
multiplication of northern representatives here and in the 
Senate.”215  
 Many southerners also opposed the immigration to the 
United States they feared a successful homestead bill would 
cause.  While some of this opposition may have been 
nativism for its own sake, southerners also realized that 
Republicans were tailoring their agricultural message 
specifically to encourage Germans, Irish, and other 
Europeans to come to America to seek free homesteads.  
Logic led the South to fear that a great number of 
immigrants receiving homesteads would become Republicans 
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and populate free territories that, with sufficient 
population, would eventually become Northern states with 
antislavery congressional representatives.  Southern 
newspapers like the Richmond Enquirer helped many readers 
come to this conclusion with fiery anti-homestead articles 
and editorials.  The Enquirer summed up the Southern 
argument well in 1854, when it stated that a homestead bill 
would be “an extraordinary stimulus to immigration and 
would speedily subject the South to the irresistible 
preponderance of the North.”216 
 Another southern concern was the effect the Homestead 
Act might have on non-slaveholding whites in the South.  
Though a relatively small percentage of whites owned 
slaves, it was critical for non-slaveholding whites to 
support the slave system.  Many in the South feared a 
homestead bill would entice whites without slaves to flee 
the South for the freesoil West.  Comments from northerners 
like Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin served to justify 
these Southern fears and encourage opposition to any 
homestead measure.  Doolittle praised the homestead bill as 
a law that would “allow poor nonslaveholding men of slave 
states to escape.”217 
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 Rather than directing American expansion westward, 
some in the South preferred to spread further south.  Many 
prominent southerners envisioned a tropical Atlantic empire 
in places like Cuba, where the climate favored agriculture 
and crops similar to those in the southern states.  The 
famous Ostend Manifesto of 1854 was part of this southern 
plan to expand southward.  The manifesto was an American 
diplomatic document that formally explained the United 
States’ desire to acquire Cuba.  The manifesto expressed a 
desire to purchase Cuba from Spain but also a willingness 
to take the island by force if Spain refused to sell.   
Ironically, the Ostend Manifesto listed as one reason 
the U.S. must own Cuba as this: “…humanity may in vain 
demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the 
island.… The Spanish government at home may be well 
disposed, but experience has proven that it cannot control 
these remote depositaries of its power.”218  Better to let 
the United States (and, especially, the South) control the 
importation and uses of slaves to Cuba from North America. 
 The Richmond Enquirer agreed wholeheartedly.  “If we 
hold Cuba,” read an 1854 editorial, “in the next fifty 
years we will hold the destiny of the richest and most 
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increased commerce we can hold.  Give us this, and we can 
make the public opinion of the world.”219  Here was the 
South attempting to turn the old idea of an American 
“Manifest Destiny” on its head.  Since the South could not 
take slavery from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it would 
instead take its “peculiar institution” to the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean.  Northerners and abolitionists 
cried foul; Wisconsin’s James Doolittle called the Ostend 
Manifesto and southern expansion into the tropics a 
“fanatical solution.”220 
 Southerners faced a perfect storm in 1859 when a Cuba 
annexation bill and homestead bill were simultaneously 
before the Senate.  Many feared that the long-argued 
homestead measure would overshadow debate about expansion 
to the tropics.  Robert Toombs of Georgia revealed that 
southern anxiety when he asserted that the homesteading 
ideal of “’Land for the Landless’ most exercises the 
patriotic bosoms of Free Soilers…the very moment that a 
question comes up which they [are] afraid to meet.”221  In 
other words, Toombs argued that many supposedly pro-
homestead northerners used debate on the homestead bill as 
a means of avoiding debate on other issues.  Various 
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homestead acts had been proposed and debated for decades; 
apparently, Toombs and other southerners speculated that 
northerners cared little for the bill on its own merits but 
brought it up for debate anytime a bill that could benefit 
the South and slavery expansion came before Congress.  To 
Toombs and many of his southern colleagues, debate on the 
homestead measure was simply a delaying action. 
 Benjamin Wade of Ohio thundered a response.  “When you 
come to niggers for the niggerless,” he said, “all other 
questions sink into perfect insignificance.”  Wade railed 
against the purchase of Cuba, asking his southern 
colleagues, “Are you going to buy Cuba for land for the 
landless?  What is there?  You will find three quarters of 
a million niggers, but you will not find any land; not one 
foot, not an inch.”222  Wade seemed to understand that the 
South’s true interest in Cuba was to continue and expand 
slavery, not provide land for actual settlers (unless they 
happened to be slaveholders). 
 Along these lines, it can be definitively stated that 
the net effect of the Kansas-Nebraska Act on southern 
attitudes about homesteading was to encourage further 
opposition to the “free land” idea.  While passage of the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill eased Arkansas senator Johnson’s fear 
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that the Missouri Compromise would prevent slaveholders 
from benefiting from the homestead measure, it also ended 
any efforts to avoid strict sectionalism that many members 
of Congress made after the Compromise of 1850.223  In fact, 
after passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, sectionalism 
became much more pronounced and overt in Congress.  
According to historian Roy M. Robbins, this was 
understandable because, “For the first time, the slaves 
states west of the Appalachians joined with the South 
Atlantic States in the attempt to open up the West to 
slavery.… All of the important interests of the North, 
incongruous as they may have been, were immediately arrayed 
against the slavocracy.”224 
 Like many northerners, Horace Greeley was enraged by 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Unlike most of his like-minded 
brethren, however, Greeley had the power of the press 
behind him.  Shortly before the act came to a vote in 
Congress, Greeley attempted to rally his antislavery 
readers, writing “If slavery is determined upon the 
conquest of free territory it will inevitably be resisted 
and paid in kind.… Let but the sentiment gain foothold, and 
seize and appropriate whatever it can wrest from the hands 
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of free labor, and the banner of reclamation will be 
raised.”225 
 The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had two major 
implications on the homestead question.  First, by 
increasing sectionalism, it became much more difficult for 
southerners in Congress to consider any homestead bill on 
its own merit.  From 1854 forward, most southerners refused 
even to entertain thoughts of approving a homestead measure 
and began simply to vote with their section against the 
bill.  Secondly, it brought together the laboring interests 
in the East and the agricultural interests in the West to 
form the Republican party. 
 Powerful southerners clearly saw how detrimental to 
their own interests a homestead bill would be, including in 
the rapid build-up of free soil interests in the West.  
Admission of new free states, paired with the expected rise 
in immigration a homestead bill would bring, would increase 
the North’s—and the Republican party’s—political power.  
This was dangerous to the existence of slavery because a 
Republican majority might very well attempt to outlaw 
bondage.   
In addition, the South feared that increased northern 
power would have economic consequences by making potential 
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slave buyers less confident about the institution’s future 
and therefore more conservative with their purchases of 
slaves. In other words, the value of the South’s massive 
stock of human capital would be decreased.   
Andrew Johnson, by then a rare pro-homestead 
southerner, argued that western expansion under the 
Homestead Act would increase demand for southern goods and, 
therefore, actually create northern dependence on slavery 
and a de facto endorsement of the South’s institution.  
“The time will come,” stated Johnson, “when the Northern 
man will see it to be his interest to stand by the 
institution of slave labor [and] the Southern man will see 
it to be his interest to stand by the Union, to stand by 
the agriculturists, and by the manufacturer.”226  This 
reasoning is questionable at best and likely reflects 
Johnson’s desire to have his cake and eat it too, by having 
both slavery and a successful homestead bill. 
Apart from slavery interest, however, southern members 
of Congress had other reasons for opposing the homesteading 
idea.  Many of these additional reasons went far beyond the 
explanations that continually recurred in debates and were 
at least partially intended for public consumption by their 
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constituents.  In fact, southern opposition to homesteading 
was often a case of many major political figures concealing 
their true motivations from one another and their 
constituents.  Two of these focused on the questions of 
equity and constitutionality of the homestead bill.  These 
were important and powerful arguments in their own right as 
well as rationalizations that many southerners came, over 
time, to believe. 
 
The question of equity constituted many different 
factors but basically boiled down to a fear that the 
homestead measure would reward the undeserving and 
speculators.  The Richmond Enquirer agreed when it stated 
in 1854 that a homestead bill “asserts it to be the duty of 
the government to supply the wants of the lazy and 
improvident.”227  The Senate Public Lands Committee in 1850 
issued a report describing the homestead bill as un unfair 
tax on those who could not move west and take free land and 
an unwarranted help for the undeserving.  The report also 
expressed a fear that homesteading would reduce land 
values.228   
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Some press organs of the Democratic party also allied 
themselves against homesteading based on the equity 
argument.  The New York Courier and Enquirer called the 
measure a philanthropic bill, not a political one, and 
stated that the South was right to oppose it since the 
North and West “embrace nine-tenths of the needy 
population.… The South…to our mind correctly denounces it 
as a fraud, and as a scheme that could proceed from no 
other source than demagogism [sic] itself.”229 
Many considered free gifts of land (or anything else) 
to the poor to be damaging to the “national morale.”  
Others worried that homesteading would create a thriftless 
population that expected the government to provide them 
everything the needed to thrive on their free farms.  
Finally, many considered that providing free homesteads 
constituted discrimination against earlier settlers who had 
paid full price for their lands and against railroads and 
veterans who had received land bounties.  The legendary 
sense of southern chivalry may have at least partially 
contributed to the South’s desire for fair play and its 
distaste for gifts to those deemed undeserving.  Southern 
pride may have contributed to that region’s image of itself 
as being above the need for governmental charity.  However, 
                                                 
229 New York Courier and Enquirer, quoted in Hibbard, History of Public Land Policies, p. 366. 
170 
 
it is difficult to imagine these abstract concepts 
contributing but so much to sectional unity during votes in 
Congress.  
The same might be said of southern opposition to the 
Homestead Act based on hatred of land speculators.  There 
is no doubt that speculation was a major problem in the 
West.  Many worried that a homestead measure might very 
well encourage, not reduce, speculation by permitting “a 
rich millionaire to pick out of the gutters men who could 
be induced to take up land on the share-basis” and then 
sell it to a speculator for a small sum.230  Southern 
opponents of homesteading were bolstered by an 1852 report 
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office that called 
homesteading wasteful and likely to foster speculation. 
Despite these arguments, it is difficult to see how a 
homestead bill could have been any worse in regard to 
speculation than was the existing system.  Speculation was 
already rampant in the West, and speculators could buy 
nearly unlimited numbers of acres with discounted warrants.  
Ironically, many of the largest and most successful 
speculators were, in fact, southerners.  The southern land 
speculation tradition extended back to George Washington 
and beyond.   
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Based on these factors, it seems likely that southern 
opposition to homesteading based on the fear of land 
speculation was, in sectional terms, an argument that was 
deployed after the main battle lines had already been 
drawn.  Fear of speculation does not seem to have had quite 
as much bearing on how and why those lines were drawn in 
the first place. 
 
Many southerners also objected to the homesteading 
idea based on issues of constitutionality, particularly 
questioning Congress’s power to give away lands and, more 
generally, the government’s power to deal with the public 
lands at all.  The latter argument was based in large part 
on the increasing states’ rights sentiments of the 1850s.  
Many in the South, including Texas senator Louis T. 
Wigfall, feared that a homestead bill would make settlers 
indebted to the federal government for their lands and 
livelihoods, thus weakening the power and rights of the 
individual states.  The states, according to Wigfall, 
should manage their own public lands.231  Debate on this 
perspective of homesteading seems to have been more 
concerned with the merits or detriments of centralized 
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government than with the actual constitutionality of a 
homestead bill. 
The former issue, however—Congress’s authority to 
grant free public land to settlers—was a genuine 
constitutional question.  The real problem was in 
reconciling two principles that produced opposite 
conclusions when applied to the homesteading idea.  
Congress had an explicit constitutional right to dispose of 
the public domain.  The general belief existed, however, 
that Congress had no such right to give away money, and 
this led many to imply that as long as public lands 
generated even minimal revenues, Congress had no right to 
dispose of them.   
Senator Andrew Johnson, a southerner, saw a difference 
in Congress’s powers regarding appropriation of land as 
opposed to money: 
The Congress of the United States has power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and pro- 
vide for the common defense and general welfare.  I believe it 
has the power to lay and collect duties for these legitimate 
purposes; but when taxes have been laid, collected, and paid 
into the treasury, I do not think it has that general scope 
or that latitude in the appropriations of money that it has  
over the public lands.… I am very clear on this point, that in  
the disposition of the public lands they should be applied to  
national purposes.  If we grant the public lands to actual set- 
tlers so as to induce them to settle upon and cultivate the  
public lands, can there be anything more national in its char- 
acter?  What is the great object of acquiring territory?  Is it  
not for settlement and cultivation?232 
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 President James Buchanan disagreed, vetoing a 
homestead bill sponsored by Johnson in 1860.  Buchanan 
argued that Congress held the public lands as a trustee for 
the American people, and he considered the payment of 
twenty-five cents per acre (a feature of Johnson’s bill) 
much too low to constitute a sale.  Buchanan believed that 
giving away land purchased with tax dollars was no 
different—and no less unconstitutional—than giving away tax 
revenues.233 
 Congressional authority to grant free land was also 
challenged on the basis of the original state land cessions 
to the federal government.  Many southerners argued that 
their states had ceded lands after the Revolution for the 
common good of the states.  Virginia, according to the 
Richmond Enquirer, gave land for the purpose of raising 
revenue and would “prefer less tilt in favor of 
settlement.”234 
 Southern leaders succeeded in raising a somewhat 
plausible constitutional objection to homesteading.  
Whether or not their true opinions centered on the bill’s 
constitutionality or other motives is unclear; they likely 
chose to view the Constitution from whatever perspective 
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necessary to ensure a bill they feared went against their 
interests would not pass.  Historian David Potter noted a 
similar case in which Texas (unconcerned about homesteading 
since it had no public lands within its borders) suddenly 
became a vocal proponent of preserving Indian land claims 
in order to prevent approval of a northern route for a 
transcontinental railroad.235   
Southerners’ motives for raising constitutional 
objectives to the homestead measure were certainly 
insincere, especially considering that region did not 
oppose liberal land policies that helped it.  While the 
unconstitutionality of a homestead law provided a southern 
argument against homesteading, it was likely not a real or 
major reason for opposition.  Rather, it provided 
southerners a way of arguing against a homestead law 
without admitting publicly or privately that their 
objections had everything to do with the expansion and 
survival of the institution of slavery. 
 Closely related to the constitutional argument was the 
assertion that homestead bills were class legislation.  
President Buchanan argued in his 1860 veto message that the 
bill discriminated in favor of farmers, calling it “a boon 
exclusively conferred upon the cultivators of the soil.… 
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There should be no new legislation which would operate to 
the injury or embarrassment of the large body of 
respectable artisans and laborers.”236  Others felt the 
homestead bill too heavily favored urban laborers by 
providing them a means to escape the drudgery of life in 
eastern cities by moving westward to start over as farmers.  
Andrew Johnson rebutted, arguing that the bill was not 
agrarianism but should be supported as a means to prevent 
cities from controlling the federal government and reduce 
poverty, saying of paupers: “Interest them in the country; 
pin them to the soil, and they become more reliable and 
sustain themselves, and you do away with the pauperism in 
this country.”237  Johnson’s statements aside, the rural 
South continued to oppose homestead bills, often labeling 
them as socialist. 
 Certainly any homestead bill would affect workers in 
the urban East by providing them with an option to move 
westward rather than continue on in their respective 
cities.  Some historians have speculated that free land 
laws actually did nothing to assist eastern laborers 
because most could not afford transportation to the West 
and did not possess the initial capital required to make a 
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new homestead operational. While these assertions are 
certainly somewhat correct, it cannot be said that all 
eastern laborers were unable to take advantage of any 
homestead law.  Small artisans, for example, whose 
businesses were declining, could travel west rather than 
becoming part of the working class, increasing poverty and 
putting downward pressure on wages.  Easterners could also 
look for opportunities to assume ownership and control of 
small farms in Midwest states like Ohio and Indiana when 
those farms’ original owners went farther west to claim 
homesteads.  Either way, it is important to avoid making 
blanket statements that a homestead bill would have no real 
effect on eastern workers.  The important fact here is that 
any homestead bill was viewed by many as a benefit to those 
urban workers and was therefore opposed by many as being 
class legislation. 
 Class arguments understandably resonated with eastern 
capitalists that relied on poor workers for labor in their 
factories.  However, why did the homestead idea arouse such 
ire in the rural and elite populations of the South?  As 
time went on, one reason might have been not so much what 
homesteading truly was, but rather who supported it.  For 
example, the National Reform Association (NRA), with 
outspoken leaders like George Henry Evans and Horace 
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Greeley, vocally favored homesteading.  The NRA and 
Greeley’s newspaper were both identified with “isms” the 
South considered very dangerous: unionism, socialism, and 
particularly abolitionism.  Conservative southerners were 
not above opposing anything advocated by “radical” groups 
like the NRA. 
 It is possible that much of the South’s opposition to 
the homestead bill was, in fact, largely a reaction against 
change in general.  Antebellum southern society was 
somewhat backward-looking.  While northern capitalists 
sought the building of a vast economic empire founded on 
western agriculture and eastern industry bound together by 
railroads and canals, southern planters often reminisced 
about the bygone days of Washington, Jefferson, and 
plantations along the Potomac.  The cotton empire was at 
its peak in the 1850s, and many southerners saw no need for 
change.  This mentality—and their concerns over slavery’s 
future and expansion—led them to oppose homesteading long 
after many in the North conceded that it was all but 
inevitable. 
 The social upheavals of the 1840s also increased 
resistance to change in the South and other regions.  
Changes to land policies had to overcome a great deal of 
inertia in any case because, in historian Benjamin Horace 
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Hibbard’s words, “inertia works just as powerfully in 
keeping a force in operation as in holding a body at 
rest.”238  In other words, many sought to implement 
homesteading to bring about change while others fought 
against it to prevent any change from occurring.  Many 
southern planters and politicians resisted any homestead 
law because it threatened to change their stable way of 
life.  When coupled with real and exaggerated claims about 
the bill’s threat to slavery, southern opposition to it 
became as inevitable as many in the North thought a 
homestead act to be. 
 Another factor contributing to southern opposition to 
homesteading was the reason historically most important to 
southern hostility to liberal land policies in general: 
concerns about tariffs.  Besides slavery, the tariff was 
perhaps the most important and persistent political issue 
of the second half of the nineteenth century.  Tariffs 
often had profound influence on federal land policies.  The 
South was an active exporter and a tax-bearing importer 
with no real manufacturing sector a tariff could protect.  
This meant the South received little benefit from a high 
tariff but bore most of its burden.  Since tariffs and land 
sales made up two principal sources of government revenue, 
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southerners (and others who supported low tariffs) 
regularly pushed for maximum land sale revenue to decrease 
the need for higher amounts of tariff revenue.239  The 
homestead measure was the ultimate example of low land sale 
revenue, and many believed that even if land given away 
under the bill would not have been sold, it could still 
have been put to better use by being held to guarantee the 
public debt. 
 If the tariff issue was still important to southerners 
in the 1850s, then the land sales revenue argument may well 
have been quite influential in forming southern opposition 
to homesteading.  Many historians, however, have minimized 
the tariff’s role in the political environment encountered 
by proposed homestead bills.  For example, two preeminent 
historians of federal land policies, Benjamin Horace 
Hibbard and Roy M. Robbins, agreed that the goal of 
obtaining revenue from public lands gave way to the goal of 
settlement of public lands as early as the 1841 passage of 
the Preemption Act.240  Others argued that by the time of 
the Preemption Act, the South was complacent about the 
tariff and viewed land policies strictly through the lens 
of the extension of slavery. 
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 However, such absolute judgments are difficult to 
make.  Since slavery and tariff concerns pulled in the same 
direction with respect to land policy, it is impossible and 
incorrect to select a specific date on which one became 
more important than the other.  Surely many southerners 
still had legitimate concerns about the tariff throughout 
the 1850s, even as slavery expansion became the nation’s 
preeminent issue and the source of public friction between 
North and South.  Whether southern tariff concerns at this 
late period were rooted in decades-old habits or because 
the South was relatively prosperous during the 1850s, it is 
ludicrous to claim that the issue no longer mattered.  
President Buchanan touched on the issue in his 1860 
Homestead Act veto, decrying the unfairness of the loss of 
revenue the bill would mean for the older states.241  Though 
the tariff issue was certainly less important by the 1850s 
than it had been in previous decades, and the slavery 
factor was correspondingly more important, it was still an 
active component of southern opposition to homesteading. 
 Many homestead law opponents also feared that 
homesteading would not only financially harm land grant 
recipients in new states, but would lower land values in 
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old states as well.  If the theory that a homestead measure 
would lead to emigration from old states to the West proved 
true, then a lower rural population in the old states would 
mean less demand for land and declining land values in the 
East.  A homestead law’s potential effects on the values of 
their own lands was something property owners in many areas 
of the country had to consider, and this was another issue 
Buchanan addressed in his veto, stating, “The offer of free 
farms would probably have a powerful effect in encouraging 
emigration especially from states like Illinois, Tennessee, 
and Kentucky, to the west of the Mississippi, and could not 
fail to reduce the price of property within their 
limits.”242  Fear of lost land values and revenues could be 
a very powerful factor in homestead opposition. 
 The negative effect on land values may have been even 
more so in the South if a homestead measure had expanded 
cotton lands.  The South had such a large share of the 
world’s cotton production that international cotton prices 
were determined there.  Also, the West and South were bulk 
exporters.  Increased food production in the West meant 
higher international freight rates; these increased 
shipping costs were not offset by lower food prices because 
the South was mostly self-sufficient in food production.  
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 Therefore, even apart from its potential harm to 
slavery’s existence and expansion, southerners believed 
that western homesteading had the potential to cause them 
great economic harm.  Southern pride and prestige were on 
the line as well, since many saw the rising fortunes of the 
West as resulting in declining importance for the South.  
One historian even went so far as to speculate that much of 
the South’s opposition to homesteading flowed from outright 
feelings of jealousy and helplessness.243  The South, stated 
historian George M. Stephenson, feared isolation from the 
Union’s main economic, cultural, and demographic flows.  
The North and East did not have such fears since they would 
always be connected to the West by investment and market 
ties.   
In other words, the West was linked with expanding 
capitalism and development, not decaying plantations and 
morally questionable domestic institutions. East-West 
connections grew stronger as railroads developed, and 
western trade shifted over time from flowing south on the 
Mississippi to New Orleans to heading directly west via 
canals and, later, railroads.  If southern prestige was a 
contributing factor to that region’s opposition to a 
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homestead law, then a trade shift away from New Orleans was 
surely another blow to that prestige. 
 
Inferiority complexes aside, the South clearly had a 
number of reasons to oppose any homestead law.  Though 
concerns about the equity and constitutionality of the 
measure appear to have been more talking points than actual 
factors that could lead to unified southern opposition, 
general southern conservatism and resistance to social and 
economic change did contribute to anti-homestead feelings 
below the Mason-Dixon Line.  The view of homesteading as 
class legislation that would benefit the urban poor played 
into southern fears.  Other economic concerns, especially 
the fear that homesteading would lead to higher tariffs and 
lower land values in the older states, also set many in the 
South against the “free land” idea.  Apprehension that 
expansion to the West meant decreased economic 
opportunities and southern prominence were prevalent as 
well.   
These considerations, when combined with the 
preeminent fears of what homesteading would mean to the 
backbone of southern life and economy—slavery—led many 
southerners to fight tooth and nail against any 
homesteading measure.  For decades, the South successfully 
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prevented any homestead act from advancing in Congress.  
When one finally made it through the national legislature 
to the White House in 1860, a northern-born president who 
feared angering the South over any issue because he did not 
want a civil war to erupt during his administration vetoed 
the measure.  Only after the North-South relationship had 
broken down completely and that war began could the 
Republican party advance the Homestead Act of 1862 and 
place it on the desk of a much more sympathetic president 
than James Buchanan. 
That North-South relationship was always strained, but 
it deteriorated quickly during the 1850s.  Politicians in 
both sectors but especially the South began to adopt 
sectional rather than national outlooks during this decade.  
Many in the South began to view their region as united on 
every major issue (including homesteading) and having a 
purpose and destiny apart from the North’s. Southern 
prospects of any meaningful alliance with the West 
diminished as economics and transportation bound that 
region with the North and East.  Southerners had realized 
for years that if they could not expand their trading 
routes and opportunities with the West, that region would 
become tied to the North.  When this occurred, the South 
had little choice but to retreat into arguing against land 
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distribution laws that would lead to expanded settlement in 
the West and increased political and economic power for the 
North.  The homesteading issue, then, was clearly a factor 
in the South’s adoption of a “states’ rights” and 
constitutional minority rights mentality. 
 There is no doubt that southerners had many of what 
they viewed as legitimate reasons for opposing the free 
land idea that eventually culminated in the Homestead Act.  
Those reasons may all be boiled down to the simple fact 
that many southerners believed that a homestead bill would 
run counter to the interests of slaveholders and cause 
economic ruin to their region.  Anything that threatened 
the existence, expansion, and future of slavery was a 
potential economic disaster for the South since that 
institution was the backbone of the southern economy.  That 
the homestead idea was eventually championed by the hated 
Republican party merely confirmed to southerners that free 
land was an abolitionist scheme meant to harm the South 
politically, socially, and economically. 
 When viewed from the South’s point of view, opposition 
to homesteading was completely rational because it 
threatened the very fabric of southern society.  The idea 
of a homestead measure existed in the world of politics, 
and in that world, those in power must look after their own 
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interests and those of their constituents.  Though many 
poor, non-slaveholding southerners may very well have 
benefited from homesteading, they did not hold political 
power.  Southern politicians opposed homesteading for years 
based on their own understanding of what was good for the 
South and would guarantee that region’s economic and 
political survival. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 REALIZATION: 1860-1863 
 
 
 On February 29, 1860, Pennsylvania Representative 
Galusha A. Grow gave a lengthy speech on the House floor 
extolling the virtues of a homestead bill.  He provided a 
short history of federal land policies back to the 
Revolution and rejected outright the notion that the 
government should forgo a homestead law because of any 
sizeable revenue generated by land sales.  Comparing the 
present system of land distribution to “feudalism,” Grow 
sounded downright Jeffersonian when he portrayed man’s 
right to farmland as a gift from God: “Since the hour of 
the primal curse, ‘In the sweat of the face shalt though 
eat bread,’ man has been forced to the cultivation of the 
soil to obtain subsistence for himself and the means of 
promoting the welfare of the race.”  What right did the 
government have to prevent man from tilling the soil when 
the directive to do so came from God?  In Grow’s view, the 
government had only to make the country’s abundant land 
available to those willing to farm it. 
 Building on his characterization of the existing 
system as feudal in nature, Grow launched a scathing attack 
on land speculation and speculators.  He portrayed them as 
preying on poor settlers who wished only to have a small 
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farm and a home and blasted his congressional colleagues 
for perpetrating a system that favored the strong over the 
weak.  “It is a struggle,” he dramatically stated, “between 
the bones and sinews of man and dollars and cents.”  In 
Grow’s estimate, many poor farmers paid speculators three 
or four hundred percent for a piece of land.  He concluded: 
“Why should not the legislation of the country be so 
changed as to prevent for the future the evils of land 
monopoly, by setting apart the vast and unoccupied 
territories of the Union, and consecrating them forever in 
free homes for free men?”244 
 Grow’s support of homestead legislation is telling for 
a number of reasons.  First, he was a Republican.  As shown 
in previous chapters, the young Republican party sought a 
homestead bill from its earliest days and, in fact, formed 
in the West as a coalition of those who hoped to restrict 
the spread of slavery and make land available to settlers.  
As Grow made his speech, the party was less than three 
months away from its nominating convention, at which it 
would write its 1860 national platform and select its 
presidential candidate.  The party would surely debate 
homestead legislation at its Chicago convention and seek to 
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include a plank favoring it in its platform.  The candidate 
selected would have to demonstrate support for a homestead 
bill or, at the very least, be able to live with running 
his campaign based on a platform that included advocacy of 
such a bill. 
Grow’s speech is also noteworthy in that it 
demonstrated how his party’s vision of homesteading had 
evolved over the years.  In its earliest days and, to some 
extent, even at the beginning of the 1860s, Republicans 
viewed homesteading strictly as a critical tie to their 
own—and the nation’s—Jeffersonian past.  Later, they added 
the incentive of providing free lands as a cure-all for 
urban poverty and overcrowding.  Now, however, their 
argument had evolved into an attack against land monopolies 
and speculators.  As historian Heather Cox Richardson 
stated, “Republicans believed that speculators blocked 
settlement, as well as squeezed capital from settlers.”245  
Passage of a homestead bill helped Republicans promote 
agriculture in the Jeffersonian tradition while building a 
national system of capital and commerce.  It was no 
coincidence that Republicans sought simultaneously to 
advance homesteading, a transcontinental railroad, land 
grant colleges, new taxes and tariffs, and a national 
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banking system.  While the benefits and virtues of farming 
for its own sake were real enough to Republicans, they 
regarded as critical to the country’s advancement the 
construction of a truly national system that would provide 
for commerce, communications, education, agriculture, and 
finance.  In this way, Grow and his fellow Republicans saw 
the homestead bill as not only a long-cherished goal, but 
also as a critical piece of building the nation and 
securing its future success.    
 Galusha Grow’s longtime support of homesteading 
legislation was based on his own personal history and 
geography.  His life began in a poor farming community in 
Connecticut.  His father died when Grow was young, leaving 
the family in dire financial straits.  The family moved 
west to Pennsylvania for better opportunities and prospered 
there.  Grow had personally seen how transformative 
westward migration and access to prime farmland could be, 
and he sought to extend that opportunity to all via 
homesteading.  Many early pro-homestead Republicans had 
similar life histories of westward movement.  These 
experiences likely influenced their advocacy of homestead 
legislation.246   
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 Just a week after Grow’s impassioned speech, 
Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois, himself a strong 
believer in the homestead idea, reported another piece of 
homesteading legislation from the House Committee on Public 
Lands.  Six days later, after surprisingly little debate, 
the House passed the bill by a 115 to 65 vote. Just one 
negative vote came from a free-state representative; just 
one positive vote came from a slave-state representative.247   
Senator James Mason of Virginia made clear that 
opposition to the homestead bill was a sectional issue, 
saying that Republicans supported the bill because “the 
great feature of this policy is…by means of the gratuitous 
distribution of the public lands, to preoccupy the 
Territories by population from the free States, and thus 
incidentally, but of necessity, to exclude slavery.”248  
Mason and many other southerners saw homestead legislation 
as an overtly political ploy by Republicans to keep slavery 
out of the territories.   
In this assessment, he was not necessarily wrong.  
While many Republicans truly believed in the virtues and 
advantages of a homestead bill, their party had, in fact, 
been founded on the single-minded purpose of prohibiting 
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the spread of slavery to the western territories.  A 
homestead act was one way to do just that.  If it pleased 
the many advocates of free land among their ranks and made 
them more loyal Republicans, so much the better.   
Despite the protests of Mason and other southerners, a 
compromise homestead bill passed both houses of Congress in 
May 1860.  It was not the perfect bill for which many 
advocates had so long argued.  It provided land only to 
household heads and imposed an up-front price of 25 cents 
per acre.  For those who saw no constitutional right for 
the government to distribute free land, this provision 
assuaged their concerns by requiring settlers to pay at 
least something for the property. 
In the Senate, future vice president and president 
Andrew Johnson was a key player in securing passage of this 
compromise.  In the pages of the New York Daily Tribune, 
longtime homestead advocate Horace Greeley offered measured 
praise: “The House of Representatives has finally consented 
to take a half loaf rather than no bread with regard to the 
Free Homesteads.… We do not object to taking this as an 
installment.… But, understand that this half loaf is 
accepted only for what it is, and that the friends of the 
Free Homesteads principle will not rest till their whole 
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object is attained.”249  Greeley saw the compromise bill as 
a better-than-nothing proposition that would still reduce 
land prices and take important steps toward reducing land 
speculation. 
Despite homestead advocates’ joy at finally passing a 
bill through both houses of Congress, they were well aware 
that President James Buchanan, a Pennsylvania Democrat, was 
unlikely to sign it.  The Senate version of the legislation 
went to the president on June 19; he returned a veto 
message on June 22.  In it, he expressed his personal doubt 
that Congress had the constitutional power to grant free 
land to settlers. Despite the nominal land price listed in 
the bill, Buchanan characterized the law as “an absolute 
and unqualified gift.”250   
He also worried that homesteads would prove injurious 
to veterans holding military land bounties and provide 
farmers with an unfair advantage over those in other lines 
of work.  “The mechanic who emigrates to the West and 
pursues his calling must labor long before he can purchase 
a quarter acre of land, whilst the tiller of the soil who 
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accompanies him obtains a farm at once by the bounty of the 
Government.”251 
Finally, Buchanan worried that land speculation would 
increase exponentially, not decrease, when lands were 
available for just 25 cents per acre.  “Men will not pay 
$1.25 for lands,” he wrote, “when they can purchase them 
for one-fifth of that price.”  He concluded his message by 
stating his belief that homestead legislation would go far 
toward undermining American individualism and its “noble 
spirit of independence” and lead to “pernicious social 
theories which have proved so disastrous in other 
countries.”252  Though he never mentioned slavery or 
sectional concerns, many felt sure he issued the veto in 
deference to his southern allies in the Democratic party. 
Horace Greeley and other longtime homestead supporters 
were enraged but not surprised.  “The Northwest was already 
so unanimously averse to him that he could only intensify 
its dislike into hatred; but that seems an object worthy of 
his ambition,” Greely wrote three days after the veto.  “So 
the last hope of obtaining any good from this Congress or 
this administration has vanished.  Shall we ever see their 
like again?”253 
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Republicans met in Chicago in May 1860 to select their 
presidential candidate and write their campaign platform.  
Sectional concerns ruled the convention, and issues of land 
distribution in the West, though secondary, received much 
attention as well.  Many Republicans stood firm in their 
desire to pass homestead legislation and viewed it as a way 
to keep southerners from carrying slavery into the West.    
Republicans also rejected any characterization of 
settlers taking advantage of a homestead bill as beggars or 
paupers.  Many homestead opponents had publicly stated over 
the years that anyone looking to obtain free land under a 
homestead act must be poor or lazy.  Republicans instead 
chose to view those willing to journey onto the frontier to 
establish small farms as rugged, noble yeoman in the 
tradition of Thomas Jefferson.  When the delegates 
completed the party’s platform, the thirteenth plank 
affirmed: “That we protest against any sale or alienation 
to others of the Public Lands held by actual settlers, and 
against any view of the Homestead policy which regards the 
settlers as paupers or supplicants for public bounty; and 
we demand the passage by Congress of the complete and 
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satisfactory Homestead measure which has already passed the 
House.”254   
The platform also contained measures supporting 
federal creation of a transcontinental railroad and 
national funding of harbor and river improvements.  In this 
platform, the Republican party reached back to its Whig 
roots to support internal improvements, promote commerce, 
and create agricultural opportunities.  They rejected 
outright anyone’s right to extend slavery into the western 
territories.  Plank eight asserted that “the normal 
condition of all the territory of the United States is 
freedom.… We deny the authority of Congress, of a 
territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give 
legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United 
States.”  The platform also condemned the reopening of the 
African slave trade, demanded immediate admittance of 
Kansas as a free state, and called the Democratic belief 
that the Constitution provided for slavery in the 
territories “dangerous political heresy.”255  Finally, the 
Republicans selected Abraham Lincoln as their presidential 
candidate. 
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The Democrats, meanwhile, met in Baltimore a few weeks 
after the Republicans and adopted a platform that did not 
address the homestead issue.  Democrats expressed support 
for a transcontinental railroad and called for immediate 
acquisition of Cuba.  They agreed to abide by any future 
Supreme Court decision on the right to carry slaves into 
the territories and called the actions by several state 
legislatures to avoid enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law 
“subversive of the Constitution and revolutionary in their 
effect.”256 
As the sectional crisis worsened during Lincoln’s 
campaign, Republicans paid less attention than usual to the 
homestead issue.  Lincoln himself never mentioned it in any 
writings or speeches after he became his party’s nominee.  
Yet some continued to raise the issue.  Horace Greeley kept 
the push for a homestead bill at the forefront in the New 
York Daily Tribune, and some notable Republicans mentioned 
it in speeches and letters.  Carl Shurz, a prominent German 
immigrant soon to become a Union general, addressed a St. 
Louis crowd and pointedly linked the slavery and land 
distribution issues in the mocking voice of a southerner: 
“We want the Negro in the territories.… Slavery cannot 
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exist except with the system of large farms, and your 
homestead bills establish the system of small farms with 
which free labor is inseparably connected.  We are, 
therefore, obliged to demand that all such mischievous 
projects be abandoned.”257 
Although the homestead bill received less attention 
during the 1860 campaign than it might have otherwise due 
to rising sectional tensions, the decades of agitation both 
for and against it contributed to those very tensions.  
Lincoln’s election to the presidency and the subsequent 
disappearance of southern Democrats from Congress seemed to 
guarantee that a new homestead bill would sail through the 
national legislature and be quickly signed into law.  In 
reality, it was not quite as easy as many Republicans 
assumed it would be.  However, as historian Benjamin Horace 
Hibbard noted, “The project of free land was, after March 
4, 1861, in the hands of its friends.”258 
 
President Lincoln called Congress into special session 
on July 4, 1861 to deal with the secession and rebellion of 
southern states.  During that special session, Republican 
Representative Cyrus Aldrich of Minnesota introduced yet 
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another homestead bill, which the House quickly referred to 
the Committee on Agriculture.  No further action was taken 
on it until the start of the next session of the 37th 
Congress.  Aldrich’s introduction of the bill during the 
special session called specifically to discuss raising 
troops and destroying the rebellion demonstrates just how 
serious many Republicans and westerners were about the 
issue.  They simply would not let such an optimal moment 
pass—one in which their party firmly controlled Congress 
and the presidency and during which no real southern 
opposition was present to block the legislation. 
On December 4, 1861, just two days after the second 
session began, Owen Lovejoy reported the homestead bill 
from the Committee on Agriculture to the full House of 
Representatives.  According to House procedure, he did so 
erroneously and improperly.  Several members of the House, 
including the “Copperhead” Clement Vallandingham of Ohio, 
called him on it.  Vallandingham served on the Committee on 
Public Lands, which was also at that moment crafting its 
own homestead measure.  While Lovejoy was in the wrong when 
he claimed to present the bill on behalf of the Agriculture 
committee, Vallandingham likely opposed him specifically to 
give his own committee more time to draft a bill to its 
liking.  Lovejoy may, in turn, have acted as he did to 
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stall Vallandingham’s bill.  Lovejoy and his ally in the 
homestead movement, Galusha Grow, now Speaker of the House, 
worried that Vallandingham and his committee would allow in 
their bill cash bounties for military members instead of 
the opportunity to claim homesteads after the war.  This 
would surely be unpopular with congressmen who worried 
about the government’s already shaky financial status and 
might make them less likely to approve homesteading 
legislation. 
Vallandingham called for Lovejoy’s bill to be referred 
to the Committee on Public Lands for further consideration. 
Naturally, Lovejoy objected.  He demanded that the House 
vote on the bill immediately.  Representative John Potter 
of Wisconsin, a Republican who was also a member of 
Vallandingham’s committee, publicly scolded Lovejoy: “I am 
surprised that the gentleman from Illinois should have 
taken the course he has, and I hope that any motion to 
refer the bill to the Committee on Public Lands 
prevails.”259  As a last-ditch effort, Lovejoy proposed that 
the bill be returned to his Committee on Agriculture, but 
he did not succeed.  The proposed legislation was instead 
sent to the Committee on Public Lands. 
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A week later, Potter reported the bill from the Public 
Lands Committee.  It was nearly identical to several that 
had passed the House in previous years.  The bill offered 
160 acres of unappropriated public land worth $1.25 per 
acre (or less) or 80 acres in areas where land was worth 
$2.50 per acre.  Small administrative fees aside, the land 
was cost-free.  The claimant needed only to stay on it and 
improve it for five years to obtain title to the land from 
the government.  Additionally, homestead lands could not be 
considered assets against any of the claimant’s debts until 
the title was earned.   
As Lovejoy, Grow, and others feared, however, the bill 
included the cash bounty provision for military service, 
offering $30 to any man who served three months or more 
during the rebellion crisis.260  Lovejoy rose before the 
House on December 10 to ask Potter once more to substitute 
the old bill for the new, noting that the old version was 
the true bill the Republicans supported and “without being 
pledged to which, the Republicans never could have elected 
their President.”261  Potter refused, and the Speaker of the 
House ended the debate. 
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The issue arose again on December 18 when 
Representative William S. Holman of Indiana spoke in favor 
of land bounties for soldiers rather than the cash bounties 
guaranteed them in the Potter version of the Homestead Act. 
Ohio’s Vallandingham, a Democrat, voiced his opposition to 
Holman’s idea and demanded immediate action on the current 
version of the bill.  “The effect of the homestead policy 
may, indeed, be to diminish the sales of those lands, and 
thereby the revenue,” Vallandingham told the House.  “But 
the answer to that is that the settlement of the lands 
increases their value, brings in a larger population, 
extends the basis of taxation, gives greater wealth, and 
thereby increases the resources of the state, and in this 
way returns to the Treasury, a much larger sum than would 
otherwise be received from the sale of the land.”262  
Surprisingly, Vallandingham sounded positively Republican 
as he urged a vote on the bill. 
Holman, Vallandingham, and others entered into a 
lengthy discussion about the bill on the House floor.  The 
Ohioan expressed opposition to offering both land and 
monetary bounties to soldiers and worried that, as often 
happened with soldier land warrants, speculators would 
gobble them up from military members who had no intention 
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of ever actually living on the granted land and instead 
would be happy to unload them for a price.  Vallandingham 
noted that ex-soldiers selling bounty warrants would be 
lucky to receive twenty cents per acre from speculators, 
while those same lands would increase in value ten times or 
more for taxation purposes if homesteaded.  “Let them have 
their bounty in money,” Vallandingham argued, “and then, 
also in common with every citizen, a free homestead in 
land.”263 
Justin Morrill of Vermont rose to speak and proposed 
postponing the entire homesteading debate.  Morrill still 
viewed the public domain as a potential source of income 
for the federal government and was not willing to see that 
source given away just yet.  “It must be admitted,” he 
stated, “that here at home…the public lands are a resource 
that is relied upon as a security for the payment of our 
public debt, and of the interest thereon.… It will be very 
disastrous to our public credit to part with any portion of 
our means at the present time.”264  Morrill was the long-
time champion of a land grant college bill, and many 
believed he spoke against the homestead measure because he 
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thought its approval threatened the chances of his pet 
legislation passing Congress. 
While some surely agreed with Morrill, the argument 
that the public lands were an important revenue source for 
the federal government was largely discredited or ignored 
by the early 1860s.  As evidenced in the arguments of 
several House members and senators, Republicans in 
particular felt sure that the public domain’s real value 
was in future tax revenues, not the few dollars per acre 
settlers initially paid for the lands.  When coupled with 
the Republicans’ strong interest in populating western 
lands with anti-slavery homesteaders, it is clear why the 
Homestead Act became a policy objective of the Republican-
dominated 37th Congress. 
Representative George Julian of Indiana rose to 
counter Morrill’s argument:  “It is shown by the report of 
the Secretary of the Interior that these public lands have 
paid but a few dollars more than the expense of keeping up 
the land system.  And I believe it is true that, during the 
last twelve or thirteen years, these lands have ceased to 
be of any practical or substantial benefit to the country 
as a source of revenue.  Our purpose is, or ought to be, to 
have them settled and improved, and thereby made the 
subject of taxation and the sources of wealth to the 
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Government.”265  Julian expressed the views of most, but 
certainly not all, Republicans.  He urged immediate action 
on the bill. 
Others who purported to favor homestead legislation 
worried less about the bill’s provisions and more about its 
timing.  John Covode of Pennsylvania argued that the bill 
should not go into effect until one year after the end of 
the Civil War.  He feared that passing the law immediately 
would “give the persons who decline to go into the service 
of the country an undue advantage over those who are now in 
the service.  They would have the opportunity to occupy the 
choice land, while the soldiers now engaged in the service 
are not in a position to avail themselves of the same 
privilege.”266 
Thomas M. Edwards of New Hampshire worried about 
weakening public credit in the midst of the war: “In the 
present condition of the country, there is…a question which 
takes precedence of this and of all other questions, and 
that is, the question of finance.  That question, as it 
controls the whole expenditure of money in this country 
today, so it should control, in my judgment, any 
disposition which should be made of the public domain.… If 
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we do not fight the battles of the country and maintain the 
integrity of the country and the continuance of the 
Government, we shall have no lands to bestow upon 
anybody.”267 
Both Samuel C. Fessenden of Maine and William D. 
Kelley of Pennsylvania fretted over disposing of public 
lands which they thought might prove profitable at some 
point in the future.  New York’s Roscoe Conkling wanted 
more time to ponder a land bounty system and cash bounties.  
“I think it will require an argument dexterous and strong 
to convince this House or the country that the way to 
improve our credit is to give away our property,” Conkling 
said.  “I believe, sir, that land is the basis of credit, 
and I believe…that at a period later than this we can judge 
better than we can judge now what it is prudent to do, if 
anything, in regard to the public domain.”268   
John J. Crittenden, a Kentucky Unionist, advocated for 
abandoning the homesteading debate altogether until the 
successful conclusion of the war: “We are now engaged in a 
war, the greatest war the world ever saw.  It is better for 
these very men whom you desire to benefit that you should 
reserve these lands and apply every dollar they can yield, 
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and make them yield as many dollars as you can, for the 
benefit of the Army.  They will be more benefited by that 
than by any such measure as this.”269  
Justin Morrill rose again and formally suggested 
postponing debate on the homestead bill until February 
1862.  Wisconsin’s John Potter was incredulous.  “I must 
confess my surprise,” he stated, “at the apparent change 
which has taken place upon the part of some gentlemen who 
have hitherto supported the homestead policy.”  In Potter’s 
mind, many of those now raising questions about the bill 
had in the past concurred that homesteading was a wise 
policy to adopt.  Why, he wondered, was the policy wise 
before but not so now?  “Pass this measure now,” he argued, 
“and before February next tens of thousands of these 
acres…may be occupied and made to contribute thereby to the 
aggregate wealth of the country from which the revenues of 
the Government are derived.”270 
Like Potter, Owen Lovejoy, who had labored so long for 
passage of a homestead bill, was distraught.  He despaired 
that postponing the bill would be its “final defeat.”  He 
accused the opponents of proposing the bounty amendment for 
that very purpose and seeking to be “courteous to kill it 
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indirectly than vote it down directly.”  To those with 
concerns about the effects the bill might have on the 
public credit, Lovejoy proclaimed that “everyone knows that 
cultivated real estate is a better basis of credit than 
uncultivated, and we shall derive more by that means than 
we can hope for from the sale of the lands if this bill is 
voted down.”271 
The House voted on Morrill’s postponement motion.  To 
the dismay of Potter, Lovejoy, and others, the motion 
carried, 88 to 50.  Congress shelved further debate on the 
Homestead Act until February 1862. 
Almost all of the Representatives seeking to amend the 
homestead bill or avoid voting on it altogether were 
eastern Republicans, yet all worried over various aspects 
of approving homestead legislation.  Any Republicans who 
felt confident that their domination of Congress and 
control of the presidency would make passage of a homestead 
bill easy were clearly mistaken.  While many House members 
agreed with Potter, Lovejoy, and others that immediate 
passage of the homestead bill was good policy for the 
nation, they must also have worried about the political 
consequences of the delay.  If the bill could be pushed 
aside in the name of concentrating on the war, it was 
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conceivable that it could be postponed indefinitely—or at 
least until the Union won the war.  Once the war ended, 
would a homestead bill be a high priority for a rebuilding 
nation?  By putting off the bill, were the Republicans 
squandering the advantage they held in Congress?  If 
homestead legislation could not pass now, could it ever?  
Why did a surprising number of Republicans oppose the bill?    
 
The House of Representatives resumed consideration of 
the Homestead Act on February 21, 1862.  House Speaker 
Galusha Grow, a longtime champion of the bill, took an 
unprecedented and dramatic step: he summoned Elihu B. 
Washburne of Illinois to the Speaker’s chair and descended 
to the House floor to speak in favor of the bill.  Grow 
reminded his colleagues that the bill had been discussed 
for years and approved by many different groups, including 
both houses of Congress, state assemblies, and national 
conventions.  “There has never,” he stated, “been a measure 
before Congress so emphatically approved by a majority of 
the American people.… I am aware that it was never very 
popular with the Representatives of that portion of the 
people now in rebellion.”   
To defuse the argument of those who still sought 
profit from the public domain, Grow quoted the Secretary of 
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the Interior as saying that the public lands no longer 
generated significant revenue for the government.  He also 
attempted to counter those seeking a bounty provision for 
soldiers, noting that Congress had already legislated cash 
bounties of one hundred dollars for Union troops at the end 
of their service.  “Whatever benefit the Government would 
confer upon the soldier, let it be made in a way to be a 
substantial advantage to him without being of lasting 
injury to anyone else.” 
Finally, Grow compared the noble yeoman farmer to the 
Union soldier in the field, calling them “the grand army of 
the sons of toil, whose lives, from the cradle to the 
grave, are a constant warfare with the elements, with the 
unrelenting obstacles of nature, and the merciless 
barbarities of savage life.  Their battlefields are on the 
prairies and wilderness of your frontiers; their 
achievements…smoothing the pathways of science and 
cultivation in their march over the continent.”  Would it 
not serve the best interests of the nation, Grow argued, to 
make as much of the public domain as possible available to 
these hearty souls that would simultaneously create 
millions of acres of new farmland as well as millions of 
acres of taxable property, saving them from “the grasp of 
speculation?” 
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Grow’s brief but dramatic speech concluded with a 
final plea on behalf of those would-be homesteaders.  “I 
submit…that the best disposition that can be made of the 
public domain is to set it apart and consecrate it forever 
in homes for freemen relieved from the burdens of unjust 
legislation, and secure in all their earnings with which to 
develop the elements of a higher and better 
civilization.”272  Here he harkened back not only to his own 
pro-Homestead Act speech from February 1860, but also to 
Thomas Jefferson’s statements on the nobility of yeomanry 
from nearly a century before.   
With his grand gesture of descending from the 
Speaker’s chair and his evoking of Jeffersonian vision, 
Grow undoubtedly hoped to inspire other members of the 
House to support the homestead bill when it came back up 
for debate.  His words must surely have been aimed 
particularly at fellow Republicans who had wavered in their 
support two months before.  Grow would only have to wait a 
week to determine the effect of his words and years of 
labor in the service of the homestead movement.  
The House resumed consideration of the bill on 
February 28.  Indiana Democrat William Holman immediately 
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rose and spoke at length about the lack of a land bounty 
provision in the current version of the bill.  He pledged 
his “unqualified support” of the homesteading idea but 
still felt compelled to speak up for the bounty provision 
as a just reward for those defending the Union on the 
battlefield.  He viewed soldier bounties as an investment 
in the future survival of liberty, saying that the children 
of those granted bounty lands “will become the noblest 
defenders of the Republic, because the soil on which they 
were reared was the gift of the Republic as the reward of 
the patriotism and valor of their fathers.”273   
In this speech, Holman also did a passable job of 
summing up opposition to homesteading of the southerners 
who were no longer in Congress to argue against it:  the 
Homestead Act would bring “new States into the Union, 
founded on the idea of free labor, and thus increase the 
preponderance of that form of labor in the control of the 
Federal Government, and because the revenue derived from 
the public lands diminished the duty on foreign imports, 
which the South, as a producing people, regarded favorable 
to their interests.”274 
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Another Indiana representative, James A. Cravens, also 
spoke in favor of the bounty amendment for soldiers.  Like 
Holman, Cravens professed his support for the homesteading 
idea:  “A homestead bill, well guarded, I think is a 
measure which involves more the prosperity of the western 
country than any measure that can be adopted by this 
House.… In southern Indiana…they believe that to be the 
wisest policy…which will bring into settlement and 
cultivation at the earliest practicable period all the 
uncultivated lands of the West.”275  Like Holman, Cravens 
professed to believe that those serving in uniform for the 
Union deserved some extra measure of consideration above 
the liberal provisions of the current version of the 
Homestead Act. 
William Windom of Minnesota responded to Holman and 
Cravens with a lengthy speech detailing the long and 
tortured history of the homestead bill in Congress.  He 
rejected the logic behind the soldier bounty amendment.  He 
pointed out that the current version of the bill made 
homestead lands available to both citizens and soldiers, 
and that those in military service for the Union would also 
receive a cash bounty of either thirty or one hundred 
dollars, depending on when and for what duration they 
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enlisted.  Therefore, according to Windom, the government 
was already pledged to “giving to all our soldiers a farm 
of one hundred and sixty acres, and the means of going to 
it and partially improving it.”276   
Providing additional bounties or warrants to soldiers 
was, in Windom’s assessment, unwise.  Most soldiers would 
likely seek to sell their warrants, and the current rate 
for such lands was usually less than fifty cents per acre.  
“What will they sell for when you issue 100,000,000 acres 
more?” Windom asked rhetorically.  With little or no 
additional demand and an increased supply of over one 
thousand percent, the warrants would rapidly lose value, 
and the soldiers to whom they were issued would get nothing 
for them.  Windom argued that this would help no soldiers, 
but only speculators.  “I am not willing,” he declared, 
“for the sake of making a pompous show of regard for the 
soldier, thus to inflict upon him an actual injury.”277 
Windom spoke at length and quoted numerous statistics 
to show that adopting a homestead policy without any 
additional land warrant or bounty provisions would actually 
increase the funds in the federal treasury more than sales 
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of public lands ever could.  He finished with a dramatic 
flourish worthy of Thomas Jefferson and Galusha Grow: 
Beyond the Mississippi—stretching away toward the setting 
sun, lies the most magnificent public domain on earth. 
Slumbering in its bosom is a giant energy of productiveness, 
which, if roused by the hand of industry, would pour the 
wealth of empires at our feet.  In our own country and a- 
mong the oppressed of Europe are millions with strong arms 
and brave hearts, who would gladly perform this task for 
you.  They need your lands, but have not the means to pur- 
chase them.  Your lands demand their industry, and the Gov- 
ernment wants the wealth which their toil would produce. 
Remove the barrier which a mistaken policy has interposed, 
and a wilderness transformed into teeming farms and thriving 
cities, a Treasury replenished, and the gratitude of loyal 
millions will be your reward.278   
 
 Wisconsin’s John Potter took the floor after Windom 
and offered his agreement with the Minnesotan’s sentiments.  
Potter expanded on the issue of the homestead bill’s 
potential appeal to European immigrants and argued for the 
most liberal version of the bill possible, which he hoped 
would “induce the emigrant to seek a home here, and invest 
his capital and direct his labor to the development of the 
now unproductive resources of the country.”279 
The House of Representatives then voted on the current 
version of the Homestead Act, which included the thirty 
dollar cash bounties for soldiers, and approved it by an 
overwhelming majority of 105 to 16.  Every single House 
                                                 
278 Ibid., p. 1,034. 
279 Speech of John F. Potter, Ibid., p. 1,035. 
216 
 
Republican voted “yea.”  Those voting “nay” were either 
Democrats (seven) or Unionists (nine).280 
After the February 28 vote, the House version of the 
bill went to the Senate on March 3.  There it was referred 
to the Committee on Public Lands.  James Harlan of Iowa 
chaired that committee, which also included Andrew Johnson 
of Tennessee, a longtime supporter of homestead 
legislation.  The bill seemed sure to sail through the 
committee and head to the full Senate for a vote.  However, 
President Lincoln soon appointed Johnson as military 
governor of Tennessee, so a sure “yea” vote disappeared.  
Unionist Senator Joseph Wright of Indiana replaced Johnson 
on the Committee on Public Lands.281 
The Senate committee held onto the bill for three 
weeks and appears to have heavily debated the cash bounty 
provision.  When the committee reported the bill to the 
full Senate on March 25, the soldier bounties had been 
deleted.  The Senate took no action on the bill until April 
30, when Benjamin Wade of Ohio moved that the bill be 
considered immediately.  However, after realizing that 
Senator Harlan, chair of the Committee on Public Lands, was 
                                                 
280 Roster of votes in Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1,035. 
281 Curry, Blueprint for Modern America, p. 106. 
217 
 
not present, Wade suggested postponing the debate until 
Harlan could attend.282 
The Senate took up debate on the bill on Friday, May 
2.  The bill was read, and the members approved several 
minor amendments affecting the wording of the legislation 
that the Committee on Public Lands recommended.  It was 
here that the provision was inserted preventing anyone who 
had borne arms against the United States from taking 
advantage of homesteading.  The full Senate also agreed to 
the Committee’s recommendation for removing the thirty 
dollar cash bounties for soldiers.283 
Unionist Senator John S. Carlile of Virginia then took 
the floor to oppose the homestead bill.  “I am opposed at 
all times,” he said, “and particularly at a time like the 
present, to disposing of the public domain of this country 
without adequate consideration.  I do not think it wise, 
when we rely upon loans for the means to defray the 
expenses of the Government, that we should dispose of any 
of the available property…out of which means could be had 
to enable us to repay those loans.”  Carlile worried that 
disposing of the public domain would eventually lead to tax 
increases on Americans.284  He clearly counted himself among 
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those who believed that land sales still amounted to a 
significant amount of the federal government’s income. 
Republican Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas requested time to 
speak on the homestead bill, which he received on Monday, 
May 5.  Pomeroy began by acknowledging the feeling among 
some of his fellow senators (not to mention House members) 
that it was not an opportune time to give away public lands 
due to the revenue they supposedly generated for the 
government.  He quickly eschewed that notion and noted that 
the funds the government generated from land sales were not 
even sufficient to cover the operating expenses of the land 
offices.  “What has been will be, as a general rule,” he 
told the Senate, and argued that the public domain would 
not in the future produce any significant profits for the 
federal government.  Besides, he argued, he did not believe 
the government should make profit from selling land any 
more than it should from “a sale of the air, or the 
sunshine.”285   
As Pomeroy continued, he railed against the 
speculators who sprang from indiscriminate land sales and 
called non-resident and non-occupant owners of lands “the 
greatest curse to a new country.”  The Homestead Act, he 
argued, would transfer land to actual settlers and 
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therefore discourage and prevent speculation.  “With one 
hundred and sixty acres of God’s free earth under a man in 
his own right, and genial skies above him, he shall not 
want.” 286 
Pomeroy then turned his attention to the place of 
slavery in the homesteading debate, something that few of 
his counterparts in either the House or Senate had done 
during this round of debate on the bill.  Coming from 
Kansas, Pomeroy was uniquely situated to discuss this 
aspect of the bill’s potential impact on American life.  He 
lamented the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its implicit 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise: “We soon witnessed a 
country containing land enough for an empire of itself, and 
as rich as the valley of the Nile, having been consecrated 
to freedom for more than thirty years by positive law, at 
once opened to the blighting influence of human slavery.”   
Like many of his Republican colleagues, he idealized 
the yeoman farmer and his role in the settlement of Kansas.  
“Freedom was secured in Kansas,” he told the Senate, “by 
being planted in the soil, set to growing upon each quarter 
section of land that we were able to hold.… Hence it is 
said that I would rather have the ‘free homestead bill’ as 
a measure to secure freedom to the Territories than the 
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reestablishment of the compromise line of 1820, or even the 
ordinance, reenacted, of 1787.”  Finally, after a long 
speech, he concluded.  “Having been occupied almost 
exclusively with matters pertaining to the war, I think we 
should not be insensible to the requirements of peace!”287  
In Pomeroy’s view, opening the public domain to 
homesteading was one such requirement. 
The next day, Tuesday, May 6, the Senate voted on the 
Homestead Act and passed it by a margin of nearly five to 
one.  As in the House, all Republican members voted for it.  
Just four Democrats and three Unionists voted against it.  
The Senate sent its version of the bill back to the House, 
where it was opened for debate again on May 12. 
Potter of Wisconsin moved that the House refuse to 
concur with the Senate’s amendments to the bill and called 
for a conference committee with the Senate.  Speaker of the 
House Galusha Grow placed Potter himself, Republican Cyrus 
Aldrich of Minnesota, and Unionist Edwin Webster of 
Maryland on the conference committee.  The Senate agreed to 
the committee, and President Pro Tem Solomon Foot named 
Republican Senators Harlan of Iowa, Daniel Clark of New 
Hampshire, and Unionist Joseph A. Wright of Indiana to the 
committee.  After three days of meetings, the committee’s 
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recommendations were reported to Congress.  Nearly all of 
the Senate’s stated changes—including the deletion of the 
soldier cash bounties—remained.288  Both houses agreed, and 
Congress finally passed the Homestead Act. 
 
President Abraham Lincoln signed the Homestead Act 
into law on May 20, 1862.  It was the culmination of nearly 
a century of debate and agitation.  Strangely, for all of 
the newspaper ink spilled over those many decades arguing 
either for or against it, the bill’s passage attracted 
little attention from the national press.  Dispatches from 
the battlefields of the eastern and western theaters of war 
dominated the news as usual.  Many Republicans in Congress 
quickly moved on to other pressing business and spent no 
time gloating over the victory or even thinking much about 
the bill one way or the other.  Little could they know just 
how strongly their approval of the Homestead Act would 
affect the future course of the nation in ways both good 
and bad. 
The Act went into effect the following January 1 and 
remained active for the next 123 years.  Few pieces of 
legislation ever passed by Congress have lasted as long or 
impacted so many people and aspects of American life.  
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Historians today continue to debate the positive and 
negative aspects of the Homestead Act, as well as its 
overall success as a national policy.  However, while few 
consider it unimportant in American history, until now even 
fewer have recognized it as a major issue in the decades-
long sectional disputes that culminated in the Civil War. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Neither Abraham Lincoln nor any of his Republican 
colleagues had any idea how long the Homestead Act would 
remain in effect or how influential it would be.  In fact, 
on January 1, 1863, when the Act became effective, it was 
barely front page news.  Instead, the long-awaited 
enactment of the Emancipation Proclamation dominated news 
coverage that day, as did continued casualty lists from the 
recent Union defeat at Fredericksburg.  The Emancipation 
Proclamation changed the course of the Civil War and 
American society, formally establishing the abolition of 
slavery as a Northern war aim.  Its importance cannot be 
understated, either in 1863 or in the nearly 150 years 
since. 
 The Homestead Act, while perhaps less newsworthy at 
the beginning of 1863, remained in effect for the next 123 
years, ending only with the 1976 passage of the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act.  (The law included a 
special 10-year extension on homesteading in Alaska.)  
Thirty of the nation’s fifty states eventually had 
homestead lands within their borders.  According to U.S. 
Department of the Interior figures, homesteaders made two 
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million claims and acquired 270 million acres of land.289  
This equals the settlement of about ten percent of the 
total land area of the United States. 
 The Homestead Act represented unprecedented 
opportunity in many different ways.  It meant land and 
farms for the poor that could not afford them otherwise.  
It represented small steps toward social equality for women 
(who could acquire and own land in their own names under 
the law) and African Americans, be they former slaves or 
not.  Immigrants from nearly anywhere could come to the 
United States and acquire homestead lands even before 
becoming American citizens. 
 Of course, the Homestead Act was not perfect.  It 
openly discriminated against Chinese immigrants and, 
initially, American Indians.  Congress eventually amended 
the law to open homestead lands to natives, but doing so 
basically constituted just one more way to force them to 
become white Christian farmers and take back reservation 
lands.  The Homestead Act was a lose-lose for American 
Indians. 
 Still, the Homestead Act has gotten a bad rap over the 
years.  Historians have almost universally called it a 
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failure based simply on the fact that only about forty 
percent of those who claimed homesteads completed the five-
year process and earned title to their land.  Does the 
success rate of homesteaders constitute the only measure of 
the Act’s success?  This is purely subjective.  Did more 
than half of all homesteaders fail to “prove up” on their 
claims?  They did.  Did the law fail to meet some of the 
Republican Party’s settlement and political objectives?  It 
did.  Did homesteading represent yet another in a long line 
of lies and disappointments to American Indians?  It did. 
 The Homestead Act succeeded in other ways, though.  It 
was an issue around which early Republicans could coalesce 
at a time when they did not always agree on the proper 
course to deal with slavery.  Later, when Republicans held 
both Congress and the White House, they viewed the Act as a 
way to direct the future course of settlement in the West 
and, in tandem with other legislation, forever alter the 
American economy, development, education, and commerce. 
 As demonstrated in this work, the idea of free land 
distribution by the United States government existed from 
the nation’s earliest days.  It had been a major political 
issue since the American Revolution.  Ideas about the 
proper way for the government to distribute land changed 
and evolved as the country acquired more territory and 
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began to discuss and disagree about slavery.  Homesteading 
eventually became a key component of Republican ideology, 
though Southern secession was required to finally ensure 
the passage of the bill.  This is fitting since the debate 
over homesteading had caused so much contention in the 
halls of Congress over the years and had become so linked 
with the arguments about the westward expansion of slavery. 
 From the time of the Missouri Compromise forward, land 
distribution, slavery expansion, and homesteading were all 
related and debated simultaneously.  These debates 
increased over the next forty years, until blood was 
finally shed.  The Homestead Act’s role in bringing about 
the Civil War has been mostly ignored or downplayed until 
now.  However, it can no longer be denied that the “free 
land” idea was a contributor to the long national debate 
about slavery, the creation of the Republican Party and, 
consequently, the onset of the Civil War. 
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